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Synopsis 
 
This thesis explores the political, economic and cultural transformation of the Loango Coast 
during the era of the transatlantic slave trade from the point of contact with Europeans in the 
sixteenth century until the end of the eighteenth century, with particular focus on the 
eighteenth century. While a number of previous studies of the West Central African slave trade 
have focused principally on the role of the Portuguese on the Angola Coast, this thesis makes a 
new contribution by evaluating the balance of power between Dutch and Loango Coast 
merchant communities. In doing so, this thesis concludes that well into the eighteenth 
century, local African religious and political traditions remained relatively unchanged on the 
Loango Coast, especially in comparison to their southern neighbours in Angola. Drawing upon 
detailed records compiled by the Middelburgse Commercie Compangie (MCC), the thesis 
builds upon an original database which accounts for approximately 10,000 slaves sold by 640 
identified African merchants to the Dutch Middelburg Company over the course of 5,000 
transactions. 
Expanding upon the work of Phyllis Martin and other scholars, this thesis highlights a 
distinction between the Loango and the Angola coasts based on models of engagement with 
European traders; furthermore, it draws attention to the absence of European credit data in 
the MCC slave purchasing balance sheets; and, finally, it explores the difficulties involved in 
procuring slaves via long distance trade. While making extensive use of the Slave Voyages 
Database, this study also seeks to move beyond the European focused studies of shipping 
patterns to begin to discover the identities of the African traders. In doing so, the thesis 
provides the first comprehensive list of African merchants in the eighteenth century. This list 
of African merchants also reinforces fragmented lists of rulers for the polities of Loango, 
Kakongo, and Ngoyo, and also gives us a more concrete picture of the role of the principal 
traders on the coast, Mafouks, in the eighteenth century. Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the thesis emphasises the large numbers of relatively small African investors in 
the trade, giving names and faces to the minor merchants of the slave trade. Consequently, 
African merchants stop being depicted only as amorphous interchangeable figures in the 
history of the transatlantic slave trade and begin to gain identities comparable to those of their 
European counterparts. 
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Introduction 
 
Between 1514 and 1865, approximately 12.5 million enslaved Africans entered the Atlantic World 
via the transatlantic slave trade.1 This massive forced migration transformed coastal communities 
throughout the Atlantic Ocean and beyond. Europeans acted as brokers in the redistribution of 
goods from Europe, and later Asia and the Americas, in exchange for enslaved labourer to develop 
the Americas. Thus, the transatlantic slave trade was truly a global phenomenon which was 
facilitated by European advances in shipping technology in the Early Modern period. During this 
period the Loango Coast, Africa’s Atlantic coastline north of the mouth of the Congo River to the 
Equator, emerged an important market of exchange.  
According to the Transatlantic Slave Voyages Database (hereafter the Voyages Database), the first 
known transatlantic slaving voyage departed the African Coast with a cargo of slaves in 1514. 
Unlike the more famous transatlantic voyages to come later, this ship was in search of labourers 
for use in Europe not the Americas. The voyage was undertaken by a Portuguese ship. This ship 
embarked an estimated 237 slaves at the Congo River, the southern boundary of the Loango 
Coast. An estimated 168 of these slaves disembarked in Vigo, Spain, the remaining 69 slaves 
having died en route.2 In 1865 the last transatlantic voyage recorded in the Slave Voyages 
Database, whose area of slave embarkation is known, set sail for the Congo River. This vessel’s 
name was the Cicerón, a steamship built in Liverpool. Although a British built ship, the ship’s last 
slaving voyage began in Cadiz, Spain. Mesquita directed this voyage as the ship’s captain. The ship 
docked in the Congo River where it embarked an estimated 1,265 enslaved Africans. Upon its 
arrival in Cuba, 1,004 slaves remained to be disembarked.3 These two voyages, which bookend the 
Slave Voyages Database, highlight the continuity of trade on the Loango Coast while 
                                                          
1 The Transatlantic Slave Voyages Database. http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces 
Accessed on 8 September 2011. 
 
2 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West 
Central Africa. Accessed on 23 May 2010. 
 
3 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query: Voyage Identification Number - 5052. 
Accessed on 23 May 2010. 
 
7 
 
simultaneously drawing our attention to the economic and technological advances which evolved 
as a result of continued contact between the four continents of the Atlantic world. 
Stretching from Cape Lopez in the north to the Congo River in the south, the Loango Coast is best 
known for its three slave trading ports, Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda Bay, which serviced 
the transatlantic slave trade between 1660 and 1867. Although Europeans frequented the coast 
before this time, they came primarily in search of cloth, ivory, redwood, and elephant tails. In this 
early period, trade policy was defined by Loango, the dominant polity to the north of the Congo 
River. In the 1660s, the external trade of the Loango Coast shifted definitively from products to 
people. Between 1660 and 1810, the French, English, and Dutch were the dominant trading 
partners of the merchants on the Loango Coast. During this period at least 475,000 slaves entered 
the transatlantic slave trade through Loango Coast ports. This was the formative stage in slave 
trading on the Loango Coast, when the mechanisms of long-distance slave trade were established. 
Between 1811 and 1867 a further 1.3 million slaves are recorded to have passed through these 
ports on Portuguese, Brazilian, and American ships which made the Loango Coast one of the top 
four transatlantic slave trading regions in Africa.4 Despite its importance as a site of cross-cultural 
exchange in the early-modern world and its major contribution to the Atlantic world via the 
transatlantic slave trade, the Loango Coast has not excited much scholarly interest. 
Using slave trading negotiations to measure the tempos of change, this thesis uses the 
understudied topic of the eighteenth century Loango Coast to create a more nuanced 
understanding of: 
 the economic and political geography of the Transatlantic slave trade in Western Africa; 
 the role of political structures in Africa in mediating European influence; 
 the significance of key features of cross cultural encounters and patterns of exchange; 
 the structure of day-to-day transactions of European and African slave traders; 
                                                          
4 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, 
Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, Malembo, Mayumba, and Mpinda. Accessed on 8 
August 2011. These figures are the raw data rather than the estimates provided by the database. For a more 
complete explanation of why the raw data, rather than the estimates, are used throughout this thesis see 
Sources and Methodology below. 
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 and, the implications of these transactions for comprehending credit arrangements and 
economic markets. 
Two main lines of inquiry develop these themes. The first compares and contrasts experiences on 
the Loango Coast with parallel experiences in cross-cultural exchange in other African coastal 
settlements which participated in the transatlantic slave trade, but it also sometimes involves 
looking further afield to European trading networks. The second line of inquiry looks more closely 
into the specific practices and procedures which governed trading relationships in Loango. Despite 
the major contribution of Loango to the overall slave trade, there have been surprisingly few 
studies that have specifically focused upon this region. By focusing upon trading records and 
associated activities, this thesis generates additional insights about a region about which 
historians currently know relatively little. In this introductory chapter, I will primarily focus on the 
first of these two lines of inquiry, by offering a preliminary analysis of the types of literatures and 
subject areas to which this thesis aims to contribute. 
Defining the Study Area: West Central Africa 
From the 1980s onwards, a growing literature has examined the crucial role of West Central Africa 
in the transatlantic slave trade. This now-substantial literature has demonstrated the scope of the 
transatlantic slave trade, impact of this trade both demographically and economically, and the 
methods of procuring and selling slaves from West Central Africa into the Atlantic World, but it has 
also tended to favour Portuguese archives and Portuguese activities. This Lusophone orientation 
has contributed to a general neglect of the Loango Coast. While the Portuguese dominated the 
southern Angolan slave trade, the Loango Coast emerged as an ‘open trade’ zone that saw the 
British, French, and Dutch all play key roles. By chiefly focusing upon the Portuguese, recent 
historians have rarely engaged with Loango in a systematic fashion, but have instead primarily 
concentrated on activities south of the mouth of the Congo River. Significantly, most of the main 
sources on Loango were published in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This thesis will add to a growing body of literature on West Central Africa. Joseph Miller, John 
Thornton, Linda Heywood, and José Curto are among the scholars whose research has focused 
more dominantly on Portuguese sources and therefore develop a picture with Luanda at the 
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center. The works of Mariana Candido and Roquinaldo Ferreira have focused on Benguela on the 
southern periphery of Portuguese control. 5 Furthermore, Jan Vansina and Robert Harms have 
engaged in studies of the riverine trading communities in the interior of West Central Africa. 
However, this thesis points to the Loango Coast as an integrated yet separate part of the West 
Central African coast as a whole.6 The single most significant work on this topic remains Phyllis 
Martin’s 1972 book: The External Trade of the Loango Coast, 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing 
Commercial Relations of the Vili Kingdom of Loango. In this book, Martin compiled and analysed 
descriptions of political, economic, and religious institutions on the Loango Coast through 
exploring the unpublished journals and published narratives of European travellers and traders 
over a period of three centuries. During this period Martin suggests that the polity of Loango grew 
                                                          
5 Mariana Candido, Fronteras de la Esclavización: Esclavitud, Comercio e Identidad en Benguela, 1780-1850 
(Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico Press, 2011); Mariana Candido, "Transatlantic Links: Benguelan-Bahian 
Connections, 1700-1850," in Ana Lucia Araujo (ed.) Paths of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Interactions, Identities, 
and Images (Amherst, NY: Cambria, 2011); Mariana Candido, "Different Slave Journeys: Enslaved African 
Seamen on Board of Portuguese Ships, c. 1760-1820," Slavery and Abolition, 31, 4 (2010) pp. 395-409; 
Mariana Candido, “Trade, Slavery and Migration in the Interior of Benguela: the case of the Caconda, 
1830-1870,” Beatrix Heintz and Achim von Oppen (eds.) Angola on the Move: Transport Routes, 
Communications, and History (Frankfurt: Otto Lemberck Publishers, 2008); Mariana Candido, “Merchants 
and the Business of the Slave Trade in Benguela, c. 1750-1850,” African Economic History, 35 (2007) pp. 
1-30; José C. Curto, Enslaving Spirits: The Portuguese-Brazilian Alcohol Trade at Luanda and its Hinterland, c. 
1550-1830 (Boston: Brill, 2004); Roquinaldo Ferreira, “The Suppression of the Slave Trade and Slave 
Departures from Angola, 1830s-1860s,” in David Eltis and David Richardson (eds.) Extending the Frontiers: 
Essays on the New transatlantic Slave Trade Database (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) pp. 313-334; 
Roquinaldo Ferreira, “The Atlantic Networks of the Benguela Slave Trade (1730-1800),” in Centro de Estudos 
Africanos do Porto (CEAP) (ed.) Trabalho Forçado Africano: Experiências Coloniais Comparadas (Lisboa: 
Campo das Letras, 2006), pp. 66-99; Joseph C. Miller “The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves in 
the Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade,” Social Science History. Vol. 13, No. 4, (1989) pp. 381-419; 
Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); John Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (New York: 
Routledge, 2003); and, John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic world, 1400-1680 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
6 Robert Harms, Games Against Nature: An Eco-Cultural History of the Nunu of Equatorial Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Robert Harms, River of Wealth, River of Sorrow: The Central Zaire Basin 
in the Era of the Slave and Ivory Trade (London: Yale University Press, 1981); Robert Harms, “Sustaining the 
System: Trading Towns along the Middle Zaire,” in Claire C. Robertson and Martin A. Klein (eds.) Women and 
Slavery in Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) pp. 95-110; Jan Vansina, Paths in the 
Rainforests (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990); Jan Vansina, The Tio Kingdom of Middle Congo, 
1880-1892 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savannah (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); Jan Vansina, ‘Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa’ in The 
Journal of African History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1962) pp. 375-390; and, Jan Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes in 
Central Africa,” The Journal of African History, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1962) pp. 375-390. 
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to its height in the mid-seventeenth century, and diminished in the eighteenth century due to the 
growing economic and therefore political independence of the lesser polities of Ngoyo and 
Kakongo which controlled the ports of Cabinda and Malemba respectively. 
Although Martin acknowledges the diminishing political influence of Loango in the eighteenth 
century, this thesis argues that the patterns of external trade developed on the Loango Coast in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries persisted in the eighteenth century.7 Thus, in the 
eighteenth century the Loango Coast remained a common economic region and continued to 
develop trade strategies within a common framework. This thesis further argues that this 
standardization may have persisted so as to not interrupt a common system of external trade 
which was developed between Europeans and Loango merchants in an earlier period. 
David Birmingham’s book, Central Africa to 1870, gives a prominent place to Loango as a growing 
economic power in the seventeenth century while acknowledging its relative autonomy in 
comparison to the Angola Coast. Birmingham’s conclusions about the Loango Coast mirror Phyllis 
Martin’s:  
 Loango was more successful in retaining its integrity, and in controlling its economic 
relations with the Atlantic powers. As the political and economic strength of Loango 
increased, so its influence spread into the northern interior. At the end of the seventeenth 
century, when the Kongo had virtually disappeared as a commercial kingdom, Loango 
extended its economic control to dominate a new pattern of southern trade routes as 
well.8  
In 1981 Birmingham wrote: “The study of history came late to Central Africa but is now developing 
rapidly” suggesting that the newness of the study in this region had resulted in an enthusiasm and 
                                                          
7 Phyllis M. Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial 
Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 29-32. 
 
8 David Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870: Zambezia, Zaïre and the South Atlantic, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981Press1981), p. 53. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this book are a reprint of Birminghams earlier 
chapters in the Cambridge History of Africa Volumes 3, 4, and 5, first published in 1977, 1975, and 1976 
respectively. 
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openness in the field.9 Since this time two studies of historical religious practices on the Loango 
Coast have been published: Frank Hagenbucher-Sacripanti’s Les Fondements spirituels du pouvoir 
au royaume de Loango and Zdenka Volavka’s Crown and Ritual: The Royal Insignia of Ngoyo. While 
both studies delve into the oral traditions of the Loango Coast in an attempt to explain the origins 
of religious practices, both studies are primarily dependent on evidence collected in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hagenbacher-Sacripanti’s study uses the frameworks of oral 
traditions to inform his analysis of religious practices on the Loango Coast. These oral traditions 
point to the Kongo, south of the Congo River, as the origin of the polities of Loango, Kakongo, and 
Ngoyo.10  Volavka’s study focuses more narrowly on the polity of Ngoyo.  In contrast to 
Hagnbucher-Sacripanti’s focus on oral traditions, Volavka’s exploration of the Ngoyo shrine of 
Lusunsi is viewed through the prism of art history. Her analysis centers on a basket of copper 
objects collected by Constantin Tastevin at Cabinda in the 1930s and later deposited in the Musée 
de l’Homme, Laboratoire d’Ethnologie, Département de l’Afrique noire. While Volavka’s 
conclusions were obscured by her premature death in 1990 before the finalization of her 
manuscript, Volavka’s basic argument was that the objects of insignia found at the shrine of 
Lusunsi provide evidence of two periods of political authority preceding the foundation of the 
Ngoyo polity: the first period being organized by élite associations of blacksmiths and the second 
being the creation of matriclan leadership.  
Volavka’s observations closely mirror those of Jan Vansina’s 1990 book Paths in the Rainforests: 
Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa. Primarily using the evolution of Bantu 
languages as a guide, Vansina traces political transitions in West Central Africa from the arrival of 
the Bantu speakers circa 1000 B.C. until the beginning of colonization in the late nineteenth 
century. In doing so, Vansina advances a rough timeline for the development of political traditions 
in this region. Through this exercise Vansina concludes that while European contact up to 1880 
radically expanded markets and challenged traditional structures, the crises which developed were 
equalized using innovations based on local political traditions rather than innovations from 
                                                          
9 Ibid., vii. 
10 Frank Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, Les Fondements spirituels du pouvoir au royaume de Loango (Paris: Office 
de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1973), p. 22. 
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Europe. These innovations expanded upon existing matrilineal, kin, and association models which 
predated European contact. To illustrate this type of innovation Vansina uses the example of 
caravan routes which built upon the tradition of parties of tribute bearers for long distance travel. 
This method of travel was adapted to suit the needs of long distance trade. 11 This thesis expands 
upon the economic and political transitions outlined by Vansina and Volavka in a specific case 
study of the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, particularly focusing on the transition of 
power from the traditional authorities, the Maloango, Mangoyo, and Manikakongo, to the 
economic brokers, the Mafouks. Like Vansina, this thesis finds that while contact with Europeans 
provided stimulus for change, change was mediated by local matrilineal traditions of authority.  
Historical Approaches to the Transatlantic Slave Trade 
In the last five decades the field of African history has expanded rapidly. Spurred on by the 
American civil rights movement and the decolonization of Africa and given an academic voice in 
Philip Curtin’s 1969 book The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, historians, anthropologists, 
archaeologists, and linguists have sought with increasing energy to explore Africa through 
examining European documents, recording oral histories and traditions, collecting artifacts, 
studying language, and tracing the movements of peoples.12 The proliferation of African ports in 
the Atlantic coast region features in a growing body of historical literature. Some of the most 
substantial contributions on African merchant communities explore the transformation of the 
Atlantic ports of Ouidah, Calabar, Bonny, Lagos, Luanda and Benguela. Robin Law’s Ouidah focuses 
on the formation of Ouidah first as a Hueda settlement and later, after the Hueda were defeated, 
as a Dahomey village which grew in importance as a point of cross-cultural trade upon the arrival 
of Europeans on the coast. He traces its evolution through the slave trade to the free trade period. 
Law suggests the eventual success of Ouidah over its neighbours was partly due to fluctuations in 
the internal political system, partly due to convenience of location, and partly due to the evolution 
of relationships of trust. Furthermore, he argues that if Ouidah emerged as a neutral port it was 
                                                          
11 Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforests: Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990) p. 200. 
12 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1969). 
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due to European rather than African design.13 This offers an interesting counterpoint to the study 
of the Loango Coast as the focus of trade shifts from Loango Bay in the early commodity trade to 
Cabinda in the slave trade. However, this study suggests that unlike Ouidah, it was the stability of 
the Loango Coast which contributed to the effective supply of the external trade with Europeans, 
and that neutrality, or non-preference among trade partners, was an indigenous rather than 
European innovation. 
Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson’s articles on Calabar and Bonny analyse the development of 
mechanisms of trade in this region and are particularly interested in the role of credit in the 
transatlantic slave trade. Of particular importance to this thesis is the model of transatlantic trade 
developed in Lovejoy and Richardson’s chapter “African Agency and the Liverpool Trade.” Based 
on evidence from Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast, and the Bight of Biafra, they divide European 
strategies of trade in Africa into three categories: a system based on trust, a system guaranteed by 
a central authority, and a system based on pawning.14 This thesis suggests that evidence from the 
Loango Coast presents a fourth more complex strategy of trade which builds upon Lovejoy and 
Richardson’s second category of trade guaranteed by a centralized government. This strategy 
involves the support of a centralized government in combination with a barter-based, ship trade, 
with elements of internal financing. Furthermore, it argues that this trade strategy was the result 
of active negotiation between African and European merchants, and as such, it evolved to 
accommodate the expectations and limitations of both trading partners. 
                                                          
13 Robin Law, Ouidah: The Social History of a West African Slaving ‘Port’, 1727-1892 (Oxford: James Curry, 
2004) p.48. 
 
14 Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, “African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade,” in David 
Richardson, Suzanne Schwarz and Anthony Tibbles (eds.) Liverpool and Transatlantic Slavery (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2007) pp. 43-65. Also see: Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, “'This Horrid 
Hole': Royal Authority, Commerce and Credit at Bonny, 1690-1840” The Journal of African History, Vol. 45, 
No. 3 (2004) pp. 363-392; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, “The Business of Slaving: Pawnship in 
Western Africa, c. 1600-1810” The Journal of African History, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2001) pp. 67-89; Paul E. Lovejoy 
and David Richardson, “Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations of the Old 
Calabar Slave Trade” The American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (Apr., 1999) pp. 333-355; Paul E. 
Lovejoy and David Richardson, “British Abolition and its Impact on Slave Prices Along the Atlantic Coast of 
Africa, 1783-1850” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Mar., 1995) pp. 98-119; and, Paul E. 
Lovejoy and David Richardson, “Competing Markets for Male and Female Slaves: Prices in the Interior of 
West Africa, 1780-1850” The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1995) pp. 
261-293. 
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In Kristin Mann’s 2007 book Slavery and the birth of an African city: Lagos, 1760-1900, Mann 
attributes the rise of Lagos “from a minor coastal kingdom into an Atlantic port” to the security of 
its location, the proximity to a steady supply of slaves, and “policies and acumen of its political and 
commercial elite.” However, she suggests that this new found commercial wealth fuelled existing 
power struggles and undermined the strength of the polity in the long term. 15 In contrast, the 
Loango Coast offered three primary ports, two of which, Loango and Cabinda, offered safe 
anchorage and one, Malemba, which required anchorage a fair distance from shore. None of these 
ports were particularly close to a steady supply of slaves. Nevertheless, the merchants of the 
Loango Coast were able to provision a substantial number of slaving voyages. This thesis offers 
support to Phyllis Martin’s argument that the economic success of the Loango Coast ports lay 
partially in their ability to generate competition among European traders, and later among traders 
from the Americas as well. While the support structures which were built up on the Loango Coast 
to facilitate the transatlantic slave trade temporarily buffered the long term culturally 
transformative effects of cross-cultural exchange, these buffers had begun to weaken by the end 
of the eighteenth century. In terms of the political impact of the transatlantic slave trade, this 
thesis finds that while the end of the slave trade destabilized the power structure of the Loango 
Coast, during the eighteenth century political institutions on the Loango Coast were able to create 
a barrier between European traders and local communities, slowing the rate of change stimulated 
by cross-cultural exchange and the inevitable transformation of local societies. 
Mariana Candido’s book, Fronteras de Esclavización: Esclavitud, Comercio e Identidad en Benguela, 
1780-1850, focuses on the migration of people to and from Benguela. Candido argues that the 
transatlantic slave trade transformed the identity of the people in Benguela and its hinterland by 
creating new paths of migration and new forms of commerce.  New people brought new culture 
and religious practices which mixed with the old.16 Candido’s emphasis on religious and cultural 
change concurs with the findings of Linda Heywood and John Thornton in Central Africans, Atlantic 
                                                          
 
15 Kristin Mann, Slavery and the birth of an African city: Lagos, 1760-1900 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2007) p. 313. 
 
16 Mariana P. Candido, Fronteras de la Esclavización: Esclavitud, Comercio e Identidad en Benguela, 
1780-1850 (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico Press, 2010). 
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Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1660.17 In a more focused study of the impact 
of the European and Brazilian trade goods which were exchanged for slaves, José Curto’s Enslaving 
Spirits has argued that the Luanda sub-region of West Central Africa received a remarkably high 
proportion of alcohol which in turn led to increased alcohol consumption in trade centres and 
eventually led to “a serious socio-economic and health problem for increasing numbers of 
Angolans” that persists to this day.18 Thus, the impact of the transatlantic slave trade reached 
beyond the losses of enslaved Africans to the transformation of African communities themselves. 
Using the intensity of cultural change and the growing demand for foreign trade goods at Luanda 
and Benguela during the transatlantic slave trade as a point of comparison, this thesis explores the 
impact of this trade on the communities of the Loango Coast. It concurs with Heywood and 
Thornton’s findings that the Loango Coast experienced a lesser degree of cultural transformation 
than the Angola Coast. Furthermore, this thesis argues that this continuation of traditional cultural 
norms runs parallel to the continued use of traditional problem solving strategies in the political 
spheres of the Loango Coast.  
Within this literature, this thesis will provide a model of contact between the MCC and the traders 
of the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century against which other models of contact can be 
compared and contrasted.  This comparison will enable a greater understanding of the 
negotiations and transformations which took place in pre-colonial African history. Using the 
transatlantic slave trading records of Loango Coast merchants and the merchants of a privately 
owned Dutch trading company, the Middelburgse Commercie Compangie (hereafter the MCC), 
this thesis identifies 640 African agents in the slave trade and explores their potential sources of 
slaves, the hierarchy structure among local traders, and the increasing influence of the wealthiest 
slave traders in the political arena. In doing so, it makes a major contribution to the identity of 
African agents, the slaves themselves, and the cultures in which they interacted. This is the first 
study of the Western African transatlantic slave trade to achieve this level of detail in the 
identification Europe’s African trading partners. Furthermore, this thesis explores the 
                                                          
17 Linda M. Heywood and John K. Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the 
Americas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
18 Curto, Enslaving Spirits, p. 185-201. 
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transformation in African political structures at the peak of the transatlantic slave trade in West 
Central Africa. 
Situating the Loango Coast in Atlantic History 
Beyond these questions surrounding economic and cultural impact of the slave trade on West 
Central Africa’s development lays the debate about the demographic impact of the transatlantic 
slave trade in Western African and the broader Atlantic World. Prominent voices in this debate 
include David Eltis, Joseph Miller, Walter Rodney, Joseph E. Inikori, and Paul E. Lovejoy. David Eltis 
has suggested that the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on African communities has been 
overemphasised: “The slave trade for most regions and periods was not a critically important 
influence over the course of African history. At the very least, those who place the slave trade as 
central to West African and west-central African history should be able to point to stronger 
common threads, if not themes, across African regions than have so far come to light.”19 In Way of 
Death, Joseph Miller has argued that while the transatlantic slave trade did not decrease “local 
artisanal or industrial output” in the agricultural regions of West Central Africa that it encouraged 
a dependency on European trade: “The quest for imports, once begun, thus tended to gain 
uncontrollable momentum in these areas, and the rate of importing, while not destroying local 
production, created a kind of political dependence on foreign trade.”20 Walter Rodney represents 
perhaps the most extreme position among his colleagues, arguing that “the process by which 
captives were obtained on African soil was not a trade at all. It was through warfare, trickery, 
banditry and kidnapping. When one tries to measure the effect of European slave trading on the 
African continent, it is very essential to realize that one is measure the effect of social violence 
rather than trade in any normal sense of the word.”21 Joseph E. Inikori’s 2002 book Africans and 
the Industrial Revolution in England emphasises the impact of enslaving Africans in Europe and the 
Americas while Paul E. Lovejoy emphasises the agency of Africans on the African continent. In his 
                                                          
19 David Eltis, Economic Growth in the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987) pp. 226-227. 
 
20 Miller, Way of Death, p. 73. 
 
21 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1981) p. 
143. 
 
17 
 
seminal work, Transformations in Slavery, Lovejoy creates a broader framework for these more 
specific studies.22 Here Lovejoy has argued: “Slavery was transformed, in part because of external 
influences and in part because of the dynamics of internal forces ... Africa responded to outside 
influences to a greater extent than it influenced the outside world.”23 This thesis follows Lovejoy’s 
lead in examining how the transatlantic slave trade influenced African political economies by 
focusing on the specific case study of the Loango Coast, and where possible, contrasting the case 
of the Loango Coast with different adaptations throughout Western Africa. 
As few historians have written monographs focusing specifically on the Loango Coast, our 
knowledge of the Loango Coast most often is framed within a broader study of Atlantic History 
and the transatlantic slave trade. In Bernard Bailyn’s Atlantic History: Concepts and Contours, he 
traces the conventional boundaries of Atlantic history. Although Bailyn acknowledges the 
presence of Africa on the periphery of the Atlantic world, he identifies Europe and the Americas as 
the primary actors. He highlights D. W. Meinig’s description of the birth of the Atlantic world as “‘a 
sudden and harsh encounter between two old worlds that transformed both and integrated them 
into a single New World,’ ” adding his own commentary, “this was the origin of Atlantic history.” 
Thus for Bailyn, Curtin’s The Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Census is a footnote in the story of the 
genesis of the Atlantic World.24 
This thesis builds on the work of numerous scholars of the transatlantic slave trade and African 
history who have followed in Phillip Curtin’s footsteps and sought to reintroduce Africa as a major 
rather than minor actor in the foundations of the Atlantic System. In Slavery and the rise of the 
Atlantic System, Barbara L. Solow describes the fundamental contribution the African continent 
made to the rise of the Atlantic System: 
The mere existence of imperialism or colonialism does not explain how the 
metropolis exploited the periphery, as some would have it: It was the coerced 
                                                          
22 Joseph E. Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and 
Economic Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 
23 Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa, 2
nd
 Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) p. xvi. 
 
24 Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and Contours, (London: Harvard University Press, 2005) p.56. 
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labor of African slaves that allowed Europe to benefit so greatly from its 
conquests in the New World. When we assess the distribution of those benefits, 
we find that although the race went to the swift, the glittering prize was 
hammered out by African hands.25  
While Solow focuses on the agency of Africans in creating a “new world” in the Americas, this 
thesis focuses on the agency of Africans in creating the markets which shipped these enslave 
African labourer to the Americas.  
Joseph C. Miller suggests that  enslaved African labour, acquired through low-cash-cost, in 
combination with free land in the Americas eased the strain on European finances to allow an 
incredibly fast rate of expansion in the Atlantic economy 26  Thus, the innovation of 
inter-continental shipment of slaves was fundamental to the formation of the Atlantic System in 
the early modern period. Walter Hawthorne, James Sweet, Linda Heywood and John Thornton 
have made recent and significant contributions to a growing literature which describes the 
movement of enslaved Africans from Africa to the Americas and traced their impact on the 
formation of new economic, social, and political systems of the Americas.27 
In addition to the considerable contributions of enslaved Africans to the Atlantic system from their 
positions on plantations in the Americas, the active role of Africans in procuring slaves was 
fundamental to the foundations of this system. John Thornton emphasises the instrumental role 
Africans played in establishing the supply chains for the slave plantations in the Americas: 
“Africans controlled the nature of their interactions with Europe. Europeans did not possess the 
                                                          
25 Barbara L. Solow, “Introduction,” in Barbara L. Solow (ed.) Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic System 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 1-20. 
 
26 Joseph C. Miller, “A marginal institution on the margin of the Atlantic system: The Portuguese southern 
Atlantic slave trade in the eighteenth century” in Barbara L. Solow (ed.), Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic 
System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 149. 
 
27 Walter Hawthorne, From Africa to Brazil: Culture, Identity and an Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600 to 1830 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); James H. Sweet, Recreating Africa: culture, kinship, and religion in 
the African-Portuguese world, 1441-1770 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); and, John 
Thornton and Linda Heywood, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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military power to force Africans to participate in any type of trade in which their leaders did not 
wish to engage. Therefore all African trade with the Atlantic, including the slave trade, had to be 
voluntary.”28 Thornton’s assessment of Africans’ contributions to the Atlantic economy brings us 
one step closer to one of the key themes of this thesis: African agency in pre-colonial trade 
negotiations. 
Significant volumes have been written on the role of European trading cycles in procuring slaves, 
including: Johannes M. Postma’s The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815; David W. 
Galenson’s Traders Planters, and Slaves: Market Behavior in Early English America; Kenneth G. 
Davies’ The Royal African Company; and Herbert S. Klein’s The Atlantic Slave Trade.29 While 
Postma, Galenson, and Davies were predominantly interested in the decision making structures 
and patterns of particular European nations, Klein has favoured a broader approach which begins 
to include the African organization of slave supply. Admittedly, this Eurocentric approach is 
partially due to the limitations of the documents about exchange on the Western African coast, 
the majority of these sources being European trade and travel documents, as the majority of 
African societies prior to the eighteenth century were dependent on oral preservation of histories. 
However, this thesis shows how the European sources can be used to fill in some hitherto blank 
pages of the African side of Atlantic history. Using these studies to add to the picture of the 
European role in Atlantic exchange, this thesis carefully mines these sources to test and 
supplement our knowledge of pre-colonial African societies thus adding to our limited knowledge 
of the African role in this exchange. 
In Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, Philip D. Morgan and Jack P. Green expand the definition of 
Atlantic History beyond the conventional framing of Europe and the Americas to encompass all 
four continents of the Atlantic with equal emphasis: 
                                                          
28 Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Modern World, p. 7. 
 
29 Johannes M. Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); David W. Galenson, Traders, Planters, and Slaves: Market Behavior in Early English America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986);  Kenneth Gordon Davies, The Royal African Company 
(London: Routledge, 1999); and, Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
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Atlantic history is an analytic construct and an explicit category of historical 
analysis that historians have devised to help them organize the study of some of 
the most important developments of the early modern era: the emergence in 
the fifteenth century and the subsequent growth of the Atlantic basin as a site 
for demographic, economic, social, cultural, and other forms of exchange 
among and within the four continents surrounding the Atlantic Ocean – Europe, 
Africa, South America, and North America – and all the islands adjacent to those 
continents. As people, pathogens, and plants – to mention three key agents of 
change – moved ever more intensively across the Atlantic, profound 
transformations occurred in all spheres of life.30  
Within this context, this thesis examines the transformations of the Loango Coast as it comes into 
contact with an increasing diversity of trade goods from Europe, and in some cases trade goods 
transhipped through Europe, and an increasing demand for slaves from the Americas. In their 
assessment of the future of Atlantic History, Morgan and Green suggest that while Atlantic History 
has “focused primarily on the movement of people and goods, *it+ would do well to explore more 
fully the exchanges of values and the circulation of ideas.”31 This thesis begins to fill this hole 
through observing the evolution of the merchant communities of the Loango Coast. It shows how 
the leaders of the Loango Coast successfully resisted permanent European settlement in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in contrast to the experiences of Europeans in other 
Atlantic ports. This resistance resulted in the slow spread of European economic, political, and 
social norms in the eighteenth century. This pattern of change is particularly evident in the slow 
absorption rate of European religious practices on the Loango Coast in comparison to its 
neighbours to the south. 
  
                                                          
 
30 Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) p. 3. 
 
31 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Global Migrations and World History 
A study of Loango not only has something to offer our understanding of the Atlantic World, it can 
also offer broader insights into global patterns of cross-cultural encounter and exchange. The story 
of first contact between Europeans and the leaders of the Loango Coast and the consequent 
establishment of a mutually beneficial set of trade norms and social customs is not a story limited 
to the Atlantic world but also belongs to the broader frame of world history. Through occasionally 
stepping back and describing the transformations of the polities of the Loango Coast through a 
global rather than a European or African framework, this thesis attempts to move beyond 
stereotypes of individual European traders and travelers as projecting the power of a broader 
European hegemony or of individual African communities being politically decentralized, 
economically disorganized, and responsive to European whims. In order to challenge this frame of 
European hegemony, this thesis acknowledges the place of the Loango Coast within broader topics 
of global migration and world systems theories. 
In Patrick Manning’s Migration in World History, he creates a framework for understanding the 
movements of people through space without using modern sociological constructs of ethnicity, 
empire, or state organizing identities. Through focusing on language as the defining factor in 
community membership, Manning outlines four types of migration: migration within the home 
community, colonial migration (to unoccupied territory or territory from which the previous 
occupants are expelled), whole community migration, and cross-community migration. Within this 
framework he identifies cross-community migration as being the most transformative of the four 
types of migration. Cross-community migration is defined by one of three motivations: to improve 
the situation of the individual; to bring resources, skills, or aid back to the community of origin; or, 
to help other communities by sharing technology and resources of the home community. Within 
the context of European contact with Sub-Saharan Africa in the early modern period, this thesis 
identifies Europeans merchants and travelers as belonging to this second category, at first 
returning with valuable trade items such as ivory, redwood dye, and copper, and later in providing 
labourers to facilitate colonial expansion in the Americas. Although European migrants attempted 
to implement both colonial and cross-community migration strategies in Africa, this thesis shows 
how the centralized power of the Loango Coast community framed European interaction and how 
Europeans were limited to strategies of cross-community migration in the eighteenth century. 
These European migrants, particularly the MCC merchants in the eighteenth century, were what 
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Manning describes as “sojourners” or people passing through.  These merchants and their crews 
travelled in cycles, spending two to eight months on the Loango Coast before heading to the 
Americas and then on to Europe. They did not leave permanent brokers on the coast. They lived at 
sea as much or more than they lived on a single continent. This transient form of migration is 
consistent with Manning’s conception of a temporary settlement.  He defines sojourners as “those 
moving to a new community, usually for a specific purpose, with the intention of returning to their 
home community.”32 These merchants stopped long enough to begin to understand and be 
understood by the local without the intention of becoming local.  
Manning asserts: “More often than not … the movement of cross-community migrants is 
facilitated by networks: chains of people who facilitate their movement and their settlement at 
the end of the journey.” He goes on to argue: “*Cross-community networks], involving cooperation 
across distance and across boundaries of language and culture, facilitate the movement of 
migrants from one place to another.”33 However useful this framework, the focus of this thesis is 
not the migration itself, but how migration transforms communities. Greg Dening provides a 
useful description of the places where cross-community contacts happen using the metaphor of 
beaches: 
Beaches are beginnings and endings. They are frontiers and boundaries of 
islands. For some life forms the beaches divide the world between here and 
there, us and them, good and bad, familiar and strange … Crossing beaches is 
always dramatic. From land to sea and from sea to land is a long journey and 
either way the voyager is left a foreigner and an outsider. Look across the beach 
from the sea, there is what the mind’s eye sees, romantic, classic, savage but 
always uncontrollable. The gestures, the signals, the codes which make the 
voyagers own world ordered no longer work. He does not see the islander’s 
colors or trees or mountains. He sees his [own].34 
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33 Ibid., p. 9. 
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It is on these “beaches” that communities meet, each with their differing notions, each with their 
own agendas, to negotiate a common language and mutually beneficial terms of exchange. 
It is difficult to interpret the preconceived notions which framed the world view of non-literate 
African coastal communities beyond the broad outlines available through oral histories and 
linguistic and archeological evidence. However, an understanding of the world view of European 
migrants is easier to access.35 Janet L. Abu-Lughod suggests that the modern world system of 
European hegemony which emerged in the sixteenth century owed a significant debt to the world 
economy which had developed in the thirteenth century. She argues that in the thirteenth century 
surplus production of goods became possible throughout the Old World, allowing the spreading of 
complex trade networks from northeastern Europe to China. These networks spanned huge 
distances and traders moving along them took years to follow a complete circuit. No common 
language or currency connected these communities, however “goods were transferred, prices set, 
exchange rates agreed upon, contracts entered into, credit – on funds or goods located elsewhere 
– extended, partnerships formed, and obviously, records kept and honored.”36 When Europeans 
set sail for the African continent, it was with the intent of building upon a set of common 
understandings based on their prior understanding of cross-cultural trade. Using Paul Sharp’s 
categories of encounter relations, discovery relations, and re-encounter relations, this thesis 
traces the evolution of the relationship between Europeans and the people of the Loango Coast.37 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
34 Greg Dening, Islands and beaches: Discourse on a silent land: Marquesas, 1774-1880 (Homewood, IL: 
Dorsey Press, 1988) pp. 33-34. 
35 For an analysis of oral histories of West Central Africa see Robert Harms, “Oral Tradition and Ethnicity” 
Journal of Interdisciplanary History, 10, no. 1 (1979) pp. 61-85 and Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition as History 
(Madison: University of Wisconson Press, 1985); for a linguistic approach see Vansina, Paths in the 
Rainforests; for an archeological approach see F. Van Noten ed. The Archaeology of Central Africa (Graz, 
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Sources and Methodology 
In Stuart B. Schwartz’s Preface to Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on 
the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era, he writes: “The 
voices and attitudes of the indigenous peoples of Asia, Africa, Australia, and the Americas need to 
be recorded, understood, and appreciated, but also subjected to the same kind of nuanced 
analysis now increasingly accorded to sources.”38 While it is important to make use of local sources 
where they exist, we cannot disregard the importance of European sources for these regions even 
though they are indelibly marked by the voice of the “outsider” or the “other”.39 Thus, this thesis 
deals with two types of primary sources: the first, and most obvious, is a collection of European 
impressions, observations, geographical descriptions, and trade records; the second is a collection 
of oral traditions recorded by Europeans. Due to the scarcity of the second set for this region, the 
former receive substantially more attention than the latter. 
The majority of sources on the Loango Coast fit into two categories: descriptive texts and 
economic data. Written sources include both European descriptive texts and transcriptions of 
African oral traditions. The published contemporary, or near contemporary, accounts and 
collections of oral traditions include, but are not limited to F. Michael Angelo and F Denis Carli’s 
“Account of the Congo,” Georges Balandier’s Sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique noire, Adolf Bastian’s 
Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste, Andrew Battell’s Strange Adventures, Pieter van den 
Broecke's Journal of Voyages to Cape Verde, Guinea and Angola, Giovanni Antonio Cavazzi’s 
Istorical descrizione de’tre regni Congo, Matamba et Angola, Jean Cuvelier’s “Tradition 
congolaise,” Olfert Dapper’s Naukeurige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten, Richard 
Dennett’s Notes on Folklore of the Fjort and Seven years among the Fjort, Louis de Grandpré’s 
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Voyage a la cote occidentale d’Afrique, Sheila Lambert’s transcriptions of the House of Commons 
Sessional Papers of the Eighteenth Century, Jerome Merolla’s “Voyage to the Congo,” Liévain 
Proyart’s Histoire de Loango, Jan Vansina’s Notes sure l’origines du royaume de Kongo and Annie 
Merlet’s Autour du Loango.40 The unpublished papers include a collection from the British ship the 
Madampookota, and the journals of the MCC ships which traded on the Loango Coast in the 
eighteenth century. These sources provide a combination of European written interpretations of 
African economic, social, and political systems and, to a lesser degree, European recordings of 
African oral traditions. They have been used predominantly as an aid to interpreting the MCC 
business records and the Voyages Database. Due to the absence of an in-depth analysis of the 
economic records of trade on the Loango Coast, a heavier emphasis has been placed on the 
organization, analysis, and presentation of the Voyages Database, available at 
http://www.slavevoyages.org, and the MCC records, available at the Zeeuwse Archief (Zeeland 
Archive) in Middleburg in the Netherlands. 
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This thesis will use the recorded data collected in the Voyages Database rather than the 
supplementary estimates to evaluate the broader trends of the slave trade on the Loango Coast. 
Whereas the estimated figures in database conflate the records of the Loango and Angola coasts; 
this thesis contests that West Central Africa is best understood as two distinct regions. The 
estimates in the Voyages Database do not offer port by port estimates, but rather regional 
estimates, making disaggregation of the numbers very difficult without knowing how the 
estimates were calculated. Using the recorded data rather than the estimates, the Loango Coast 
contributes at least one million slaves primarily through the coastal trading centers of Loango Bay, 
Malemba, and Cabinda. Separating out the total slaves recorded to have left each individual port 
and using them to calculate the total number of slaves embarked from the Loango Coast, the 
Loango Coast emerges as the fourth largest supply region on the Western African Coast, behind 
the Angola Coast (2.1 million), the Bight of Benin (1.5 million), and the Bight of Biafra (1.1 million). 
Given the large scale of the slave trade on the Loango Coast, it is hard to understand why many 
economic historians have continued to represent the Loango Coast as an undifferentiated part of 
West Central Africa.41 
In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of the Loango Coast within the context of West 
Central Africa, it is useful to look at early trading records of Europeans at the Loango Coast. A 
particularly rich set of documents can be found in the eighteenth century slave trading records of 
the Dutch Middleburg Commercial Company on the Loango Coast. The MCC was the largest Dutch 
slave trading company in the eighteenth century. Unlike the centuries before when the Dutch 
West India Company exerted a monopoly of Dutch shipping to Africa, the Dutch transitioned in to 
a period of private traders in the eighteenth century. Due to fastidious record keeping, a 
significant portion of the original MCC records have been preserved and are currently housed in 
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the Zeeuwse Archief (Zeeland Archives) in Middelburg. Although the broader academic community 
has shown little interest in these substantial records, our knowledge of the MCC was significantly 
furthered by W.S. Unger’s catalogue and preliminary studies of the MCC published in 1951 and 
1961 respectively.42 Aided by significant advances in computer technology, Johannes Menne 
Postma has compiled the most significant database on Dutch slave trade data, which is showcased 
in his 1990 book The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815. In this book he calculated price 
and profit data for MCC ships as well as providing an analysis of “coasting, mortality, crowding and 
efficiency”.43 Postma’s database subsequently was incorporated in the transatlantic Slave Trade 
Database project, which was made public first as a CD ROM in 1999 and later was expanded to the 
online Slave Voyages Database.44 Through this process, Postma’s data were augmented by a team 
of researchers under the leadership of David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and 
Herbert S. Klein. The online database currently contains a record of 114 voyages of ships owned by 
the MCC. Of these 114 voyages, the database records 32 voyages which mark ‘West Central Africa’ 
as their primary port for the embarkation of slaves. In this context, ‘West Central Africa’ is 
understood to be the Loango Coast, as further explained in Chapter 1. Despite the richness of 
these sources, the MCC records have excited little interest outside of Dutch academic circles. 
In this thesis, I will engage in a more in-depth analysis of trade on the Loango Coast focusing on 
the MCC’s trade negotiation documents between 1732 and 1796. This time period is defined by 
the documents themselves as the first MCC ship arrived on the Loango Coast in 1732 and the last 
MCC ship departed from the coast in 1796. During this period, the MCC outfitted 32 voyages; 
significant data have been preserved for 29 voyages. For each of these voyages between two and 
eight documents have been preserved. These documents contain hundreds of pages of records 
including purchases and sales of materials on the European, African, and South American coasts; 
journals of brief anecdotes, sailing coordinates and weather patterns; crew lists and wage tallies; 
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and even occasional packets of letters. Although each document has a story to tell, this thesis 
focuses on the transaction records between Loango merchants and MCC captains. These data 
have been organized in a database which records ships’ names, captains’ names, African 
merchants’ names, port of transaction, day of transaction, number of slaves exchanged (men, 
women, boys, and girls), and values of European goods exchanged. One significant advantage of 
focusing on the economic records of European traders rather than on their journals and log books 
is that the economic data provide significant information on the identity of Loango Coast 
merchants. They contain all of the purchases made in the name of the MCC during a voyage. As 
employees of the MCC were not allowed to make private purchases or to sell personal slaves in 
the Dutch colonies, it is unlikely that such purchase would have been recorded in the MCC books if 
captains or their crews made such purchases on the side.  These MCC data contribute significantly 
to our understanding of how trade proceeded on the Loango Coast, offering concrete data on 
approximately 10,000 slaves sold by 640 African merchants in 5,000 transactions. 
This thesis represents only a preliminary exploration of the utility of this database. This database 
can also be used in future endeavours to trace the dispersion of Loango Coast slaves in Suriname, 
Curacao, Paramaribo, St. Martin, and St. Eustatius. Once analysis of these data has been extended, 
it will be possible to explore options for making this database more broadly available. The primary 
focus of this study is the role of the MCC on the Loango Coast. 
Terminology 
As long as Europeans have been aware of African peoples, they have struggled to define systems 
of authority and control on the African continent. In 1995 Denise Miller initiated an online debate 
on the H-Net forum entitled “tribal/ethnic/language groups” by asking the question “Do you find 
the term “ethnic group” more effective and less problematic *than tribal or language identities+?” 
45 In response to this discussions, Chris Lowe, Tunde Brimah, Pear-Alice March, William Minter, 
and Monde Muyangwa produced the paper “Talking about ‘tribe’: Moving from stereotypes to 
analysis”, which suggests the term “tribe” is tainted by implications of “primitive savagery” and 
                                                          
45 This discussion is available at http://www.h-net.org query: "tribal ethnic language groups". This discussion 
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that groups in Africa can be more accurately described as nations, peoples, communities, 
chiefdoms, kin-groups, or villages.46 In Paths in the Rainforests, Jan Vansina’s discussion of “tribe” 
and “ethnicity” emphasizes the Eurocentric nature of the word “tribe” and the problems of 
assuming homogeneity among people living in the same environment and at the same time 
inventing difference between neighbours. He emphasizes the changing composition of “ethnic” 
groups and the multiplicity of identities present in a single geographical location. Given these 
problems Vansina decides “ethnic units must be abandoned as unanalyzed units for study.”47 
However misleading these categories, it is still necessary to make reference to them within 
carefully qualified parameters as disregarding them would cause a disconnect between the 
literature and this thesis. In defining these parameters, we must avoid the assumption that all 
members of any given group shared the same religious, linguistic, genetic, or political allegiances. 
Nor should we ignore the multiple strategies through which people can assimilate into a group or 
the multiple motivations people can have for modifying their identities.  Furthermore, acceptance 
into a group can take time, even generations, and it often comes with a cost, the greatest of these 
being enslavement. Thus, terms like “Vili” are used in this thesis to represent people who have 
privileged one common goal above all others to share membership in a group. Most often, these 
groups are concentrated in geographical location. However, these identities are not stagnant, and 
groups can integrate and exclude members at different times to meet different goals. Limited 
evidence has survived on the Loango Coast making it difficult to trace all of the alliances, conflicts, 
and dislocations within the Loango Coast which occurred to reconstitute identities over time. 
Nevertheless, this thesis identifies the slave trade, and the economic gains made particularly by 
the polities of Ngoyo and Kakongo, as an important element in the changing political allegiances of 
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the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, and therefore as an important element in the forging 
of new identities.  
In describing these consensus groups or political organizations, another term commonly used is 
the term “king.” John Thornton problematizes this term in his second edition of Africa and Africans 
in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, suggesting that “although sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century sources routinely refer to African rulers as “kings,” the term must always be 
qualified by noting that in many cases they were elected by officials, even if family or hereditary 
claims were honored the rulers were overwhelmingly powerful relative to the electors.”48 
Furthermore, the term “king” has a very specific meaning rooted in European political structures. 
Thus, in an attempt to eliminate the ambiguity posed by these false kings and to find a term less 
rigidly conforming to European political structures, this thesis will take one step farther, using the 
words “ruler” or “leader”.  
If African “kings” were not the same as European kings, then the same could be said of African 
“kingdoms” and even “states”.  A state, particularly in the context of a Westphalian conception of 
a sovereign state, is traditionally defined as existing within a fixed and clearly demarcated 
territory. However, within a Sub-Saharan African context prior to the nineteenth century, African 
political organizations did not necessarily exist within a bounded territorial model. Therefore the 
term polity, defined as a political community that is capable of defending itself militarily, 
administering justice, raising and redistributing revenue, and commanding the allegiance of its 
subjects, is more reflective of a pre-nineteenth century Sub-Saharan context. 49 Thus African 
political communities will be referred to as polities throughout this thesis. 
Rather than appropriating English words to fit an African reality, this thesis takes a different 
approach. Assuming that if you stretch definitions too far they cease to have any specific 
relevance, this thesis privileges African words where possible to describe African organizations and 
political figures explaining each organization or role within their specific context. In describing 
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States in Angola (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) pp. 1-11. 
31 
 
these organizations and posts, comparisons are drawn to European structures without equating 
local African systems with European power structures. A glossary of the key African terms can be 
found in Appendix E. Likewise, when describing groups of Africans holding a set of common 
economic, political, or religious practices, the terms “communities” or “polities” are used rather 
than outmoded terms such as “tribe” or language groups such as “Bantu”, as they do not reflect 
the variations in economic, political, or religious practices which are integral to the arguments of 
the thesis. An exception is made where primary or secondary sources are quoted directly. This 
approach is not meant to suggest that Africa developed a homogeneous or a uniquely “African” 
type of governance but rather to discern the specificity of one African region. For place names on 
the Loango Coast where alternate spellings arise the most common spelling from the MCC 
documents are used, i.e. the Dutch spelling “Malemba” rather than the Portuguese spelling of 
“Malembo”. 
Moving from political to geographical concerns, for the purposes of this thesis, the Loango Coast 
will be defined geographically as the section of the West Central African Coast running from Cape 
Lopez in the north to the Congo River the south. Through the early period of contact between 
Europeans and the peoples of the Loango Coast, three primary trading centres emerged at 
Loango, Malemba, and Cabinda. Although the term Loango can be used to refer to bay, a polity, 
and a sphere of influence, I will follow Phyllis Martin’s lead in differentiating these three by using 
the terms Loango Bay, Loango, and the Loango Coast respectively. Loango’s sphere of influence 
builds and diminishes over time, but at its zenith it encompassed tributary polities such as Gobby, 
Sette, and Bukkameale to the north and to a lesser extent Kakongo and Ngoyo to the south.50As 
such, the Loango Coast makes up the northern section of the West Central African Coast, while the 
Angola Coast makes up the southern section. Likewise, for the purposes of this thesis Western 
Africa represents the whole of Atlantic Africa and, West Africa represents the northern portion of 
Western Africa and West Central Africa represents the southern portion dividing the coast 
between the southern boundary of the Bight of Biafra and the northern boundary of the Loango 
Coast. Thus West Central Africa is understood as the southern section of Western Africa and, the 
Loango Coast makes up the northern region of West Central Africa. 
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Thesis Summary 
The structure of the thesis is organised around a central question: What were the distinguishing 
features of and primary causes behind patterns of cross-cultural exchange on the Loango Coast in 
the eighteenth century? This central question is approached through six secondary questions, each 
of which is addressed in some way by the thesis’ most significant primary source, the 
eighteenth-century MCC trade records: 
1. Why was there such a significant divergence between the patterns of slave supply on the 
Loango and Angola coasts? 
2. How did the trading relationship between Loango Coast and European merchants change 
through time? 
3. How do the patterns of trade evident in the MCC records confirm or modify the 
generalizations in the existing literature? 
4. How did the buyers in the hinterland of the Loango Coast pay for and make use of the 
influx of European trade goods? 
5. What political strategies along the Loango Coast did Atlantic resources enable?  
 
While some of these questions are answered in one coherent chapter, others are answered in 
threads which are woven throughout the thesis and are tied together in the final chapter. In order 
to begin answering these questions, this thesis is organized around three themes: the distinct 
nature of the Loango Coast, the development of mechanisms that facilitated large scale slave 
trade, and the persistence of traditional structures on the Loango Coast which mediated cultural 
transformation during the transatlantic slave trade. 
 
This thesis is organized into an introduction followed by six chapters. Chapter 1, “Loango and the 
transatlantic Slave Trade,” explores the position of the Loango Coast in the transatlantic slave 
trade. It establishes the Loango Coast as a region distinct within West Central Africa In a 
port–by-port analysis of West Central Africa, this chapter outlines the Loango Coast as an open 
trade zone characterized by trade with multiple partners whereas the Angola Coast markets 
privileged Portuguese interests. Moreover, the Loango Coast slave trade started later than the 
Angola Coast trade and fluctuated at different rates than the Angola Coast trade, with the 
exception of parallel booms in the 1811 to 1820 period. This chapter concludes that while the 
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focus of scholarship on the Lusophone trade has led us to conclude that the Portuguese had a 
dominant impact throughout West Central Africa, the impact of the Portuguese was concentrated 
most heavily on the Angola Coast prior to the nineteenth century. Therefore, to understand the 
cross-cultural exchanges of the Loango Coast we should redirect our focus to Dutch, French, and 
English experiences. 
Chapter 2, “Afro-European Encounters on the Loango Coast,” takes a step back from this Atlantic 
framework to explore theories of first contact and how the Loango Coast reflects and diverges 
from the general trade and migration trends throughout the early modern world. This chapter 
traces how Europeans formed trade communities throughout Europe and how Europeans 
attempted to negotiate these same privileges and responsibilities in African trading communities. 
However, African communities also had preconceptions of the roles of insiders and outsiders 
within their communities. In each trading context, a balance had to be struck which 
accommodated both trading partners. On the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, this process 
of negotiation led to a number of understandings or mechanisms to facilitate trade: first of all, 
traders of all nations were welcome on the Loango Coast; second, Europeans could not create 
permanent settlements and were limited to ship trade; third, local traders supplied slaves to the 
Europeans; fourth, slaves were bartered for goods on the coast; and fifth, local governments 
guaranteed the smooth running of trade. 
The third chapter, “Maximizing Profits and Minimizing Risks: Transatlantic Shipping and the 
Loango Coast Slave Trade,” narrows the focus to the ebb and flow of the slave trade on the Loango 
Coast in the eighteenth century. This chapter shows the importance of developing a specialized 
knowledge of patterns of transatlantic shipping and Loango Coast slave markets was required for 
Europeans to profit from the slave trade. An analysis of trade patterns indicates that MCC ships 
favoured the Loango Coast; this preference may have been in part due to the lower prices, faster 
loading times, larger cargos, and shorter middle passages available to slave trading voyages from 
the Loango Coast. The accumulation of shipping data and slave prices and the accuracy of the 
information would have been crucial to making the calculated risks inherent in long-distance 
trade. 
The next chapter, “Cross-Cultural Exchange and the Transformation of the Loango Merchant 
Community, 1732-1797,” compares the political structure of the Loango Coast as assembled 
primarily by Phyllis Martin and Zdenka Volavka, to a list of Loango Coast merchants’ transactions. 
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It concludes that by the eighteenth century political authorities on the Loango Coast had little 
direct investment in, and therefore little direct profit from, the transatlantic slave trade, though 
they collected indirect profits though the taxes imposed by the Mafouks. Instead, we find a few 
major traders and many minor traders involved in the provisioning of each European slaving 
voyage. Among the major traders we find the Mafouks of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda Bay 
who, as appointees of the local ruler to oversee cross-cultural trade, were able to amass significant 
personal wealth that they used to undermine the authority of the rulers themselves. 
Chapter 5, “Negotiating Cross-Cultural Trade: From Coastal Markets to the Interior,” explores the 
evolution of trade conventions on the Loango Coast, the prevalence of textiles, weapons, and 
alcohol in the trade bundles exchanged for slaves, and the importance of these goods to both the 
Loango Coast and the interior markets where these goods were exchanged for slaves. An 
examination of the supply chains suggests that the long-distance caravan routes were profitable 
for Loango Coast traders as they were able to supply the internal slave trading markets with 
textiles and firearms superior to the competing offerings of Portuguese-linked traders from the 
south. Furthermore, Chapter 5 provides a rough calculation of MCC and Loango trading schedules 
including estimated provisioning times of European slaving ships, travel times from Europe to 
West Central Africa, arrival dates of ships,  peak loading times of slaving voyages on the Loango 
Coast, and the equivalent provisioning  and delivery schedules of caravan supply routes from the 
interior. This calculation suggests that the MCC shipping cycle does not support evidence of 
European investment in the slave procurement process. Rather it supports a model where 
Europeans brought their goods to trading ports where they bartered with Loango Coast merchants 
and moved on as quickly as possible to repeat the cycle. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 brings together these observations to elaborate the broader implications of this 
thesis. Through exploring the transformations which take place on the Loango Coast in the 
eighteenth century, this thesis endeavours to get a step closer to a better understanding  the 
impact of trade between Loango Coast and Middelburg traders in eighteenth century Loango 
Coast, particularly the economic and political transformations . By focusing on the evolution of 
trade relations between the Middelburg and Loango merchants, it attempts to evaluate the 
balance of power between these communities without an assumption of European dominance. In 
showing the Africans as the purchasers of a growing diversity of trade goods originating in Europe, 
Asia and the Americas, and transhipped by Europeans to African ports, this thesis highlights the 
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global dimension of the transatlantic slave trade. In its focus on the ports of the Loango Coast, it is 
situated between three spheres of research reflecting the role of ports as the spaces between 
places, the meeting grounds of cultures and the stage for the beginnings of political relations 
between Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe. 
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Chapter 1: Loango and the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade 
 
Since Philip Curtin’s attempt to quantify the transatlantic slave trade in 1969, calculating the 
number of slaves who entered the transatlantic slave trade has been a major preoccupation of 
African, American, and Atlantic historians.51 Phyllis M. Martin’s influential work on the Loango 
Coast was published three years later.52 Although Martin’s work remains the definitive history of 
the eighteenth-century Loango Coast, it did little to expand upon Curtin’s admittedly rough 
assessment of the volume of the slave trade in this area. Until the late 1980s, the scholarship on 
West Central Africa focused primarily on the Portuguese sources.53 However, in 1989 and 1990 
two prominent studies were published which highlighted the British, French, and Dutch 
involvement in the West Central African slave trade.54 More recently, the release of the Voyages 
Database has provided the means to reassess this trade. This chapter addresses this gap in the 
literature. 
An examination of patterns of trade on the West Central African coast between 1515 and 1800 
reveals two distinct pictures: the first is a picture of a Portuguese dominated trade in the regions 
to the south of the Congo River; the second is a picture of multinational trade on the regions to 
the north of the Congo River. This divergence raises the question: If West Central Africa was a 
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coherent slaving region, why did the Portuguese fail to dominate the Loango Coast? This chapter 
argues that West Central Africa encompasses two slaving regions: the Loango and Angola Coasts. 
In doing so, it focuses on the Loango Coast as a key contributor to the Atlantic and African 
commercial spheres in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries primarily concentrating on the 
exchange in human beings as a test case. This chapter begins by exploring the geographic and 
political contexts of the trade; this discussion is followed by a general analysis of the economic 
importance of the Loango Coast to the transatlantic slave trade; and it concludes with an 
argument to disaggregate West Central Africa into two economic spheres by analysing annual 
patterns, thus setting the stage for a more specific discussion of the evolution of trade 
mechanisms later in this thesis. 
A Brief Sketch of the Loango Coast 
The Loango Coast stretches 460 miles, or 740 kilometres, between Cape Lopez in the north and 
the Congo River in the south (see Map 1 below). This area includes three sheltered bays at Loango, 
Pointe-Noire, and Cabinda. Loango is used as the name for a specific settlement at Loango Bay as 
well as a polity containing four provinces: Loangiri (also Loango or Longo), Loangomongo (hilly 
Loango), Pili, and Chilongo.55 The Loango Coast refers to Loango’s sphere of influence at the time 
of European contact, which included tributary polities such as Gobby, Sette, and Bukkameale to 
the north and, to a lesser extent, the polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo to the south.56 Published by 
an Amsterdam printing house circa 1700, the map below likely represented these regions as they 
related to a Dutch sphere of influence in the lighter shaded region to the north and a Portuguese 
sphere of influence in the darker shaded region to the south. In contrast to this map’s 
interpretation of spheres of influence, this thesis will argue that the Congo River represented the 
major boundary of Portuguese influence encompassing the southern polities of Kongo, Ndongo, 
and Benguela, while the northern bank of the Congo River, dominated by Loango, Kakongo, and 
Ngoyo, was characterized by open trade. Today, the Loango Coast is split between the modern 
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nations of Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Angola (Cabinda Enclave), and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo. 
The Loango Coast was inhabited by three groups of people. The first group of people was known 
as the Vili or Fioti. These people lived in Loango and traded with Europeans primarily at Loango 
Bay. The second group was known as the Kotchi. They belonged to the polity of Kakongo and 
traded at Malemba. The third group was called the Woyo. They belonged to the polity of Ngoyo 
and traded at Cabinda Bay. Also, the people of Kongo, who resided to the south of the Congo 
River, referred to the Vili, and perhaps even all the people of the Loango Coast, as the Mubiri.57 
Jan Vansina also has suggested that the term Vili could be used to refer to all of the people of the 
Loango Coast as a single linguistic or ethnic identity.58 However, this thesis uses the term Vili only 
to refer to the members of the Loango polity. In the early period of contact, Loango was the most 
dominant among these polities. 
This stretch of coast was renowned for its great surf and occasional underwater earthquakes, 
which posed high risks for sailors.59 These geographical hazards begin to explain what Phyllis 
Martin has described as the “spasmodic and impermanent” European presence on this stretch of 
the western African coast.60 The winds and currents which prevailed on the Loango Coast 
promoted a pattern of approaching the coast from the north and leaving the coast by sailing 
southward to use the strong current which pushed westward from the mouth of the Congo River. 
In contrast, approaching the Angola Coast was easiest from the south and leaving the coast was 
most expedient by sailing northward to catch the same strong currents of the Congo River. Thus 
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the Congo River served a significant divider for sailing ships approaching the Loango and Angola 
Coasts and moving between the coasts.61 
Unlike the people of the Kongo and Angola, the people of the Loango Coast maintained their own 
trading routes to the interior to the exclusion of the Portuguese pombeiros or African agents of 
European merchants.62 These trade routes went from the Atlantic coast to Stanley (Malebo) Pool 
to the Teke town of Monsol, where they traded for slaves, ivory, and copper. On trade routes to 
the north-east the Vili sold European goods and salt from Mayombe to the Jaga in exchange for 
slaves, copper, and ivory.63 Thus by acting as the middle men in the trade and though imposing 
tributes on neighbouring costal polities of Ngoyo and Kakongo during the period of early contact 
with Europeans, Vili trade policy heavily influenced the trade of the Loango Coast. Therefore, this 
chapter will highlight the early contact between the Vili and Europeans on the Loango Coast. 
Although the primary and arguably most infamous export from the Loango Coast was slaves, from 
the late fifteenth century Portuguese traders had sought palm-cloth, redwood, elephant tails, and 
copper to be sold for slaves in Angola, and ivory to be sold in Portugal. 64 Jan Vansina draws 
attention to the fact that ivory was a royal monopoly in Portugal during this early period which 
indicates that the trade in ivory would have been minimal at best given the difficulties in selling it  
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Map 1: Petrus Schenck and Gerard Valck’s engraving “Regna Congo et Angola” Amsterdam, 1700 
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Source: Petrus Pieter Schenck and Gerard Valck’s engraving “Regna Congo et Angola” Amsterdam, 1700. 
http://catalog.afriterra.org/viewMap.cmd?number=449 Accessed on 10 September 2010. Used with permission of the 
webmaster. 
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in Portugal. 65 Alternatively, ivory was initially the primary interest of the Dutch in Loango 
beginning in the late sixteenth century.66 Over this 350-year period, a substantial amount of cloth, 
ironware, alcohol, guns, ammunition, and beads entered African markets; Chapter 5 addresses the 
configuration of supply and demand on the Loango Coast during the transatlantic slave trade in 
more detail. 
The Vili and the early trade with Europeans 
First contact between the Vili and the Portuguese can be dated to the late fifteenth century, with 
the arrival of the first Portuguese vessel on the Loango Coast in 1483. Originally joined to the 
polity of Kongo, by this time the Loango Coast operated largely as an independent economic and 
political unit under the authority of the Vili, though it was not until 1535 that the Kongo formally 
acknowledged this separation, or at least until the Kongo explained this separation to the 
Portuguese. For the next hundred years or so, the Vili dominated the Loango Coast. The Dutch 
made their first appearance almost 60 years later in 1593.67 Portuguese and Dutch trade was well 
established by the mid seventeenth century. The primary goal of the Portuguese was to obtain 
goods such as raffia cloths and redwood from the Vili to trade in Luanda for slaves.68 Despite 
Portuguese claims of dominance in the West Central African trade, they barred European 
competition effectively only south of the Congo River.69 Martin suggests that the Vili preferred 
Dutch, French, and English traders who “brought a more varied selection of trade goods, of better 
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quality and cheaper prices.” 70 In addition to the roll of local traders in encouraging trade with 
specific traders, winds and ocean currents created a natural barrier at the Congo River, as outlined 
above. These geographical feathers facilitated a triangular shipping pattern on the Loango Coast 
allowing Northern Europeans to ship textiles, guns, and alcohol from Europe in exchange for slaves 
in Africa, which were in turn exchanged for cash crops in the Americas.   Whereas, Portuguese 
traders favoured a bilateral shipping pattern allowing them to eliminate return trips to Europe in 
favour of a more direct trade of Brazilian alcohol for Angolan slaves.   
The structures of trade established between the Vili and their European counterparts in the early 
period of contact created foundations for negotiations throughout the slave trading period. 
Understanding the internal and regional politics in Loango is a key factor in reconstructing the Vili 
trade policy. In describing the polity of Loango, Dutch trader and explorer Pieter van den Broecke 
wrote the following ca. 1600: “The king keeps his residence less than a mile inland in a town 
named Bansa de Loango [=Mbanza Loango], which lies on a very high hill and is an extremely 
pleasant location.”71 This proximity to the coast was important to maintaining tight personal 
control over trade relations on the coast without middlemen.72 Much the same as the system of 
trade that evolved later at Bonny in the Bight of Biafra which relied upon a centralized authority to 
guarantee justice and safe conduct, this centralized organization of trade on the Loango Coast may 
have presented barriers to initiating trade in the early period. However, as a system evolved, it 
allowed facilitated relationships between European trading partners and a select number of Vili 
traders to sustain rapidly growing demands for cloth, guns, and alcohol goods on the Loango Coast 
and slaves to work European plantations in the Americas. 
Loango had an active trade network that included trading networks to Mayumba in the north, to 
Malebo Pool in the east, and to Luanda in the south. The Vili operated independent of Europeans 
throughout West Central Africa; however, these Vili networks resembled Portuguese trading 
                                                          
70 
Phyllis M. Martin, “The Cabinda Connection: A Historical Perspective,” African Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 302, 
(Jan., 1977) p. 51. On the superiority of Dutch over Portuguese trade goods, also see José C. Curto, Enslaving 
Spirits, p. 62. 
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 Broecke, Journal of Voyages, p. 94. 
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networks which focused on forming permanent contacts in other communities through settlement 
encouraging a flow of merchants and caravaneers between communities. Thus, the Vili emerged 
as a distinct group with a distinct, though interconnecting, trading network from their neighbours 
to the south. 73  
Although reconstructing a picture of the Loango Coast is challenging due to the scarcity of sources, 
one major source of information which reaches beyond episodic evidence and cultural 
misrepresentation is the economic data produced by the trans-cultural trade between the 
merchants of the Loango Coast and Europeans. The release of the Voyages Database was a 
substantial achievement in organizing the bulk of these fragmented data to show how Western 
Africa fit into the Atlantic World. The MCC produced a more specific and particularly rich collection 
of economic data specific to the Loango Coast, which has been organized into a database for the 
purposes of this thesis. These data offer not an unbiased source but rather an additional source 
that can be used to test our observations that come from European travel narratives and ship logs. 
While Phyllis Martin’s work focused on letters, shipping logs, and travel narratives, this thesis 
focuses on the transaction records in the Voyages Database and in the MCC. 
Defining West Central Africa 
Understanding the transatlantic slave trade is one of the key driving forces behind the emergence 
of Atlantic History. The web of interconnections which developed between Europe, Africa and the 
Americas during this period laid the foundations for trade, migrations (both forced and free), and 
cultural exchange. Table 1, below, lists 39 key trading regions identified in the Voyages Database. 
Each of these regions was a node in this web of interconnections ranging from Europe to Africa to 
the Americas and even reaching into Asia, sorting them in terms of their role as consumers 
textiles, guns, and alcohol (Africa) or as consumers of slaves (predominantly the Americas and 
Europe) . As outlined in the Introduction, the Voyages Database contains two types of data: raw 
data and estimates. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on the raw data except where 
specifically noted as the online database does not supply figures for specific embarkation regions. 
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Table 1: Primary Trading Regions of Consumption in the Transatlantic Slave Trade, 1514-186574 
 
Textiles, Guns and Alcohol Slaves 
1. Senegambia and 
offshore Atlantic 
2. Sierra Leone 
3. Windward Coast 
4. Gold Coast 
5. Bight of Benin 
6. Bight of Biafra and 
Gulf of Guinea Islands 
7. West Central Africa 
and St. Helena 
8. Southeast Africa and 
Indian Ocean Islands 
9. Asia e Africa 
10. Europe 
11. Northern [American] Mainland Colonies/States 
12. Chesapeake 
13. Carolinas/Georgia 
14. Mississippi/Alabama/Florida 
15. Guadeloupe 
16. Martinique 
17. Saint Domingue 
18. French Guiana 
19. Dutch Caribbean 
20. Dutch Guianas 
21. Rio de la Plata 
22. Spanish Caribbean Mainland 
23. Puerto Rico 
24. Cuba 
25. Amazonia 
26. Pernambuco 
27. Bahia 
28. Southeast Brazil 
29. Danish West Indies 
30. Barbados 
31. St. Kitts 
32. Montserrat/Nevis 
33. Antigua 
34. Jamaica 
35. Dominica 
36. Grenada 
37. St. Vincent 
38. Trinidad/Tobago 
39. British Guiana 
 
Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces See: “Voyage Itinerary” Accessed: 7 
August 2011. 
Nine of these 39 trading zones are on the Western African Coast: Senegambia and offshore 
Atlantic, Sierra Leone, Windward Coast, Gold Coast, Bight of Benin, Bight of Biafra and Gulf of 
Guinea Islands, West Central Africa and St. Helena, Southeast Africa and Indian Ocean Islands, and 
Asia and Africa. Of these trading regions, the Bight of Biafra, the Bight of Benin, and West Central 
Africa easily dominate the slave trading market with 1 million, 1.5 million, and 3.3 million enslaved 
Africans being transferred from African to European or Brazilian ownership respectively. This 
                                                          
74 See David Eltis and David Richardson, “A New Assessment of the Transatlantic Salve Trade,” in David Eltis 
and David Richardson (eds.) Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database 
(Yale: Yale University Press, 2008) pp. 46-50. 
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represents approximately 70 per cent of the total enslaved Africans recorded by the Voyages 
Database between 1514 and 1865.75 
Within this context, West Central Africa and St. Helena76 clearly emerges as the primary market of 
exchange. This dominance could be explained in two ways: first in looking at economic factors of 
supply and demand, which will be discussed later in this thesis; and second by looking at the way 
the region is defined. Stretching from Cape Lopez on the Equator in the north to Cabo Negro on 
the edge of the Kalahari Desert in the south, the Voyages Database estimates that the West 
Central African coast exported as many as 5.7 million slaves between 1505 and 1866. This was the 
single largest slaving region in the Atlantic world, which exported an estimated total of at least 
12.5 million slaves from Africa to the Americas during this period. 77 Despite its prominence as a 
slave trading region, the early literature focused almost exclusively on the Portuguese slave trade 
in West Central Africa with the notable exception of Phyllis Martin’s early works.78 It was not until 
1989 that David Richardson began draw attention to the volume of British and French slave trade 
on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century.79 A year later Johannes M. Postma published his 
                                                          
75 These numbers represent the known embarkations as recorded in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Voyages 
Database. http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces  Query: Primary place of slave purchase = 
West Central Africa and St. Helena; Table – Rows: embarkation port, Columns: Flag. These are not to be 
confused with the estimates from the same database which use these figures as a foundation for 
speculation on the total number of enslaved Africans who embarked from African ports. Accessed 28 
December 2009. 
 
76 For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of West Central Africa includes St. Helena as St. Helena was 
the central post of British administration in their efforts to suppress the Southern Atlantic slave trade, and 
thus an important site in the West Central African slave trade in the nineteenth century. 
77 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces Query - Table - Rows: Specific disembarkation 
regions, Columns: Embarkation regions, Cells: Only embarked. Note: these are the estimates, not the hard 
numbers which are available on another section of the webpage. Accessed on 15 March 2011. 
 
78 See Phyllis M. Martin’s The External Trade of the Loango Coast and “The Cabinda Connection,” pp. 47-59. 
 
79 David Richardson, “Slave export from west and west-central Africa,” p. 1-22. Also see, Paul E. Lovejoy, 
“The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on Africa: A Review of the Literature,” The Journal of African History, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (1989) p. 374. 
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study of the Dutch Atlantic slave trade which emphasised the Dutch role in the slave trade on the 
Loango Coast as early as the 1670s.80  
Although the geographical categories of the Voyages Database build upon a conventional 
understanding of Western Africa, the validity of these geographical categories has come under 
scrutiny in recent scholarship.81 At the Slave Voyages Database and African Economic History 
workshop in Toronto, 2010, Paul E. Lovejoy and Jelmer Vos presented papers questioning the 
boundaries between the Upper Guinea Coast and the Windward Coast. Furthermore, Stacey 
Sommerdyk and Filipa Ribeiro da Silva presented a paper questioning the conflation of the Loango 
and Angola Coasts into the single category of West Central Africa.82 This thesis expands upon this 
last question. The category of West Central Africa encompasses a number of geographical regions 
with conflicting definitions. The map above gives one interpretation of these definitions. The 
primary terms used to describe sections of this coast are Angola, Kongo, and Loango. While Kongo 
and Loango are pretty straight forward categories, Kongo being an African community situated to 
the south of the Congo River and Loango being an African community to the North of the Congo 
River, the definition of Angola’s location and size differs from one group of European traders to 
the next and shifts significantly over time. 
In his book Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800, John K. Thornton defines three` 
“military-diplomatic regions” in Atlantic Africa: Upper Guinea, Lower Guinea and Angola. He 
suggests that people within these regions “had more interactions among themselves than with 
                                                          
80 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p.60. 
 
81 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1969); Joseph C. 
Miller Way of Death; Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery; and Joseph Inikori, Forced Migration: The 
Impact of the Export Trade on African Societies, (London: Hutchison, 1982) have used West Central Africa as 
a transatlantic slaving region in their assessments of the slave trade. In contrast, Patrick Manning has 
identified Loango and Angola as separate slave trading regions. See: Patrick Manning, Slavery and African 
Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
 
82 The Slave Voyage Database and African Economic History Workshop was hosted by the Harriet Tubman 
Institute at York University, Toronto, Canada on Monday, May 3, 2010. Papers presented included: Jelmer 
Vos, "The Growth of the Atlantic Slave Trade on the Windward Coast of Africa";  Paul E. Lovejoy, “What 
Happened to the Upper Guinea Coast in the Voyage Database?"; and, Stacey Sommerdyk and Filipa Ribeiro 
da Silva,    “Re-examining the Slave Trade on the West Central African Coast: Looking behind the Numbers". 
These papers will be included in a forthcoming special issue of African Economic History. 
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those lying around them.”83 Within this context, Thornton defines Angola as “the whole of west 
central Africa, from the coast of Gabon to Angola.”84 This definition in itself contains a difficulty: 
Angola is both a region and a distinct sub-region within that region. Having defined the region, 
what is the definition of the sub-region? This question is difficult to answer as definitions shifted 
over time. Economic and cultural exchange predated Portuguese settlement in this area. The first 
major period of cross-cultural exchange mediated  by Portuguese navigator Diogo Cão and Kongo 
leader Nzinga a Nkuwu got underway in 1485 when Nkuwu requested the Portuguese send priests 
and artisans to build a church in Kongo. This was followed by a period of Kongo experimentation 
with Portuguese legal, agricultural, and religious practices, many of which were limited or 
disregarded as unsuitable to the local environment.85 It was not until almost a century later that 
Thornton suggests that the initial Portuguese colony of Angola was formed in the 1570s. Through 
the seventeenth century the Portuguese expanded their economic and cultural interests on the 
Angola Coast to include a military presence by inserting themselves in a series of conflicts between 
the Kongo and the Ndongo. While Joseph Miller contest the ability of this military presence to 
exert the will of the Portuguese state over the polities of the Angola Coast in the early period of 
contact, these outposts formed the foundations of the Portuguese settlement in Angola.86 Thus, at 
the dawn of the seventeenth century Angola was a small colony centered on Luanda and hemmed 
in by Kongo to the north and Ndongo to the east. Throughout the seventeenth century, the 
Portuguese along with their Imbangala allies pressed steadily eastward gaining land and slaves 
from Ndongo.87 The eighteenth century was characterized by less intense fighting, minimal 
expansion of the Angola colony, and frequent raids to supply the slave trade. The Portuguese 
colony exerted nominal power over its subjects in the vicinity of the colony engaging in frequent 
“low key wars.”88 In Jan Vansina’s book Kingdoms of the Savanna, he aptly reminds us: “The 
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conquest of Angola is something that lasted for centuries.”89 Using modern maps of Angola, which 
reach from the Congo River in the north (including the hotly contested region of Cabinda to the 
north of the Congo River) to the Kalahari Desert in the south and reach roughly a third of the way 
to the eastern African coast, it is impossible to project backwards and imagine the Angola of the 
transatlantic slave trade. 
In addition the problem of fluctuating definitions of Angola over time, the Dutch present a 
contrasting definition of Angola altogether. Johannes Postma addresses this issue in his 1990 book 
The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815: “The northernmost portion of [the West Central 
African Coast], between Cameroon and the Congo River, was generally referred to by the Dutch as 
Angola, although it has also been referred to as Loango after the seventeenth-century African 
state in that region. This mix up of historical and contemporary labels can be confusing.” 90 To 
avoid this confusion Postma chooses to use the term Loango-Angola in reference to the region 
north of the Congo. Postma goes on to explain: 
Contemporary Dutch documents nearly always referred to [West Central Africa] 
as Angola, although after 1649 they really meant the area north of the Congo 
River. This area would be more appropriately referred to as Loango, after the 
dominant state of the region during the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries… For a few years after 1642, when the WIC *Dutch West India 
Company] also controlled the coast of what today is called Angola, the whole 
Loango-Angola region was separately administered as Africa-South from the 
port of Luanda, while the Guinea coast under Elmina was referred to as 
Africa-North.91 
Another example of confusing geography on the West Central African coast is found in the 
category ‘Congo North’ found in the Voyages Database. On the online version of the database, no 
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definition of this region is available. Masquerading under the title of ‘Port’, this first region stands 
out as the origin of 88 per cent of enslaved Africans embarked on Dutch ships, by far the category 
with the highest Dutch involvement on the Loango Coast. Further investigation revealed that 
Dutch historian Johannes Postma collected the data for 176 of the 238 voyages in this category. 
This raises some questions: What was Postma’s original purpose in creating this category? Do the 
original sources contain more detailed information? And perhaps most importantly, how did this 
key information get lost in between Postma’s analysis and the Voyages Databases? This first 
question can be easily answered by looking at Postma’s 1990 analysis of his Dutch data. As Postma 
explained above: when the Dutch refer to Angola after 1649, they almost always are referring to 
the Loango Coast.92 Thus the category ‘Congo North’ might be better understood as Loango Coast 
undefined. 
Examining the Numbers 
Having problematized the definitions used for West Central Africa in the construction of the 
Voyages Database, this section will use the raw data collected in the database to examine the 
number of enslaved Africans embarking at each port and describe the patterns of trade which 
emerge. Along the 1,200 kilometre stretch of coast referred to as West Central Africa, Europeans 
purchased slaves at 25 known locations. From north to south, these are the locations recorded by 
European traders from which slaves were embarked: Mayumba, Kiloango, Loango, Malemba, 
Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire [Congo River], Mpinda, Ambriz, Rio Dande [Dande 
River], St. Paul de Loanda [Luanda], Salinas, Coanza River [Kwanza River], Ambona, Benguela Velha 
[Old Benguela], Novo Redondo, Quicombo [Kikombo]and Benguela. Although economic historians 
have hitherto dealt with this coast as one unit to be compared with the Gold Coast or the Bight of 
Biafra, the diverging shipping patterns of this region, the geographical divide of the Congo, the 
differing political systems, and the volume of trade itself all indicate a clear divide between the 
Loango Coast to the north of the Congo River and the Angolan Coast to the south. 
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Tracing trading patterns of different European groups in the various ports of West Central Africa 
can help to understand trading relations on the coast. This section will identify the location and 
evaluate the importance of each West Central African port (as listed in Table 2 below) beginning 
with the northernmost port of Mayumba. Mayumba and Kiloango sat on the northern periphery of 
the West Central African slave trading region. Mayumba was the northernmost port, trading a 
mere 2,596 slaves. This port traded the bulk of these slaves to French ships. Slightly to the south of 
Mayumba was Kilongo which traded 1,145 slaves to American ships. 
The next port to the south of Kilongo was Loango Bay. Loango is a sheltered bay to the north of 
Cabinda. This port was the dominant trading port of the Vili people who provided at least 116,000 
slaves for the transatlantic trade. The slave trade at Loango Bay was dominated by the French who 
shipped almost half or 55,000 of the slaves from this port. They were followed by the British and  
the Dutch with 23,000 slaves apiece, with the remainder split between Portuguese/Brazilian, 
American and Spanish ships.93  
To the south of Loango Bay was Malemba, the primary Atlantic port of the Kotchi people. Current 
figures from the database record 191,000 slaves purchased at Malemba. This port was dominated 
by the French who embarked almost 78,000 slaves. The Portuguese followed closely with 63,000 
slaves, and the Dutch and the British with approximately 25,000 apiece. Malemba is central to this 
thesis as it stands out as the most important MCC port in West Central Africa.94 
Further south, Cabinda was the most significant slaving port of the three sheltered bays on the 
Loango Coast. Cabinda Bay was the primary Atlantic port of the Woyo people. Situated to the 
north of the Congo River, it was the second largest exporter of slaves in West Central Africa 
exporting one third of the number of slave exported from Luanda at approximately 348,000.  
                                                          
93 David Eltis and David Richardson have suggested that Loango Bay was the eighth largest port of the 
transatlantic slave trade estimating 418,000 slaves passed through this port. This is almost four times the 
total for the raw data listed above. See Table 5 in David Eltis and David Richardson, Atlas of the Transatlantic 
Slave Trade (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) p. 90. 
 
94 Eltis and Richardson have estimated that 549,000 slaves entered the Atlantic market by way of Malemba 
making it the sixth largest port of the transatlantic slave trade. This is more than double the raw data listed 
above. Ibid. 
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Table 2: Numbers of Enslaved Africans Embarked in the Primary West Central African Ports by Ship Flag 
 
 
 
Sources: Primary West Central African Ports exclude all ports embarking enslaved Africans on less than three ships in addition to geographically obscure ports as discussed above 
accounting for approximately 480,000 enslaved Africans. Figures for this table were taken from http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Accessed: 12 March 2010.  
Port Spain / Uruguay Portugal / Brazil Great Britain Netherlands U.S.A. France Denmark / Baltic Other Totals 
Loango Coast          
Cabinda 4,276 241,198 29,572 6,521 10,347 55,972   347,886 
Congo North (Loango North) 140 1,034 4,179 78,057 2,635 2,859 100  89,004 
Congo River 5,132 32,022 39,113  37,797 3,392 562 1,250 119,268 
Rio Zaire  2,542       2,542 
Kilongo     1,145    1,145 
Loango Bay 3,727 5,176 23,293 23,148 4,873 55,311   115,528 
Malemba  63,066 24,572 25,742  77,843   191,223 
Mayumba 210 212 716  149 1,309   2,596 
Mpinda    2,554     2,554 
Angola Coast          
Ambona   1,016      1,016 
Ambriz 1,895 61,486 11,646  4,853 4,665   84,545 
Benguela 3,982 336,442   1,537 331 391  342,683 
Benguela Velho 401       401 
Coanza River  29 531       560 
Novo Redondo 1,795       1,795 
Quicombo  622       622 
Salinas  572       572 
Luanda 5,424 1,350,134 1,304 15,827 107 801 150 325 1,374,072 
Northern Region 13,485 345,250 121,445 136,022 56,946 196,686 662 1,250 871,746 
Southern Region 11,330 1,751,983 13,966 15,827 6,497 5,797 541 325 1,806,266 
Total 24,815 2,097,233 135,411 151,849 63,443 202,483 1,203 1,575 2,678,012 
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Although the Portuguese were notably the highest exporters embarking approximately 241,000 
slaves, the French managed to acquire 56,000 slaves, the British 30,000 and the Americans 10,000. 
The Dutch and Spanish also had moderate success acquiring slaves at Cabinda, embarking 6,500 
and 4,200 slaves respectively.95 
Acting as the dividing line between the Loango and Angola regions, the banks of the lower Congo 
River (also known as the Rio Zaire) exported approximately 122,000 slaves. It is important to note 
that this “port” does not represent a single market but rather a series of markets dispersed around 
the mouth of the Congo River. Interestingly, this “port” marks the boundary of Portuguese 
dominance in West Central Africa, as the Portuguese did not embark the majority of slaves. 
Instead it was the British who embarked the largest number with 39,000 slaves, followed by the 
Americans with 38,000 and the Portuguese with 35,000. France, Spain, “other” countries (this is 
the category designation from the Voyages Database), and Denmark acquired the remaining 
slaves. This port was one of only two in which “other” countries are reported to have traded in 
West Central Africa.96 
Congo North was not a port at all. It could be more accurately defined as the Loango Coast 
undefined, as argued above. This definition of Congo North would include the ports of Mayumba, 
Kiloango, Loango, Malembo, and Cabinda. Congo North embarked 89,000 slaves. The Dutch 
reportedly used this description with overwhelming frequency, accounting for 78,000 of the slaves 
listed in this category. The British, French, and Americans follow distantly with a few thousand 
slaves apiece, the Portuguese with one thousand, and the Spanish with a couple of hundred. 
Mpinda was a port on the south bank of the Congo River. This port exported 2,554 slaves, trading 
exclusively with the Dutch. Just to the South of Mpinda was Ambriz, situated at the mouth of the 
Rio Loge. Eighty-five thousand slaves embarked from Ambriz. Marking the northernmost point 
dominated by the Portuguese, 61,000 of these slaves were purchased by the Portuguese for 
                                                          
95 According to Eltis and Richardson’s estimates, Cabinda embarked 753,000 slaves. These data suggest that 
Cabinda was the fourth largest slave supplying port below Luanda, Ouidah and Benguela, and the most 
significant slaving port of the Loango Coast. This is more than double the raw data listed above. Ibid. 
 
96 Eltis and Richardson estimate 276,000 slaves were embarked at the Congo River, making it the twelfth 
most significant slave supplying “port”. This is more than double the raw data. Ibid. 
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export. The British shipped 12,000, the Americans and French shipped 5,000 apiece, and the 
Spanish shipped the remaining 2,000. 
Situated in the middle of the West Central Africa coast, Luanda was the single most important port 
in West Central Africa exporting approximately 1.4 million slaves. It transported these slaves to the 
coast along the Bengo River to the north of Luanda and from the Kikombo and Kuvo Rivers to the 
south. Interestingly, all seven major European slave trading nations attempted to gain a foothold 
in the lucrative Luanda trade. Yet the Portuguese maintained tight control over this port. They 
transported the majority of the slaves sold at Luanda to the Americas, approximately 1,350,000. 
The Dutch were a far distant second in this trade, transporting only 16,000 slaves or barely one per 
cent of slaves from this port, primarily during the Dutch occupation of Luanda between 1641 and 
1648. Great Britain, Spain, the United States, France and Denmark together shipped less than one 
per cent of the slaves from this port.97 
Between Ambriz and Benguela there were six very minor ports: Salinas, Coanza River, Ambona, 
Benguela Velha, Novo Redondo, and Quicombo. Salinas was the northernmost of these six ports, 
exporting 572 slaves via the Portuguese/Brazilians. Next was Kwanza River with a similar number 
of 560 slaves exported. Below the Coanza River was Ambona; this port exported a surprising 1,016 
slaves on British vessels between 1797 and 1808. This was the only port south of Mpinda to export 
the majority of slaves on non-Portuguese/Brazilian ships. South of the Coanza River was the port 
of Benguela Velha or Old Benguela. Portuguese/Brazilian ships loaded all 401 slaves reported to 
have been purchased at Old Benguela. Between old and new Benguela there were two ports: 
Novo Redondo and Quicombo. These ports exported 1,795 and 622 slaves respectively via 
Portuguese Brazilian vessels. 
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According to the online version of the Voyages Database, Benguela is the third most important 
port of West Central Africa having exported 343,000 slaves.98 Benguela is located between the 
Katumbela and Kuporolo Rivers and was the southernmost port of the transatlantic slave trade on 
the West Central African Coast. The breakdown of national purchases in Benguela, according to 
the database, follow the same pattern as Luanda, being heavily dominated by the Portuguese who 
exported 336,000 of the total slaves, or 98 per cent. The remaining two per cent were embarked 
on Spanish, American, Danish and French ships.99 
These numbers, for the most part, support the thesis of a Portuguese dominated south. However, 
Mpinda emerges as a port which traded exclusively with the Dutch, complicating the idea of 
Portuguese dominance below the Congo River. Due to the relatively low number of slaves 
exported from Mpinda, 2,554, this Dutch dominance simply could represent an anomaly in the 
data. Furthermore, this pattern of trade could have been the result of a less consolidated 
Portuguese sphere of influence in the early trade (this will be discussed in the next section). If so, 
Mpinda could have been the boundary of Portuguese dominance in the earlier period, and as 
Portuguese power consolidated, the boundary shifted to the Congo River. 
In discussing the role of Mpinda in the transatlantic slave trade, Joseph Miller suggest that the 
importance of Mpinda rose in the seventeenth century due to an influx of capital from Dutch and 
British slave merchants.  Whereas the financing of the trade had been hitherto primarily internal 
based out of markets at the Malebo Pool and along the Kwango River, this new influx of capital 
allowed substantial markets to form on the Atlantic Coast. By the late seventeenth century the 
                                                          
98 Mariana Candido has argued that closer to 491,000 slaves embarked from this port. Later she revised this 
figure to 499,000. See, Mariana Candido, Enslaving Frontiers: Slavery, Trade and Identity in Benguela, 
1780-1850, PhD Thesis, (Toronto: York University, 2007) p. 3; and Candido, Fronteras de la Esclavización, p. 
37. While, the Voyages Database does not give a specific estimate for slaves embarking only at Benguela, 
Candido’s figures are completely plausible within the Voyages Database’s estimate of 5.7 million African 
slaves embarking in West Central Africa as a whole. In fact, Daniel Domingues has suggested that the 
number of slaves embarked at Benguela could be as high as 671,100. See: Daniel Domingues, “The Coastal 
Origins of Slaves.” Also, see Table 3 below. 
 
99 Eltis and Richardson suggest as many as 764,000 slaves may have entered the Atlantic market through 
Benguela making it the third most significant supply market. This is well above both Candido and 
Domingues’ estimates for the port (see footnote above). Eltis and Richardson, Atlas of the Transatlantic 
Slave Trade, p. 90. 
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locus of Dutch and British trade shifted again, this time north of the Congo River to Malemba and 
Cabinda.100 This theory of a shifting locus of trade based on investment offers an alternative or 
perhaps even supplementary explanation to the theory of fluctuation of Portuguese power to the 
north postulated above.      
The organizing principle of African regions as defined in the Voyages Database focuses on what the 
key researchers identified as the slaving hinterland, or a set of ports drawing slaves from a 
common source. 101 However, this analysis of West Central Africa argues that African regions 
should be defined by the patterns of trade that evolved between African and European traders. 
Phyllis Martin offers compelling evidence that, in addition to overlapping with the Luanda 
hinterland via the Congo River, the traders of the Loango Coast purchased numerous slaves from 
the same northern and eastern traders from whom they sought ivory and copper.102 Thus, even if 
slaving hinterlands are the criteria for separating the parts of the African Coast, the Loango Coast 
still stands out as a distinct region. (For a more detailed discussion of slaving hinterlands see 
Chapter 5). 
This port-by-port analysis of the slave trade based on national shipping patterns raises questions 
about placing the Loango and Angola Coasts into one category. While the aggregation of these two 
coasts simplified the data collection for this area and emphasized the overall importance of West 
Central Africa as a slave supply region in contrast to the West African Coast, it also ignored the 
diversity of polities and the resulting diversity in trade systems which developed within West 
Central Africa. Now that more information is available on the coast, splitting the West Central 
                                                          
100 Miller, Way of Death, p. 235. 
101 The Encyclopædia Britannica defines hinterlands in terms of imports and exports: “An export 
hinterland is the backcountry region from which the goods being shipped from the port originate and an 
import hinterland is the backcountry region for which the goods shipped to the port are destined. Export 
and import hinterlands have complementary forelands that lie on the seaward side of the port. An export 
foreland is the region to which the goods being shipped from the port are bound and an import foreland is 
the region from which goods being shipped to the port originate.” In this sense the Loango Coast’s slaving 
hinterland is the regions to the interior from which the Loango Coast obtains its slaves for export. See 
“hinterland” (2011). In Encyclopædia Britannica . 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/266517/hinterland Accessed on 25 August 2011. For more 
information on the origins of slaves sold at the Loango Coast, see Chapter 5. 
 
102 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 116-130. 
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African coast into two regions based on the boundary at Mpinda acknowledges the distinct 
natures of the trading systems, with export markets characterized by open trade in the north and 
dominated by Portuguese interests in the south. Traditionally these two regions are called the 
Loango Coast and Angola. Of the 3.3 million enslaved Africans shipped from the West Central 
African coast, the total number of enslaved Africans embarked at geographically identifiable ports 
in this region is 2.7 million. Of these enslaved Africans 870,000, or 33 per cent, were embarked at 
the Loango Coast and 1.8 million, or 67 per cent, were embarked at Angola. Building upon Joseph 
Miller’s idea of the development three competing centers of trade in West Central Africa in the 
eighteenth century, scholars with more expertise in Portuguese Angola may even suggest a further 
separation of Benguela from Luanda, though that reaches beyond the boundaries of this thesis.103 
Table 2, above, clearly marks the northern and southern ports according to the above categories. 
These categories are characterized by Portuguese domination in the south and open trade in the 
north. While the data from the ports listed provide a cumulative total of over two million slaves 
shipped by the Portuguese from West Central Africa, a further analysis shows that almost 84 per 
cent of these slaves were embarked south of the Congo River. Furthermore, the Portuguese 
account for 97 per cent of slaves sold in this region during the transatlantic slave trade. In 
contrast, within West Central Africa the French, British and Dutch traders dominantly favoured the 
region to the north of the Congo River: the French purchased 97 per cent of their slaves on the 
Loango Coast; the British purchased 89 per cent of their slaves there; and, the Dutch made 90 per 
cent of their purchases there.  
Thus, an analysis of the West Central African ports has yielded a result that there is a clear 
boundary of the Portuguese slave trading monopoly at the Congo River. Dividing the data for the 
Loango Coast into two chronological categories further emphasises this difference. Graphs 1, 2 & 
3, below, emphasize a clear shift in the Loango market in the nineteenth century. In an analysis of 
the whole period, Graph 1, it appears that the Portuguese played a significant role on the Loango 
Coast, engaging in 40 per cent of the trade. While this is strictly true, a break down between the   
                                                          
103 See Miller, Way of Death, pp. 207-244. In addition to Miller, both Ferreira and Candido point to the 
distinct nature of the Benguela trade while stopping short of suggesting this separation. See: Ferreira, “The 
Suppression of the Slave trade and Slave Departures from Angola, 1830-1860,” p. 31; and Candido, 
“Merchants and the Business of the Slave Trade,” pp. 1-2. 
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Graph 1: 
 
Flag of Ships Embarking Slaves at the Loango Coast, 1514-1866    Graph 2: Flag of Ships Embarking Slaves in the Loango Coast, 1514-1800
Graph 3: Flag of Ships Embarking Slaves at the Loango Coast, 1801-1866 
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was taken from http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query - 
Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, 
Loango, Malembo, Mayumba, and Mpinda. Accessed: 24 August 2011. 
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1514 to 1800 period (Graph 2) and the 1801 to 1866 period (Graph 3) clearly indicates that the 
Portuguese were not dominant slave trading partners with the traders of the Loango Coast until 
the French, Dutch, and British had abandoned the coast. In the early period, the French clearly 
dominated the trade having embarked 46 per cent of the slaves, followed by the Dutch with 33 
per cent, and the British with 20 per cent; Portugal trailed far behind having purchased only one 
per cent. However, in the later period, the Portuguese (and by this point the Brazilians as well) 
dominate the trade having purchased 75 per cent of the slaves. Here the United States and 
Spain/Uruguay also emerge as players, buying 13 and 3 per cent of slaves respectively. However, 
the combined total of Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France drop to nine per cent. This 
transition was partly due to European wars, and partly due to the success of the British in 
abolishing the slave trade on the West African Coast. 
The Loango Coast ranked among the top four exporters of enslaved Africans, shipping numbers of 
enslaved Africans comparable to the Bights of Biafra and Benin. The calculation in Table 3, below, 
is based on the division of the West Central African Coast as indicated in Table 2 where Loango 
(north) represented one third of the enslaved Africans who embarked from the West Central 
African coast and Angola (south) represented two thirds. Thus calculated, the figures for the 
Loango Coast represented approximately one million enslaved Africans and were comparable to 
the Bight of Biafra which also embarked approximately one million enslaved Africans. These 
regions are only surpassed by the Bight of Benin with 1.5 million enslaved Africans embarked and 
the 2.1 million embarked at the Angolan Coast. 
By creating a time series of the data available for the Loango Coast we can get an even closer look 
at the patterns of trade which evolved throughout the transatlantic slave trade period (see Graph 
4 below). Graph 4 illustrates that traders using the Portuguese (and later Brazilian) flag had only 
nominal engagement in the slave trade on the Loango Coast before 1810. Prior to 1650 slaves did 
not represent a significant commodity on the Loango Coast. Between 1651 and 1720 the Dutch 
purchased the largest number of slaves on the Loango Coast. This Dutch dominance was followed 
by a brief period of British dominance between 1721 and 1740. Between 1741 and 1790 the 
French exported the largest numbers of slaves. Between 1791 and 1810, the British experienced a 
brief resurgence, ended by their abolition of their own trade in 1807. In the 1811 to 1820 period, 
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Table 3: Total Documented Enslaved Africans Embarked for Shipment to the Americas Divided by 
Region 
Region where Slaves Embarked Raw Data Estimates 
Senegambia and offshore Atlantic 403,837 755,513 
Sierra Leone 235,541 388,771 
Windward Coast 181,358 336,868 
Gold Coast 737,236 1,209,321 
Bight of Benin 1,514,814 1,999,060 
Bight of Biafra and Gulf of Guinea islands 1,079,846 1,594,560 
Loango Coast 1,028,286 
5,694,574 
Angola Coast 2,129,840 
Southeast Africa and Indian Ocean islands 378,283 542,668 
Other Africa 330,661 n/a 
Asia and Africa 490 n/a 
Total 8,020,191 12,521,336 
 
Source: Figures for this table were taken from http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query 1: 
Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa and St. Helena and, Query 2: All. Accessed on 8 June 2011. Note: 
the Database contains a combined estimate for the Loango Coast and the Angola Coast together. The data used to 
calculate separate totals from the raw data for the West Central African Ports excludes all ports embarking enslaved 
Africans on fewer than three voyages in addition to geographically obscure ports as discussed above, accounting for 
approximately 480,000 enslaved Africans. 
 
 
the volume of slaves embarked on the Loango Coast experienced its most significant increase as 
the Portuguese/Brazilians emerged as the dominant traders. Between 1821 and 1850, the 
Portuguese continued to dominate this trade, embarking the majority of all of the Loango Coast 
slaves they purchased throughout the entire slave trade. For the last 13 years of the trade, the 
Americans embarked the majority of slaves. However these numbers cannot be taken at face 
value, the Voyages Database simply records the categories captains recorded in their logs.  In a 
more nuanced analysis, Daniel B. Domingues da Silva has suggested that some of these records 
may have been falsified causing the numbers of slaves embarked at Malemba and Cabinda to have 
been overinflated as Portuguese ships. During the era of British suppression of the slave trade, 
Brazilian traders would obtain licences for Cabinda and Malemba, but continued to trade in the 
Bight of Benin. This allowed them both to avoid the bureaucracy of Portuguese dominated ports,  
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Graph 4: Slave Exports from the Loango Coast by Ship Flag 
 
Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, 
Malembo, Mayumba, and Mpinda. Accessed: 12 March 2010. 
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such as Luanda and Benguala, and to avoid seizure by British patrols, should they be boarded after 
loading slaves.  This strategy was particularly used between 1810 and 1830.104  
Despite the ambiguities introduced by the Portuguese/Brazilian trade in the early nineteenth 
century, the data from the Voyages Database provide enough information to trace the broad 
patterns of trade on the Loango Coast throughout the transatlantic slave trade. Contrary to 
popular opinion, these data show the Netherlands, Great Britain, and France competing for the 
domination of the slave trade between 1650 and 1810, while the Portuguese/Brazilians dominated 
the slave trade on the coast for a mere 40 years between 1810 and 1850. Thus a pattern of open 
trade defined the slave trade on the Loango Coast, while the Angolan Coast was distinct for its 
Portuguese-dominated trade. The degrees to which these contrasting patterns depended on local 
politics or on European wars are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Due to the limits of the online version of the Voyages Database, it is difficult to get a picture of the 
overall trading patterns of slave embarkation on the Loango Coast throughout the transatlantic 
slave trade. However, the website is useful to look at the overall trading patterns on the West 
Central African Coast. Graph 5, below, shows that the West Central African trade began to 
increase sharply in 1723 and grew steadily to its peak in 1829 with the embarkation of almost 
58,000 enslaved Africans in a single year. This pattern of embarkation is in contrast to the overall 
trend of the transatlantic trade which, despite its peak in 1829 when approximately 113,000 
enslaved Africans were embarked, was already in decline; the majority of trade happened 
between 1765 and 1807. One major explanation for this difference can be found in Britain’s 
abolition of the slave trade and their commitment to enforce abolition in the Northern Atlantic 
through navy patrols from 1807. While these patrols significantly decreased the transatlantic trade 
as a whole, the West Central African Coast experienced a boom as it continued to supply 
pre-established markets in South America and the Caribbean and at the same time began to feed 
  
                                                          
104 Daniel B. Domingues da Silva, “The Coastal Origins of Slaves Leaving Angola: From the Eighteenth to the 
Nineteenth Century,” Paper presented at the 124th Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association 
(San Diego, CA, 2010), p. 4. 
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Graph 5: Total Number of Captives Embarked in Africa separated by West Central Africa and All 
Other Regions 
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Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query: All except West Central Africa and St. Helena, 
and Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West Central Africa and St. Helena. Data exported 06 June 2011. 
new markets in the Caribbean, and to a lesser degree markets in North America, that had 
previously been supplied by West Africa.105 It is important to reemphasize that this analysis, in 
consistency with the rest of the thesis, uses the raw data. The editors of the Voyages Database 
stress their expectation that the data for the earlier stages of the slave trade, and particularly the 
Portuguese shipping, are incomplete.106 Therefore, this analysis provides only a rough sketch of 
the broader patterns of trade. 
                                                          
105 The question of the demand for slaves in the Carribean is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
106 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/methodology-17.faces Accessed on 19 August 2011. 
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Using the categories of the Loango and Angola Coasts as defined above, it is possible to trace the 
trading patterns of these distinct regions, (see Graph 6 below). If the West Central African Coast 
had truly been one trading region, minimal differences between the trading patterns of the two 
regions might be expected. While the trajectories of the two lines are similar, divergences occur as 
is clear in Graph 4. The two coasts embarked slaves at different rates at different times. Slave 
trading on the Angola Coast predated the emergence of a sustained slave trade on the Loango 
Coast by at least seven decades, beginning in the 1580s. Interestingly, slave trading on the Angola 
Coast had an early peak in the 1620s, when 32,000 slaves were recorded to have left this coast. In 
the 1650s the slave trade at the Angola Coast went into sharp decline as the slave trade on the 
Loango Coast emerged.  
Graph 6: African Embarked in West Central Africa Divided by Region 
Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West 
Central Africa and St. Helena. Table exported 17 May 2010. This chart uses the categories as defined by Table 2. 
From 1661 to 1720 the Loango Coast maintained a modest but steady stream of slave exports, 
embarking between ten and fifteen thousand slaves per decade. Through the eighteenth century, 
the Angola and Loango Coasts both peaked in the 1760s, but the Loango Coast did not experience 
the large peak in exports that Angola did in the 1740s. Likewise, as the number of exports on the 
Angola Coast skyrocketed in the 1790s, exports were actually falling in Loango. Remarkably, the 
Loango Coast recovered in the early nineteenth century to provide a suspiciously disproportionate 
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number of slaves in the era of early British naval suppression, exporting an extraordinary 176,000 
slaves in only ten years.107 Between 1811 and 1830, the number of slaves known to have 
embarked from the Loango Coast account for a total of almost 20 per cent of the known total for 
the entire Loango Slave trade. Thus, while both the Loango and Angola Coast engaged in growing 
percentages of the transatlantic trade in the nineteenth century, the two patterns of supply 
diverged throughout the entire slave trading period. However, the figures from the 1811 to 1830 
period should be viewed with caution, in light of suggestions that Brazilians’ used false records in 
this period (as discussed above). 
Building from geographical separation and the divergent slave trade patterns, this chapter and 
subsequent chapters seek to show the Loango and Angola Coasts were distinct trading regions. 
These coasts were distinguished by their differing patterns of European settlement, maritime 
trade, and cultural interaction. Table 4 below summarizes these differences. This division is 
underpinned by the contrasting characteristics of local governance. The Angola Coast was 
distinguished by a much earlier pattern of cross-cultural exchange and settlement followed by the 
insertion of the Portuguese into the seventeenth century conflicts between the Ndongo and 
Kongo, and the Ndongo and Matamba, which allowed the Portuguese to establish a military 
presence on the Angola Coast.  The earlier and more stable presence of these settlements allowed 
for a more significant degree of cultural transfer. In contrast, the Loango Coast was characterized 
by centralized polities which remained relatively peaceful throughout the transatlantic slave trade, 
allowing them to maintain open trade with European partners and a level of insulation from 
European influences. 
 
                                                          
107 During the era of British suppression Eltis estimates that approximately 7750 slave ships embarked on 
transatlantic slave trading missions and that 1635 of these ships were prevented by the British from 
delivering their slave cargo. David Eltis, Economic Growth in the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) pp. 97-8. For further details on suppression and the end of the slave 
trade in the nineteenth century see: Leslie Bethel, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil 
and the Slave Trade? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending 
of the Slave Trade (New York: Africana Press, 1975); and João Pedro Marques, The Sounds of Silence: 
Nineteenth-Century Portugal and the Abolition of the Slave Trade (New York: Berghahn, 2006). 
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Table 4: Patterns of Cross-Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century West Central 
Africa 
 Loango Coast Angola Coast 
European Settlement:  Minimal Sustained 
Maritime Trade: Open maritime trade Portuguese nominal monopoly 
Government: 
 
 
Loango Domination followed by 
the Comparatively Peaceful 
Independence of Kakongo and 
Ngoyo 
Periods of political conflict 
between the Ndongo and 
Kongo up until 1665 and 
between the Ndongo and 
Matamba until 1656 
European Cultural and 
Religious Influence: 
Minimal Sustained within a steadily 
growing sphere of influence 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted the difficulties in defining geography in the pre-colonial period before 
Africans had a written culture and before Europeans agreed upon a standardized map. It suggests 
that Atlantic Africa, or Western Africa, is made up of two large regions: Western Africa stretching 
from Senegambia to the Bight of Biafra, and West Central Africa which encompasses the Loango 
and Angola Coasts. The Loango and Angola Coasts were politically and geographically distinct 
regions divided at the Congo River. This contrast is evident in the differing slave trading patterns 
which developed on the coasts. While the Loango Coast established and maintained competitive 
trade among European nations, the Angola Coast, at least south of Ambriz, developed as a 
nominal Portuguese monopoly. Furthermore, an analysis of the Voyages Database concurs with 
Phyllis Martin’s findings that the Dutch, British, and French ships embarked the majority of slaves 
from the Loango Coast prior to 1810. Thus, it was first the Dutch and later the British and French 
who developed the slave trading systems, which will be described in later chapters, rather than 
the Portuguese. 
Though the historiography of the slave trade has been slow to acknowledge the significant 
contribution of this area to the transatlantic slave trade, the detailed information of the Voyages 
Database has allowed us to discover not only that it was the fourth largest slave trading region in 
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the Atlantic World, but also that the Loango Coast was one of the most stable regions of the 
transatlantic slave trade. Thus, it is a region with a rich history of Afro-European trade relations 
and economic development. As such, understanding this history helps us to begin to gain a greater 
understanding of the context in which the Atlantic World was created. 
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Chapter 2: Afro-European Encounters 
on the Loango Coast 
 
Current discussions of trade relations between Africans and Europeans continue to be highly 
influenced by themes of modernity and “civilization”.108 The idea of “modern” Europeans and their 
moral and technological superiority over “traditional” or “backward” African systems can be at 
times projected backwards to assume that Europeans had always been a source of enlightened 
ideas and superior knowledge to peoples in Africa. This emphasis on inherent inferiority stands in 
opposition to the Walter Rodney approach to Afro-European contact, in which Europeans instead 
are held to have perverted previously progressing African cultures and political systems by forcing 
Africans to adopt new economic and political arrangements which conformed to European 
demands for goods and persons.109 However, both explanations of Africa’s lack of development 
along the lines of modern Western Europe undercut African agency and the existence of 
complicated mechanisms of governance and trade prior to European contact. 
In The World that Trade Created, Kenneth Pomeranze and Steven Topik emphasise the importance 
of understanding the local within the global context. Furthermore, they highlight the need to 
acknowledge the contributions of all actors in the global market without privileging one group. In 
their understanding of the formation of a global market they argue: 
                                                          
108 For a critique of this focus on modernity and “civilization see: Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: 
Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: California University Press, 2005), pp. 91-93, 102-104, 113-149; John 
Thornton, Africa and Africans, pp. 1-7; John M. Cinnamon, “Colonial Anthropologies and the Primordial 
Imagination in Equatorial Africa,” in Helen Tilley and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), Ordering Africa: Anthropology, 
European Imperialism and the Politics of Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 
225-251; Richard Rathbone, “Law, Polities, and Inference”, in Derek R. Peterson and Giacomo Macola (eds.), 
Recasting the Past: History Writing and Political Work in Modern Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2009), pp. 113-124; and, Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 11–110. 
 
109 See Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. While Walter Rodney’s argument has been 
strongly challenged in academic circles, it continues to have significant popular currency. See Rhoda 
Howard-Hassmann, Reparations to Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) p. 61-87. 
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The market structures that are basic to our world were not natural or inevitable, always 
latent and waiting to be “opened up”; rather, markets are, for better or worse, socially 
constructed and socially embedded. They require a host of agreements on weights, 
measures, value, means of payment, and contracts that have not been universal nor 
permanent, plus still more basic agreements about what things should be for sale, who 
was entitled to sell them, and which people could haggle about prices…without 
compromising their dignity in the eyes of their neighbors.110  
This chapter follows Pomeranze and Topik’s lead in first trying to imagine the global context in 
which Europeans encountered the Loango Coast in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, and 
second in which the Dutch Middelburg Commercial Company traded in the eighteenth century. 
Moving away from Pomeranze and Topik’s focus on Asia to focus on the African contribution to 
the World Economy in the eighteenth century, this chapter begins to reimagine the perspective of 
both European and African trade partners at the beginning of the Modern Era and to document 
what kind of socially constructed trade mechanisms they may have attempted to develop on the 
Loango Coast and the relative success or failure of these attempts..   
Until the nineteenth century Europeans did not enjoy decisive technological or military advantages 
over their counterparts in many other regions of the world.111 This chapter will show the 
complexities of both systems, while emphasising the negotiations and adaptation inherent in 
making these systems compatible. This approach involves inherent difficulties: the source material 
for medieval and early-modern European trade is diverse, and analysis of it has been extensive. At 
the other extreme, Afrocentric sources are scarce, and the written material we have from the 
period of contact is overwhelmingly Eurocentric. When it comes to the Loango Coast, the sources 
are more limited than most Western African trading regions as few Europeans spent sustained 
periods of time on the coast prior to the nineteenth century, and the discourse around these 
                                                          
110 Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik. The World that Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World 
Economy, 2
nd
 ed. M. E. Sharpe, London: 2006, p. xii. 
 
111 John Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 
pp. 135–57; John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire (London: Penguin, 2007) pp. 
104–55; 
and, Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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sources is even more limited. However, this critique is not meant to imply that analysis is 
impossible but rather to note the boundaries of our knowledge and caution against formulating 
definitive conclusions. 
First, this chapter will rely upon an extensive secondary literature to construct a picture of the 
European trading conventions which had evolved by the time of contact with sub-Saharan Africa. 
Second, this chapter will examine early records of contacts between European traders and 
explorers and the people of the Loango Coast, contrasting them with experiences of other 
cross-cultural contact across the globe. This analysis will place the discussion of African models of 
trade and European reactions to these models, within a broader context of cross-cultural 
encounters. This is followed by a more specific contextualization of the MCC within the Dutch 
transatlantic slave trade. Finally, this chapter will use the port of Malemba as a case study to trace 
the evolution of trading mechanisms during the peak of the slave trade between Middelburg and 
Malemba merchants in the eighteenth century. The data for this case study have been taken from 
Middelburg Commercial Company’s trading records, which list 3,154 transactions at Malemba for 
purchases of 6,819 enslaved Africans. In these transactions, the Mafouk emerges as a dominant 
figure in negotiating Afro-European trade relations. This case study of a single port provides a 
theory that the MCC and Malemba merchants developed a system of barter based, ship trade 
supported by a centralized African authority. This structure allowed the modification of existing 
structures to allow the significant transfer of goods and persons without constituting a significant 
threat to preexisting traditions based on matrilineal or kin based legitimization structures. This 
theory is tested for the entirety of the Loango Coast in subsequent chapters. This analysis has 
implications not only for the histories of the transatlantic slave trade, but also for the histories of 
the evolution of merchant communities and the formation of global trading networks. 
European Merchant Communities in the 1500s 
In her 1989 book Before European Hegemony, Janet L. Abu-Lughod writes: 
Before Europe became one of the world-economies, in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, when it joined the long distance trade system that 
stretched through the Mediterranean into the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf 
and on into the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Malacca to reach 
China, there were numerous preexisitent world-economies. Without them, 
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when Europe gradually “reached out,” it would have grasped empty space 
rather than riches.112 
Abu-Lughod raises a point of vital importance to this study: Europeans did not create trade as they 
“reached out” but rather tapped into other existing trade-economies. Before examining the 
transatlantic slave trade or even the European “reaching out” into Sub-Saharan Africa, it is vital to 
understand the experiences Europeans were familiar with and the systems which they had 
developed. 
 Most historians agree that the 1500s mark the beginning of a new era of trade and migration in 
world history, if not in European history, brought on by innovations in shipbuilding. 
Comprehending European conceptions of trade mechanisms and merchant communities on the 
eve of the shipping revolution is a key element in reimagining the cross-cultural contact and the 
trade which evolved out of this transition.113 This section will explore the state of affairs in 
European trade at the point of sub-Saharan contact. In his discussion of the origins of long 
distance trade, Patrick Manning identifies a basic motivation for these trading networks: “For rare 
or desirable goods, people have long been willing to travel great distances or to pay unusual 
prices.”114 Given the uncertainties of travel, especially in earlier periods, the potential gain had to 
outweigh not only the significant investment of time and capital but also the risks of theft or loss 
of life. Thus merchants began to create networks to minimize these risks. Manning explains: 
Moving goods from one place to another involved more than identifying the 
desirable goods and developing means of transporting them. In addition, the 
people who transported goods had to be able to sustain themselves, to 
                                                          
112
 Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, p.12. 
 
113
 In this context the “shipping revolution” refers to the transformative period where shipping technology, 
led by the Portuguese and Spanish, which brought together the ship building techniques of  Northern 
European, Mediterranean, and Arabian shipbuilders to create the “three-master” or ship with three masts 
and three mainsails which could withstand the challenges of trans-ocean travel. See Jaap R. Bruijn, 
“Productivity, Profitability, and Costs of Private and Corporate Dutch Ship Owning in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries,” in James D. Tracy (ed.) The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the 
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establish cordial relations with those along the way, and to communicate in 
detail. The social systems needed to provide food and housing for those on the 
move, and needed to protect them against bandits who would surely arise to 
seize valuable goods. 115 
Manning goes on to emphasise the need for merchants to acquire not only language skills but also 
knowledge of supply and demand. This knowledge would allow their travel to be profitable. 
Additionally, knowledge of methods of exchange would allow travelers to gain sustenance, safety, 
and shelter along the way. 116 
Over time, merchants employed various strategies to address these obstacles. By the late middle 
ages, European merchants had formed networks linking key trading ports throughout the Baltic, 
the Atlantic Coast, and the Mediterranean. Through these networks, merchants travelling beyond 
their own countries developed mechanisms of trade which allowed them to navigate the hurdles 
of cross-cultural trade over long distances: safety, transport, communication, and information. 
These mechanisms would inform the European approach to cross-cultural trade in the subsequent 
expansion into African markets. 
One method of examining this transformation lies in tracing the development of institutions. 
Douglas North has described the role of institutions in economic development: 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been 
devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. 
Together with the standard constraints of economics they define exchange.117 
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In contrast to North’s conceptions of formal rules encompassing property rights, African economic 
systems privileged labour control over property rights. Nevertheless, North’s description of 
institutions can be useful in examining the development of the transatlantic slave trade.118 Avner 
Greif, in his 2006 book Institutions and the Path to Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval 
Trade, went on to further develop the function of an institution: 
Institutions are the engine of history because…they constitute much of the 
structure that influences behaviour, including behaviour leading to new 
institutions. Their independent impact and their interrelations with social and 
cultural factor imply that we cannot study them as reflecting only 
environmental factors or the interests of various agents … Comparative and 
historical institutional analysis … foster our ability to capture and study 
institutions from the required broader perspective. 
Furthermore he suggests: “Institutions may well be the engine of history, and to the extent that 
the Rise of the West is due to its underpinning institutions, the roots of this rise may have begun 
to take hold as early as the late medieval period.”119 While Greif’s emphasis on institutions as 
fundamental to processes of change and his identification of roots of an early modern 
transformation in medieval European institutions is consistent with the argument of this thesis, 
this chapter goes on to suggest that the negotiation of institutions throughout the world had a 
lasting impact on all of the cultures which engaged in these negotiations. Furthermore, this impact 
was not a process of Europeans imprinting their values and behaviours on other cultures but 
rather a cross-fertilization of ideas throughout the world which created new systems of interaction 
between continents which transformed all of the actors involved. 
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Merchant communities also held a key role in creating and transforming these institutions. 
Frédéric Mauro’s discussion of merchant communities positions the merchant community as a 
social organization separate from the other elements of trade: “Apart from the geography of the 
trade and commercial mechanisms, institutions, techniques, commercial doctrines, and politics, 
merchant community is the social base of the merchant universe.”120 The merchant community is 
the web that connects all of these elements of trade, which fosters the community’s development 
and protects it as it evolves. 
In fifteenth-century Europe, foreign merchants collected together in port cities to protect their 
trading interests. Membership in these groups was linguistically and nationally specific: “the 
members of these communities were foreigners who formed the “nation”, autonomous groups 
with their own privileges and rivalries. The prosperity of these “nations” depended, above all, on 
the attitude of the city toward foreigners and on the legal status awarded to them by the city.”121 
These foreign “nations” were the key organizing principle of merchant communities in this period. 
Multiple “nations” scattered throughout Europe, and later throughout the world, made up an 
ethnicized trading diaspora. Varying slightly in nature from port to port, nations were a common 
feature of the fifteenth-century European market. A merchant nation was made up of “merchants 
from the same geographical area, speaking a common language and often subjects of the same 
political entity – *which+ represented the corporate body to the host country’s authorities.” 122 
Drawing from evidence from the Hanseatic League, an economic alliance of trading ports which 
dominated commerce from the Baltic to the North Sea from the thirteenth to seventeenth 
century, Mauro describes the function of such a nation: “In legal matters, they occupied a place 
between the guilds or the corporations and lesser associations known as eendrachtigheid. A 
merchant nation was established with the tacit approval of the territorial prince and with the 
                                                          
120
 Frédéric Mauro, “Merchant Communities 1350-1750” in James D. Tracy (ed.) The Rise of Merchant 
Empires: long-distance trade in the early modern world, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 255. 
 
121
 Ibid., p. 262. 
 
122
 Ivana Elbl, ‘Nation, Bolsa, and Factory: Three Institutions of Late-Medieval Portuguese Trade with 
Flanders,’ The International History Review, 14 (February 1992) p. 1. 
 
75 
 
consent of the prince of the merchants’ land.”123 Thus, establishing and maintaining a merchant 
community involved a balancing act between the political and economic spheres. 
Membership in a mercantile nation and the implicit expression of mutual trust also came with a 
communal responsibility. This responsibility was often supported by both the local government 
and the nation’s origin. The example of the Portuguese nation in Flanders illustrates one path for 
these transitions. The Portuguese nation was formally recognized by Flanders in 1411 when John 
the Fearless granted them legal status, protection, right of assembly, limited self-governence, and 
self representation. At the same time, the Portuguese nation was absolved of the burden of 
collective responsibility.124 The 1438 amendment of this charter allowed the election of judges and 
consuls for the litigation of Portuguese civil disputes. In 1487 the Portuguese were recognized as 
having some recourse against the defaults of local money-changers, a protection granted earlier to 
the “Spaniards and Easterlings”. 125 
The recognition of legal status of merchant communities brought obligations, or rather shifted 
obligations. Prior to the fifteenth century, if a merchant attached to a nation impinged upon local 
laws or customs the entire nation was liable for the fault and felt the consequences, but with the 
development of support systems for the individual foreign merchant, individual merchants faced 
the consequences of their actions with the support of their nation, rather than nations taking the 
brunt of a conflict. “*Collective responsibility’s+ gradual abandonment by the major European 
commercial powers was a major achievement, and a sign of the growing importance of foreign 
trade in the late Middle Ages.”126 Nevertheless, this path was a gradual one, and attempts to 
punish a trading nation for the transgressions of an individual factor or merchant continued well 
into the fifteenth century. 
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With the diminution of collective responsibility came the evolution of mutual trust. European 
systems of trust between Portugal and Flanders “were based on the reciprocity of favours and … 
friendship … The relationship between them, dating back to the early Middle Ages, was of a 
dynastic and religious nature.”127 If trust in Europe was primarily based on a common identity, this 
raises questions about how non-Europeans fared in European markets during this period. 
Within Western Europe, Jews and Armenians “stood out against the purely European western 
background.”128 In order to understand how Iberian merchants, as the first Europeans to 
encounter sub-Saharan Africa, acted in their early encounters with Western African merchants, it 
is important to note the transition which was taking place within the Iberian Peninsula during this 
period.129 During this transformation the Jewish separation from local Christian communities 
became more pronounced, with the imposition on them of new limitations on social mobility and 
employment opportunities. Due to these limitations, Jewish people remained outsiders, lacking 
full integration, though they had often resided in the same location for generations. As outsiders 
attempting to integrate into upper levels of society, they were limited to employment as 
merchants and money lenders. As a fringe profession equally protected and restricted within 
nations, merchant groups were allowed to achieve relatively high levels of integration and 
economic success. Heather Rae in her 2002 book State Identities and the Homogenisation of 
Peoples highlights the transformation of Spain from a tolerant society to a more homogeneous 
model in the early modern period.130 However, Rae goes on to argue that though the Spanish 
crown offered protection for Jewish communities through the medieval period, the growth of 
anti-Semitic attitudes, which was supported by the Catholic Church, led to growing violence and 
the exclusion of Jewish people from state professions including military, church, university, and 
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municipal employment. Under the leadership of Ferdinand and Isabella, Spain eventually “opted 
for the path of forced homogenization, through conversion and expulsion.”131  
During this transition, long distance trade offered a social safety valve for non-integrated 
European merchants. Jewish communities were pressed by violence on the one hand and religious 
coercion on the other hand.132 These pressures of religious conformity and violence led many 
Jewish Iberians to take advantage of emerging opportunities in sub-Saharan trade. They held a 
pivotal role in the financing and administration of numerous shipping vessels in the foundational 
period of European merchant empires.133 As key brokers in transnational shipping they brought 
unique experience of negotiating identity and space into their negotiations with African 
merchants. More broadly, these interactions between European insiders and outsiders formed 
expectations of how European traders would be treated when they began to explore the trade 
opportunities beyond Europe. 
Within this environment, Africa presented a new challenge of how to build trust among strangers 
and how to create the institutions which would facilitate reciprocal favours and friendship in a 
relatively alien cultural environment. The Iberian Peninsula, which had offered merchants the 
most freedom in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, simultaneously demonstrated a growing 
intolerance for non-Christian minorities. 134 These experiences of accepting foreign traders while 
rejecting foreign religions undeniably shaped Iberian attitudes towards the trading communities 
they encountered in Africa. Furthermore, the establishment of merchant communities, the 
foundation of nations, and the abandonment of collective responsibility in cross-cultural exchange 
within Europe would have framed the expectations of Europeans as they sailed beyond Europe.  
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The institutions of nations, guilds, city authorities, and merchant associations provided the 
framework upon which the European owned Atlantic trade monopolies, such as the Dutch West 
India Comapany, were founded.  The two key goals of a trade guild were to educate skilled 
workers and to protect those workers from open competition. Guilds, city authorities, and 
merchant associations all served as mediators and guarentors in foreign markets where it was 
crutial to establish and maintain trust to conduct business.135 Eric Mielants emphasises the role of 
guilds and other organizations originating in the medieval era in providing the structural base for 
modern economic growth.136 Ideas of trade guild and monopoly were well intertwined by the 
eighteenth century in Europe when Adam Smith accused guilds of being “oppressive monopolies” 
which limited open competition and free market.137 Julia Adams, in her article “Trading States, 
Trading Places: The Role of Patrimonialism in Early Modern Dutch Development”, suggest that it 
was the particular ability of the Dutch to innovate based on traditional European institutions 
which allowed them to shift an emerging surplus into an emerging world market with the 
Netherlands at its centre. 138 As the Dutch began to mobilise their new economic institutions, they 
reached out and encountered new markets in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. The next section will 
explore initial contact between Portuguese and Dutch merchants and Atlantic Africa, particularly 
focusing on the peoples of the Loango Coast and how these first contacts compare to other first 
encounters. 
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Initial contact of Europeans on the Loango Coast 
It is impossible to know the exact degrees to which European identity, religious beliefs, and 
behavioural norms distorted the recording of the first contacts between Europeans and the 
peoples of the Loango Coast. Equally, it is extremely difficult to glimpse the Africans’ perceptions 
of what we see as European technologies, trade, and social norms. On one hand, which new 
sources of economic, social, and religious knowledge did Africans embrace, and in which 
combinations; and on the other hand, to what degree did different African polities retreat into a 
mode of cultural preservation? To what degree were cultures of the Vili, Ngoyo, and Kakongo 
experiencing growth, innovation, stagnation and/or degeneration? Although these questions are 
difficult to answer, perhaps there are some clues in the adaptability and resilience with which the 
people of the Loango Coast responded to European offers of trade. (This idea of cultural 
preservation will also be discussed in Chapter 4.) 
In an examination about what happens when representatives of two cultures come into contact 
with each other, political scientist Paul Sharp explores how cultures adapt and react to new 
stimuli. His categories of diplomatic theory can be useful when considering the outcome of these 
encounters. He theorises that cultures encountering each other for the first time attempt “to 
manage three sorts of diplomatic relations: encounter relations between peoples meeting for the 
first time; discovery relations between peoples seeking to find out more about, and enjoy closer 
relations with each other; and re-encounter relations where peoples stay in touch, yet keep one 
another at arm’s length.” He goes on to suggest: “the social character of all but the most brutal 
and simple of relations between groups very quickly brings diplomacy, if not diplomats, into 
existence.”139 Taking this accent on collaboration one step farther, Sharp implies that material 
gains trump violence and coercion in most cases. Within this context, merchants not only 
represented themselves and their own economic interests, but they were also the conduits of 
cultural, religious, and even political exchanges. One could suggest that, with the exception of 
pirates and interlopers who were trading outside of their home government’s mandate, most 
early merchants who engaged in overseas trade participated in some or all of these types of these 
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diplomatic relations. Building upon this idea of merchants as diplomats and the need of both the 
visitors and their hosts to maintain a degree of separation, Philip Curtin observes, 
At a first glance, there is no apparent reason why traders living in an alien 
society must necessarily live separately from their hosts, but physical 
segregation of this kind was almost universal ... Without barriers of some kind, 
the traders from abroad would likely disappear through assimilation into the 
host society within a generation or so; their capacity to act as cross-cultural 
brokers would then come to an end. Diaspora merchants needed contact with 
their hosts, but they also needed to keep their distance and enough of their 
original culture to serve as brokers for the traveling merchants from the original 
homeland. The host society also had reason to keep alien merchants at a 
distance. They were, after all, normally considered to be unpleasant people on 
the double qualification of being both merchants and foreigners – however 
profitable it might be to have them around when needed. The interests of the 
hosts and the strangers alike suggest that a slightly distant contact was the most 
desirable relationship between the two communities.140 
This thesis discusses the degree to the polities of the Loango Coast maintained a set of 
organizational principles exclusive of European models of organization. This chapter focuses on 
the negotiation cultural and economic barriers to trade in the period of initial contact, whereas 
Chapter 5 discusses the physical barriers between Europeans and local communities. 
The concepts of “discovery” and “re-encounter” are particularly interesting in analysing the 
Loango Coast. The former category involves the mutual assimilation of knowledge between 
cultures as they connect. In Joel Mokyr’s discussion of knowledge economies in The Gift of Athena, 
Mokyr suggests that each society is characterized by its “collective knowledge.” He goes on to 
argue that access to knowledge is key to progress: “Progress in exploiting the existing stock of 
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knowledge will depend first and foremost on the efficiency and cost of access to knowledge.”141 
Knowledge transfer was at the centre of successful long-distance trade. In the period of mutual 
discovery, Europeans’ external networks and transportation resources allowed an accelerated 
pace of information acquisition in the Atlantic world. However, their African counterparts retained 
sole access to knowledge of internal trading practices on the African continent. This balance of 
separate knowledges did not begin to tip toward European favour until the mid-nineteenth 
century. 
However, this chapter is particularly interested in the acquisition of Loango’s “collective 
knowledge” by European visitors, as understanding this knowledge is essential to conducting 
cross-cultural trade: 
Each society has access to some metaset of feasible techniques, a monstrous 
compilation of blueprints and instruction manuals that describe what societies 
can [and cannot] do … From that set, economic decision makers, be they 
households, peasants, small-scale craftsmen, or large corporations, select the 
techniques actually used.142 
For outsiders, during the encounter phase this information can take years, even decades, to 
decipher, particularly in the case of Europeans in sub-Saharan Africa who collected bits and pieces 
of information over extended time horizons. In these processes of interpreting behaviours, 
misunderstandings are inevitable for both sides. Thus, the most intense period of 
misunderstandings between Europeans and the peoples of the Loango Coast was likely to have 
occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
This discussion of the limitations of knowledge brings us back to Sharp’s idea of “re-encounter 
relations”: “Re-encounter relations attempt to keep others who are known … at arm’s length by 
reproducing and emphasizing difference. They may do so to a variety of degrees, to maintain 
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pre-existing identities completely intact, for example, or to maintain them in some sectors and not 
others.”143 The people of the Loango Coast were very careful to both maintain relations while 
simultaneously preventing Europeans from integrating into their local communities. As time went 
on, mutually recognized institutions would develop to help maintain this distance while facilitating 
trade. 
First contact between the Portuguese and the people of Loango can be dated to the late fifteenth 
century, though Martin argues that: “it was not until the last quarter of the sixteenth century and 
the founding of Luanda that the Portuguese established regular trade with the area.” 144 Even then, 
the European presence was “spasmodic and impermanent” on this stretch of the western African 
coast.145 The primary goal of the Portuguese was to obtain goods such as cloth and redwood from 
the Vili to trade in Luanda for slaves.146 
In the early seventeenth century much of the slave trade was conducted in two 
stages. In the first stage salt and shells as well as European trinkets and beads 
were used to buy palm-cloth from the peoples of the forest regions to the north 
and east of Kongo. In the second stage this cloth, which was used for clothing as 
well as being the most widely accepted currency in Angola, was exchanged for 
slaves.147 
The quality of cloth was very important in these exchanges. The enscaca  bought on the Loango 
Coast was double the price of the best cloth available in Kongo due to its superior quality and 
perhaps also due to the greater trading skills of the Vili. 
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In order to obtain these goods, traders needed brokers. Curtin has outlined the importance of the 
role of brokers to European trade in Africa: 
From their first visits to the African coast, Europeans recognized the need for 
some kind of cross-cultural brokers. Though they began with naïve solutions, 
like kidnapping a few Africans for training in Europe as interpreters, they soon 
shifted. Even before the end of the fifteenth century, Portuguese shippers 
began to leave crewmen on shore between voyages to bargain with the 
“natives” and gather a cargo ready for loading at the next visit. These were the 
earliest “stayers” of the Portuguese African trade diasporas.148 
Whereas on many parts of the Western African Coast it was the norm for Europeans to provide a 
broker to facilitate trade and provide translation, on the Loango Coast a Mafouk eventually 
oversaw a network of local brokers.149 Wary of Europeans and interested in maintaining high levels 
of control over long-distance trade, Loango Coast merchants were providing their own brokers by 
the time Italian missionaries F. Michael Angelo and F. Denis Carli arrived in 1666.150 
The Dutch joined the Portuguese in trading on the Loango Coast in 1593.151 During the initiation of 
Dutch trade on the Loango Coast, approximately 1593 to 1670, Filipa Ribeiro da Silva identifies 
various experimental trading strategies employed by European traders along the Loango Coast. 
The first strategy involved a small yacht or sloop being dispatched in advance of the main trading 
ship to begin negotiations and expedite the trading process. Once the main ship arrived, it 
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anchored in Loango Bay, conducting trade while the smaller ship(s) ran up and down the Loango 
Coast collecting trade goods. 152 Pieter van den Broecke’s voyages are a key example of this 
multi-ship strategy.153 The second strategy involved the temporary settlement of factors and junior 
factors at various ports: “To stay on shore, the traders rented a house from an African, where the 
factor or junior factor and his helper could live and store the merchandise used as barter for 
African goods as well as the products bought until the arrival of the main fleet and of the sloops 
and the yachts employed in the coastal trade.” 154 Broecke also provides an example of this 
strategy when he stationed Marten van Colck as a junior factor in Mayumba on 18 February 1612 
where he stayed even after Broecke returned to the Netherlands. 155 A third strategy employed by 
the Dutch was to send a wave of ships to the Loango coast to establish a steady supply of trade 
goods and create a permanent presence. Between November 1607 and June 1609, Broecke’s 
employer sent three boats to the Loango Coast: the yacht Merminne and the ships Neptunnis and 
Merman. In 1612, Broecke returned to the Loango Coast on the ship De Son and found two 
barques, the Mauritius and Mercurius, already trading at Kakongo. In April of the same year, 
Broecke reports the arrival of another boat: “the 22nd day. The yacht the Maen arrived here from 
Holland [and came] under my control; our majoris sent it to me to be used along the [Loango] 
coast.”156 Thus we can see the beginnings of a steady Dutch presence on the Loango Coast. 
Ribeiro da Silva emphasizes the role of knowledge accumulation in establishing this presence: 
“*Dutch merchant’s+ adaptation to the West*ern+ African trade was based on the knowledge of the 
Portuguese experience gained by direct observation … or via the Portuguese Sephardic Jews 
established in Amsterdam, who were deeply involved in the commerce with these regions.”157 The 
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ability of early traders to acquire knowledge about the internal and regional politics in Loango was 
essential in their endeavours to exploit trade opportunities to their full capacity.   
Peter van den Broecke played a key role in establishing Dutch trade relations on the Loango Coast. 
He recorded many of his experiences and published them in the Netherlands facilitating the 
formation of a collective knowledge, or a common set of understandings, between the merchants 
of the Netherlands and the Loango Coast. In these documents he emphasized the key role of the 
Maloango, the ruler of Loango, in establishing and maintaining trade relations. During the early 
seventeenth century, the Maloango dictated the terms of trade which Broecke and other 
European traders adhered to on the Loango Coast. 158 Observing these strict rules and 
conventions was essential if European traders wished not only to profit but also to survive. For 
example, in the early period of cross cultural trade, escorts were often provided to European 
traders with escorts, presumably to both facilitate trade, to protect the European traders, and to 
ensure European traders adhered to local customs. Throughout his journal entries, Broecke 
mentions the presence of escorts in his trade negotiations.159  
Violations of local laws and customs could be incredibly dangerous. Pieter van den Broecke 
records an incident on 22 April 1608 which illustrates the informed, independent, and 
self-interested nature of the Vili ruler in reaction to a Portuguese act of aggression against the 
Dutch off the Loango Coast: 
[I have] heard that the Portuguese here at Loango had shot dead with a flintlock 
the master of the same yacht, named Augustijn Cornelissen, thinking that he 
was Pieter Brandt, whom they loathed unto death because he had revealed this 
place to our company. The Portuguese invited Pieter Tillemans, Pieter Brandt 
and the master to visit them. But Pieter Brandt, who was ill, or because his heart 
gave him warning, excused himself for that time and let the other two 
aforenamed persons go. And because the master had no hat to wear, he 
borrowed Pieter Brandt’s. The Portuguese saw him coming and thought he was 
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Pieter Brandt. As the schuijdt came alongside the ship they shot him dead with a 
long flintlock, and then the others were immediately taken prisoner to be taken 
to Loando de St. Pauwel [=Luanda; São Paulo de Luanda]. This they would have 
accomplished if the king of Loango’s people had not followed them. *They+ took 
them from the Portuguese and right then and there struck the Portuguese 
master dead with elephant’s tusks. Well, the Portuguese were forced to pay a 
large fine, which clearly showed that the natives were loyal to our nation.160 
Broecke saw this resolution as evidence of preferential treatment for the Dutch. Though the Vili 
were capable of offering such preferential treatment, preferential treatment does not appear to 
have been an end in itself. Rather, it seems more likely that this reaction was the people of Loango 
protecting their own monopoly over justice and trade rights in this region, as the Portuguese had 
attempted to administer their own form of justice without regard for the law of the land. Up to 
this point, the Vili had shown clear interest in trading with both the Portuguese and the Dutch. 
When the Portuguese threatened these interests, the Vili acted, not in favour of the Dutch or 
against the Portuguese, but rather in their own favour. The Vili were sending a clear message: this 
is our territory, we hold the monopoly of power, and we will trade with whom we please. Also, by 
playing one trader against another, regardless of their nationality, the Vili may have been 
attempting to gain greater trading concessions from one or both parties involved. Whatever their 
motives, the strength of the Vili government in maintaining control over their exports and their 
active role in cultivating trade relationships with numerous nations limited the power of any single 
European nation in that region. 
Moving from the early records of contact, to the eighteenth century, additional examples of 
Europeans attempting to circumvent local laws include the 1755 attempt of a French captain to 
by-pass the Cabinda market and come to a private arrangement with local merchant Muene 
Poukouta Pandy Massigne. When Massigne attempted to acquire slaves by raiding merchant 
competitors, the ensuing chaos resulted in long delays in loading slaves for all of the ships at 
Cabinda. Nearly 50 years later an American merchant attempted unlawfully to seize freemen as 
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slaves; the merchants of Cabinda responded by blowing up the responsible American ship.161 
However, unlike the first example where the local reaction to European infringement upon local 
laws was unpredictable, in the latter two cases the French and American captains were aware of 
the institutions of trade but failed to observe them. Operating outside of local laws was a risky 
business indeed. These two examples illustrate the continued responsibility of Europeans to 
adhere to local laws or face severe consequences. 
Before the arrival of Europeans, it is likely that Loango attitudes to long-distance trade evolved 
from experiences of trade within West Central Africa. Loango had an active trade policy that 
included exporting to the north, east, and south. The Vili operated trading networks independent 
of Europeans throughout West Central Africa that resembled Portuguese trading networks, 
forming permanent contacts in other communities. 162 Evidence of Vili trade networks predating 
European trade on the coast supports Abu-Lughod’s theory, discussed above, that European 
traders did not expand into a void but rather connected with other pre-existing economies to their 
mutual financial benefit. However, these trade networks underwent significant transitions to 
accommodate trade with Europeans. The transitions of these internal trade networks will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
In addition to the European need to accommodate local laws and customs, they also attempted to 
use the knowledge they brought from Europe to integrate the trading process on the Western 
African Coast. These efforts met with varying levels of success. Failed attempts to transpose their 
understanding of a “factory”, which had evolved out of at least two centuries of trade negotiations 
in Europe, into an African context is a key example of this process. At this time the European idea 
of a factory “did not necessarily refer to a warehouse, but rather to a company branch abroad, 
distinct from the main office and run by an accredited factor” 163 A factory usually did not exist in 
isolation but as part of a merchant community or “nation”, as discussed above. Though the people 
of the Loango Coast had engaged in of the foundation of trade settlement throughout West 
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Central Africa by the seventeenth century if not sooner, they had conflicting opinions about 
allowing European traders similar privileges. Perhaps something in their experience of 
long-distance trade or in their knowledge of Portuguese military posts among their neighbours to 
the south of the Congo River discouraged them from allowing any type of settlement. Whatever 
the case, the settlement of Europeans on the Loango Coast was only ever semi-permanent at best. 
Sporadic and fragmented evidence shows that between 1608 and 1612 Dutch merchants 
established factories at Mayumba and Loango bays with the help of the charismatic trader Pieter 
van den Broecke. However, the people of Kakongo received Broecke’s envoy with less enthusiasm: 
“A trader sent by Broecke to Kakongo was killed after he had completed his business with the 
king.”164 Few details are known about this encounter, though it is reasonable to suppose that this 
envoy engaged in duplicitous or otherwise offensive behavior leading to his death. Later reports 
indicate that by 1620 the Dutch were maintaining three factories on the coast collecting ivory and 
copper. There is also evidence of the Portuguese trading in local raffia cloth at this time. Though 
European traders co-existed in this period, it was not without attempts at subterfuge. Martin 
records one such attempt: 
Towards the end of 1624, Souza [the Portuguese Governor at Luanda] wrote to 
the Maloango, asking him to close the Dutch factories and to expel the heretics. 
He promised that the Portuguese would buy all the ivory and copper which the 
Vili could supply; they would bring better-quality goods than the Dutch; they 
would provide protection against the enemies of Loango; as a final incentive, 
Jesuit priests would be sent to baptize the Maloango. The latter replied firmly 
that he intended to continue trading with the Dutch and Portuguese on equal 
terms and that he had no desire to become a Catholic.165 
In 1640, Dutch traders were involved in the seizure of a Portuguese ship. This act of aggression 
resulted in a breach in relations with the Maloango, and despite the best efforts of the WIC agent, 
Cornelis Hendrickx Ouwman, to smooth matters over, relations remained strained. “It is clear that 
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the Maloango was not more prepared to accept Dutch domination in 1640 than he had been 
prepared to accept a Portuguese monopoly earlier in the century.”166 Despite these and no doubt 
other attempts on behalf of both the Dutch and the Portuguese the local rulers maintained their 
insistence on open trade. 
The Dutch factory at Zarry was one of the shortest lived factories. Established in 1638 on the 
northern coast of the Congo River in an eastern province of Kakongo, this factory was abandoned 
within three years. In 1641, the Mangoyo refused the Portuguese permission to set up a factory at 
Cabinda. In 1648, the same year the Portuguese regained Luanda from the Dutch, Portuguese 
attacks at Mpinda, Cabinda, and Loango caused the Dutch to evacuate their factories. However, by 
the 1650s the Dutch had re-established small factories at Loango and Kakongo. In the 1670s the 
Dutch maintained small factories at Loango, Malemba, and Cabinda. Prior to the 1670s, trade on 
the Loango Coast consisted mainly of cloth, copper, ivory, redwood and elephant tails. Slaves were 
available, but not in quantities large enough to make up a complete cargo. In the 1630 to 1670 
period, Martin asserts: “The Maloango’s strength was shown by the fact that no Europeans were 
able to gain a monopoly of the Loango trade, with the possible exception of the years when the 
Dutch ruled Luanda. Nor were Europeans able to acquire land to build permanent forts. “167 
Martin identifies 1670 as a transition point for economics and governance on the Loango Coast: 
“By about 1670, a new trading era was established on the Loango Coast. It was a period 
dominated by the slave trade: a time when Dutch and Portuguese merchants faced increasing 
competition from the French and English. In the eighteenth century, Loango’s hegemony over 
external trade, which had lasted for a 100 years, came to an end; Kakongo and Ngoyo emerged as 
serious rivals.” 168 Given Martin’s reliance on Dutch sources, it is worth questioning to what degree 
the identification of 1670 as a transition point is impacted by the failure and reinvention of the 
Dutch West India Company (WIC) at precisely the same time. However the time series data 
compiled from the transatlantic slave trade database in Chapter 1 confirm that a transformation 
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was happening in the Loango trading markets during this period, 1660-1670, allowing the first 
boom in the sale of slaves on this coast. It is also evident that by the late eighteenth century 
Europeans had a substantial and growing knowledge of trade on the Loango Coast and the people 
of the Loango Coast had no less familiarity with European merchants. 
Between 1670 and 1793, Europeans had very limited success in establishing permanent 
settlements: “The three states of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo resisted almost all European efforts 
to exert a monopoly. By following a free-trade policy, the Africans were able to benefit from 
European competition which reached its peak in the second half of the eighteenth century.” 169 In 
light of their numerous failures and in an attempt to minimize costs and maximize profits, Dutch 
merchants closed down their factories permanently and shifted to shipboard trade. Thus, Dutch 
merchants on the Loango Coast acknowledged their inability to profitably transfer the pattern of 
residential factory trade, which had been beneficial in cross-cultural trade in Europe, to the 
Loango Coast. 
In her examination of the limited European settlement on the Loango Coast, Martin suggests: “In 
the course of the seventeenth century, some Portuguese traders had established themselves with 
their families on the Loango Coast and had attained some independence from Luanda.”170 To the 
minor degree to which these types of settlements existed, they were irregular and impermanent. 
This strategy of containing contact returns us to the idea of “re-encounter relations” outlined 
above as a period of contact in which two groups maintain contact while also maintaining a degree 
of separation.  The peoples of the Loango Coast were among the most effective peoples on the 
West Central African Coast at engaging with European trade without compromising their own 
cultural values. David Birmingham concluded that this was a result of the deployment of 
re-encounter relations: “Loango … had a more limited experience of early European contacts [than 
the Kongo+, and preserved more if its traditional economic political customs.” He went on to 
argue: “Loango was more successful [than Kongo] in retaining its integrity, and in controlling its 
economic relations with the Atlantic powers. As the political and economic strength of Loango 
increased, so its influence spread into the northern interior. At the end of the seventeenth 
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century, when Kongo had virtually disappeared as a commercial kingdom, Loango extended its 
economic control to dominate a new pattern of southern trade routes as well.”171 
Whereas Linda Heywood and John Thornton have approached the issue of African agency by 
exhibiting the adaptive ability of African peoples, on the Loango Coast agency can be found in the 
preservation of African cultures from the angle of religious conversion and European settlement: 
Loango’s principle interest in its relations with the Dutch, Portuguese, and English was to 
maintain itself as an independent open trading port. The absence of large and long settled 
traders from abroad with their slaves and close African allies made the development of a 
sort of Christian community (as took place in Okanga) impossible, and politics made 
conversion of rulers difficult to maintain. Loango was therefore the most religiously 
conservative region that had ongoing contacts with the Atlantic community and therefore 
outside the world of Atlantic Creole religion.172 
The disinterest in European religion which was exhibited on the Loango Coast was only one of 
many possible responses to European attempts to bring “the true faith” to African peoples. While 
this exhibits their ability to delay change once contact was made, but they could not resist it all 
together. Vansina suggests that it is through the use of local traditions in to address the challenges 
created by European contact that African peoples continued to determine their own destiny.173 
Furthermore, this is not to imply that agency can only be found in preserving some kind of 
“traditional” society, but rather in evidence that African voices persisted in the conversation over 
how their communities addressed the question of change. (See Chapter 4 for a more detailed 
discussion about the nature of this insulation.) 
Brokers from within Loango societies facilitated the trade in the relative absence of permanent 
European settlement of the Loango Coast, though sojourners – in Manning’s conceptualization of 
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the term as temporary migrants – often stayed in these communities for a time. Pieter van den 
Broecke was one of the earliest of these sojourners. The last lines of his Journal read: “This is as 
much as I have understood and seen in three voyages [to Loango] and during the roughly thirty 
months I stayed ashore there.”174 The underlying implication is that Broecke, despite his intensive 
experiences on the Loango Coast, had an incomplete knowledge of the area. In explaining how 
mechanisms of trade are developed, Mokyr suggests: “A minimum has to be known before a 
technique can be created.”175 Though Broecke and his European colleagues had collected 
substantial data on the Loango Coast by the early seventeenth century, their knowledge was still 
insufficient to impact the creation of mechanisms of trade on the coast. By the dawn of the 
eighteenth century, both European and Loango merchants had acquired enough mutual 
knowledge to transform Loango markets. By following the trail of trade transactions left by the 
MCC we can begin to unravel this progression of technical creations or rather recreations of 
existing structures to achieve new ends. While in some circumstances the peoples of the Loango 
Coast chose to outright reject European traditions, as was the case with attempts to introduce 
Christianity, in other circumstances the challenges associated with trade led to innovation in 
trading techniques.  In both cases, these peoples were actively involved in shaping this innovation. 
The systems of factory and shipboard trade which came to dominate trade on the Loango Coast 
built upon Europeans’ understandings of trans-cultural trade that were first developed in the 
western ports of Europe. Though it is difficult to distinguish all the African elements of this system, 
it is clear that on the Loango Coast the local people resisted permanent settlement of Europeans. 
Even more so, they resisted shows of force between European trading nations, especially when 
conflict interfered with profits. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the people of the Loango Coast closely 
regulated the flow of goods through their markets, appointing Mafouks and a range of lower 
officials to supervise the trade. The eventual establishment of a regularized barter-based, ship 
trade supported by a centralized Ngoyo government and internal financing, emerged only in the 
eighteenth century. Before this time, European and African traders were testing the waters of 
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trade, trying and rejecting some methods developed for different times and different spaces while 
adapting others to meet the needs unique to the transatlantic slave trade. 
The Dutch in the Transatlantic Slave Trade 
 
The development of the WIC was a conscious reaction to Spanish Imperialism and by extension to 
Portugal during its union with Spain between 1580 and 1640.176 In the late 1500s and early 1600s, 
the Netherlands was undergoing process of national unification. Unification enabled the Dutch to 
engage more actively in the Atlantic economy, particularly through the purchase and sale of 
slaves. During the struggle for independence, the Netherlands went through a period of economic 
growth, artistic innovation, and imperial expansion. The establishment of the WIC in 1621 marked 
the Netherlands’ first major foray into the Atlantic market. The WIC’s mandate stretched beyond 
the conventional boundaries of economic profit to include the capacity to engage in military and 
diplomatic missions in the Atlantic world. One of their primary goals was to disrupt Spain’s 
overseas empire, compromising Spain’s ability to maintain its political hold over the 
Netherlands.177 Indeed, Filipa Ribeiro da Silva has gone as far as to argue that the transition of the 
Netherlands from a system of private trade to a trade monopoly in the Atlantic World was not an 
economic decision at all. She supports this by pointing out that the Dutch were unable to find 
adequate funding for this venture so the Dutch state had to provide substantial capital.178 
Although the first WIC failed in achieving its economic goals, it was more successful in achieving its 
political goals, since the Netherlands obtained its independence from Spain in 1648. Indeed, prior 
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to independence, the WIC had played a crucial role in the capture, governing, and supplying of 
north-eastern Brazil between 1630 and 1654, which was then a colony of Spain. 
Jelmer Vos, David Eltis and David Richardson have presented five different periods of motivation 
of the Dutch transatlantic slave trade under the WIC monopoly: the first period (1596-1637) 
encompasses the early years of the Dutch slave trade and the establish of the Dutch WIC 
monopoly in the non-European Atlantic; the second period (1637-1650) focuses around the Dutch 
expansion into the Americas and their establishment of trade in Pernambuco; the third period 
(1650-1674) is characterized by a reorganization of the Dutch Atlantic after the loss of 
Pernambuco and an expansion of Dutch interests in the slave trade; the fourth period (1674-1730) 
follows the restructuring and ultimate failure of the WIC; and the fifth period (post-1730) see the 
overall importance of the Dutch in the Atlantic World diminish as British and French interests 
flourish. Using these categories, this section will use these categories to give a brief sketch of the 
evolving priorities of Dutch shipping interests in the Atlantic World to provide a context for the 
MCC trade. Furthermore, it will outline the nature of the MCC trade in Africa.  
During the first period of trade, 1596 to 1637, the Dutch engagement in the slave trade was 
minimal.179 The lack of a demand for labour and a general scepticism about the morality of slavery 
discouraged Dutch merchants from purchasing slave cargos in the early stages of trade in Western 
Africa.180 This period saw the emergence of the Dutch state coincide with expanded knowledge of 
the Atlantic world. 
Following the model developed by Charles Boxer, Johannes Postma identifies the Dutch 
occupation of northern Brazil as the definitive moment in the beginning of the Dutch slave 
trade.181 However, Vos, Eltis and Richardson contend that it was not until 1637 that the Dutch, led 
by the WIC, obtained their military objectives in Pernambuco and shifted to a trade agenda.  For 
the next 13 years the WIC focused almost exclusively on the establishment of a Dutch presence in 
Pernambuco. This involved the purchase and transfer of approximately 30 000 enslaved Africans 
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to the Americas between 1637 and 1650.182 This period also included the failed attempt of the 
Dutch to force the Portuguese out of Angola, in an attempt to obtain a secure supply of slaves for 
their new possessions in the Americas.  
By the end of the 1640s, the ambitious military and economic plans of the Dutch had been 
diminished by Spanish and Portuguese counter offences. By 1650, the Dutch began to reorganized 
and retrenched their investment in the Americas around supplying slaves for a contract with Spain 
for the provision of slaves from Africa, the asiento de negroes, and the supply of slaves for their 
remaining colonies, particularly Suriname.  The island of Curacao was at the centre of this supply 
chain, acting as a first landing place for the Dutch ships carrying African slaves. This third period 
(1650-1674) is described by Vos, Eltis, and Richardson as the most ambiguous and, therefore, the 
most interesting. It is at this point that the WIC restructured to form a trading model dominated 
by the slave trade.183 During this period the majority of slaves shipped by the Dutch found their 
way to Curaçao and from Curaçao to the Spanish Americas. The remaining slaves were distributed 
among New Amsterdam, Rio de la Plata, Surinam, Jamaica, and Barbados. 184 During this period, 
the Dutch doubled the volume of their slave trade into the Americas. Particularly in this third 
period of trade, Vos, Eltis, and Richardson credit the Dutch as playing an important role in the 
solidification of the Atlantic slave trade. 185 However, after this point the influence of the Dutch 
diminishes in the Atlantic World.  
The fourth era of Dutch slaving (1674-1730) was dominated by the second Dutch West Indies 
Company.186 This commerce was mostly conducted from Caribbean Islands of Curaçao and St. 
Eustatius; small numbers of these slaves were smuggled to English and French islands, but the 
majority remained in Dutch colonies. This period Dutch trade corresponds with the beginning of 
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the slave trade on the Loango Coast. Under the administration of the WIC monopoly, the Dutch 
preferred a model of trade which involved the establishment of settlement in castles, forts, 
factories, or stations in or near African market towns. These settlements served as spaces to 
mediate contact between Africans and Europeans. Postma refers to this model of trade as 
“stationary trade” whereas Galenson prefers the term “castle-trade.”187 However, permanent 
settlement on the Loango Coast could not be established, therefore the WIC shifted to a model of 
shipboard trade.188 This involved using the ship as the carrier of the administration apparatus 
rather than the administration being permanently located on the coast. When the ship arrived, an 
administration centre was set up on the coast, when the ship left, the apparatus of administration 
was shifted back to the ship. These impermanent administrative centres are often referred to as 
lodges which create confusion with more permanent settlement arrangements. However on the 
Loango Coast, the repeated failure of the Dutch to establish a permanent base resulted in a model 
of mobile administration. (The repeated attempts and failures of European traders to set up 
permanent bases of trade on the Loango Coast are discussed above.)  
The last period following the transition of the Dutch slave trade from monopoly back to free trade 
began in 1730 and marked the final decline of the Dutch as formative traders in the transatlantic 
slave trade, with the Dutch giving way to English and American slave traders even in the supplying 
of the Dutch Guianas.189 This is the period of trade most relevant to this study. It is in this context 
that the MCC shifts from commodity trade in the Mediterranean to slave trade in Western Africa. 
This also marks a transition among Dutch merchants from combined trade, shipping both goods 
and slaves, to a specialization almost exclusively in slave trading.   
Through its focus on the expansion of the sanctioned Dutch slave trade, this categorization misses 
two crucial factors in Dutch and, more broadly, in early Atlantic shipping: the ongoing presence of 
privateers and pirates on the one hand and the multiplicity of trade relationships overlapping state 
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boundaries on the other.190 While the former can be seen as acting beyond the purview of the 
emerging Dutch state, the latter played an important part in creating the information base upon 
which Dutch merchants framed their involvement – or skepticism towards – the development of 
the WIC. This introduction to the Atlantic trade was partly due to the relocation, as early as 1586, 
of many Portuguese Jewish merchants to Antwerp: 191 soon thereafter, Antwerp became the 
principal redistribution centre for Asian and Atlantic goods.192  
Christopher Ebert notes, due to tensions between the Netherlands and Spain, this was an 
awkward apprenticeship.193  Furthermore, he suggests that multiple crises of privateering, the 
Inquisition, failing economics, and raising political tensions led the Dutch to seek economic and 
political separation from their dependent relationship with the Iberians through the formation of 
the Dutch West India Company and a Dutch Republic.  He acknowledges that informal and indirect 
trade continued with Brazil despite these difficulties. Indeed, the Jewish community in Amsterdam 
financed 13 voyages to Portuguese ports between 1621 and 1630, the year in which the WIC 
successfully invaded Pernambuco in northeastern Brazil.194 
European Merchants on the Loango Coast 
Driven first by demand for specie and exotic commodities and later by their need for labour to 
develop the Americas, Europeans probed the Loango Coast in ever increasing numbers. Through 
the processes of discovery and re-encounter relations, as discussed above, Middelburg and Loango 
merchants developed a trading model which was a barter based, ship trade supported by a 
centralized African authority. This section will explore how this model fits into the African context 
by testing it against Paul Lovejoy and David Richardson’s models of African slave trade as 
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presented in their 2007 study of “African Agency and the Liverpool Slave Trade”. In their chapter 
Lovejoy and Richardson divide Africans’ trade with Europeans into three categories based on the 
theory that credit provision of Europeans to African traders was central to trade negotiations. 
They outline three categories of securing these investments: First, they outline a system of 
personal trust built upon the settlement of European traders in African communities and the 
extension of their trade networks though local marriages. This trading-diaspora strategy, the one 
termed “nations” in Europe, was particularly dominant in Sierra Leone and the Windward Coast. 
Second, they outline a system of trade in which a strong centralized authority enforced the 
repayment of loans. This strategy was dominant in the port of Bonny at the Bight of Biafra. Third, 
they outline a system of private credit which was “linked to the pawning or pledging of human 
beings as collateral for debt.” 195 This system was dominant at Old Calabar, which was also in the 
Bight of Biafra. Lovejoy and Richardson go on to propose: “this third mechanism of credit 
protection appears to have become the most common form of credit protection mechanism as 
trade with regions where European shipmasters dealt directly with Africans grew relative to other 
regions.”196 While not questioning the relevance of these models to the areas which they describe, 
I will suggest that evidence from the MCC records for the Loango Coast presents a fourth model of 
trade, a model in which barter rather than MCC credit dominates slave trading transactions. In this 
sense barter refers to a simultaneous exchange of one set of goods for another, rather than 
lending goods on credit or offering a commodity intermediary or currency. It is barter in the sense 
that each party has a good the other wants and is willing to exchange it. There is no delay in 
payment. Furthermore, this is barter within an organized market system, a system which is 
administrated and negotiated by an appointee of the local ruler, and a system that involves 
complex strategies of price fixing and controls on goods exchanged. Therefore, this could be best 
understood as “complex barter” or barter without cash or credit but still involving a degree of 
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market control.197 This model of trade encompasses both the “informal constraints” and “formal 
rules” of an institution as defined by Douglas North above. 
This section uses the Loango Coast port of Malemba as a case study. It uses detailed trade 
statistics on Malemba slave traders collected by the Dutch MCC between 1749 and 1776 while 
also drawing information from the broader records collected by the MCC on the Loango Coast 
between 1732 and 1797. Situated between Loango and Cabinda bays, Malemba was one of three 
principal slave-trading centers on the Loango Coast. Malemba stands out as the most important 
MCC port in West Central Africa. From 1749 to 1776, the Voyages Database has recorded 59,579 
slaves embarking at Malemba: 28,663 by the French, 20,217 by the Dutch, and 10,699 by the 
British.198 The MCC records alone account for 6,819 of these slaves, which represents a third of 
Dutch trading interests on the coast during this period and nine per cent of the total number of 
enslaved Africans embarked at Malemba during this period.199The key data for this section are 
compiled from the captains’ trade books which detail the negotiations between Middelburg and 
Malemba merchants. A transcript and translation of four sample transactions can be found in 
Chapter 5. These records retain their original format: in the far left column is a date containing 
day, month, and year, this is followed by four columns listing the number of males, females, boys, 
girls involved in a single purchase. The name or title of the Malemba trading partner is listed in the 
middle column above a list of goods exchange for the slaves. Each item is accompanied by a 
measure and a value in both pieces (the local currency based on a measure of cloth) and a value in 
Guilders (the Dutch currency).  In the 3,154 records of trade transactions between the Middelburg 
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and Malemba merchants, 3,101 of these interactions took place within a one-day period, 
indicating that slaves were exchanged for European trade goods at the shore without the credit 
that would have secured transactions based on delayed payments for MCC goods offered. There 
would have been little purpose in fabricating these dates if the different parts of these 
transactions were completed on different days. While these records only show a section of trade 
which occurred in one port in a limited time period, the records offer incredible detail of who was 
trading with the MCC, the exact dates which they traded, and what items were exchanged. This 
provides evidence of a different model of trade than has hitherto believed to have been practiced 
on the Loango Coast.  
This evidence adds the Loango coast as an exception to Lovejoy and Richardson’s emphasis on the 
use of European credit in expanding the slave trade on the Atlantic coast of Africa: “The 
transactions for slaves that occurred on the beaches of the Windward coast were essentially 
barter-based and involved little or no credit. Credit was, however, a feature of the commerce in 
people in almost every part of Atlantic Africa.”200 These trade records indicate that a barter-based, 
ship trade was the most common method of exchange at Malemba in the mid eighteenth century, 
definitely with the Middelburg merchants, and likely with all European groups.201 See Chapter 5 for 
a more detailed analysis of the day to day negotiations of the slave trade on the Loango Coast as a 
whole. 
In 1986 David W. Galenson published a similar study on the organization of the slave trade on the 
Western African coast in which he examined the different methods of exchange. This study used 
the records of the English Royal African Company. Using K. G. Davies’ categories of ‘castle-trade’ or 
‘factory-trade’ and ‘ship-trade’, Galenson describes how these systems worked: 
In the castle-trade, the ship’s captain would be instructed to sail to a specified 
company fort, or perhaps to one of the larger factories. The captain would 
deliver his ship’s cargo to the company factor who resided there, and the factor 
would be responsible for furnishing a designated number of slaves for the ship’s 
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cargo. Alternatively, in the ship trade … the ship’s captain would act as 
supercargo, and he would personally select the places where he would trade his 
goods to the natives for slaves.202 
Whereas in the fort-based system factors engaged in the bulk of trading resulting in the 
fragmentation of sources in forts around the Atlantic, shipboard records were recorded by a single 
captain, and although surviving captains’ logs are far from numerous, they offer a broader range of 
information about the entire shipping cycle rather than information about one segment of 
trade.203 By the time the MCC ships set sail in the early eighteenth century, the Dutch retained 
only one Western African fort at Elmina. Therefore, the majority of Dutch private traders relied 
heavily upon shipboard trade to obtain enslaved Africans. The MCC produced one of the most 
complete and coherent set of slave trading records of any private trading company that has been 
preserved. This concentrated collection of Middelburg documents detailing trade on the Loango 
Coast in the eighteenth century is an excellent resource for historians that has been hitherto 
underutilized. 
At the same time that the MCC was beginning to trade in Africa using the system of shipboard 
trade, Lovejoy and Richardson suggest that the Liverpool ships popularized this system of trade in 
the early 1700s: 
Over three out of four slaves carried by Liverpool ships came from areas of the 
African coast where there was little or no permanent European presence in 
1701-1725. Liverpool traders were, in short, among the leading slave carriers to 
diversify the pattern of slaving activity in Africa in the eighteenth century and, in 
the process, forge new commercial alliances with local African slave dealers.204 
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Despite their continued interest of the heirs to the RAC in the castle trade, by the 1730s the 
Liverpool competitors of the Londoners began a shift towards ship trade and joined Dutch efforts 
to engage on trade on the Loango Coast. Dutch, British, French and Portuguese traders’ efforts to 
establish permanent factors on the Loango Coast were continually frustrated on this stretch of the 
coast throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Therefore, they resorted to ship 
board trade and the use of temporary lodges which were abandoned once their cargoes were 
obtained. Shipboard trade was therefore an example of the institutionalization of trade on the 
Loango Coast based on a local resistance to permanent European settlement. Barred from 
establishing permanent settlements, all foreign traders were forced to engage in ship trade. 205 
Mambouks and Mafouks were appointed to represent these institutions. These representatives of 
trade were not simply brokers as they also engaged in transactions on their own account. 
Although they, or their proxy, were represented at all transaction, the majority of the Malemba 
traders engaged in their own negotiation of bundles for slaves. Like the trade at Bonny, strong 
centralized political communities supported trade at the Loango Coast. The Ngoyo people 
controlled trade at Malemba. The political representative in charge of trade at Malemba was the 
Mambouk. Middleburg merchants record 13 transactions with the Mambouk of Malemba during 
which 36 enslaved Africans were purchased, suggesting that, while this office holder engaged in 
slave trade at a moderate level, he was not a major supplier.206 The Mambouk was the supervisor 
of the Mafouk, who Martin describes as: “the official in charge of the overall management of trade 
… he was a royal appointee.”207 In exchange for this office, the Mafouk paid the ruler an initial fee 
and an agreed upon annual fee from the taxes or ‘gifts’ collected by the Mafouk as the 
administrator of international trade. These gifts are recorded in each set of trade books. At the 
beginning of the trade between Middelburg and Malemba merchants in the 1730s, gifts are 
recorded as a single payment, often at the end of the slave purchasing, but by the end of the 
1780s each trade transaction includes a price that went to the merchant and a ‘gift’ that went to 
the markedores, the brokers of the trade. This transition from gifts to a payment for each 
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individual slave seems to be the regularization of a taxation on the sale of slaves and seems to 
replace the informal ‘gifts’ initially offered to the Ngoyo for the privilege of trade.208 During the 
1749 to 1776 period, at least 27 different names of merchants include references to this post of 
Mafouk. This office holder is listed in connection to 241 transactions, or 7.6 per cent of total 
transactions. In these 241 transactions, the Mafouks sold a total of 415 slaves. 209 These numbers 
highlight the persistent presence this representative in Malemba/Middelburg trade negotiations. 
Other officials of lesser importance in the polities of the Loango Coast included the Mangove, the 
Manibanse, the Maquimbe, the Manibele, and the Makossa, all of whom are represented to a 
lesser extent in the Middelburg trading records.210 All of these positions organized under one 
political leader indicate a centralized political system similar to what Lovejoy and Richardson 
describe in Bonny in the same period. (For a more in-depth discussion of political roles on the 
Loango Coast, see Chapter 4). 
Lovejoy and Richardson suggest that the “barter-like exchanges” for slaves which developed on 
the Sierra Leone and Windward coasts were the result of Europeans settling and integrating into 
these cultures in combination with minimal political interference. They contrast this model of 
trade with the shipboard trade in the Bight of Biafra, which is said to be more representative of 
the larger patterns of trading, where pawns were used to secure credit with either a single or 
corporate guarantor. 211 The use of shipboard trade in Loango in combination with a “barter-like” 
exchange system would suggest that there were not two types of local trade arrangements but 
many different combinations of arrangements. These arrangements had some similarities but also 
some differences to other areas of the Western African coast. Thus Lovejoy and Richardson’s 
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assertion that similar conditions arose in Biafra, Loango, and Angola is only partially correct and 
raises the question: Why did trade expand in Biafra, Loango, and Angola, but not the Windward 
Coast? Perhaps the centralized organization of the trading systems around one central figure in 
both Bonny and the Loango Coast may be a stronger correlation in regards to their success in 
these areas. (This question of centralized leadership is examined further in Chapter 4).Whatever 
the case, the practice is more complex than Lovejoy and Richardson’s categories of trust, 
authority, and pawnship suggest. 
In contrast to Lovejoy and Richardson’s theory that claims that Europeans supplied the bulk of 
credit in the transatlantic slave trade, the MCC data indicates that Malemba traders may have 
financed their trade internally, as merchants on the Loango Coast had engaged in long-distance 
trade prior to European contact. The expansion of trade following contact with Europeans led to a 
more intensive exploitation of preexisting trade routes into the interior. Following a 
pre-established model, Vansina argues that “outfitting caravans did not involve the provision of 
credit by European traders to a large extent, but was realized on the profits of earlier 
expeditions.”212 By the 1750s, this pattern of trade had been modified and refined into the system 
recorded by the Middelburg merchants. 
In order to understand this process, it is helpful to break down the negotiation into stages. In 
Philip Curtin’s discussion of assortment bargaining, he describes a two-step process of exchange: 
“Bargaining between men who are both buying and selling normally involves two agreements, one 
on the price of the items being sold and one on the price of those bought in return.”213 The 
following three levels of information and bargaining power builds on Curtin’s understanding of 
bargaining: first, a Malemba merchant presented a slave to a Middelburg merchant and a price 
was agreed in the local currency based on the value of a measure of cloth known as a piece. In this 
step of the process Malemba merchants had an undeniable advantage: their knowledge of the 
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value of a slave on the local and interior markets. Second, the pieces were exchanged for 
European goods. At this stage the Malemba and Middelburg merchants were relatively equal: the 
Middelburg merchant knew the original currency prices of the goods, and the Malemba merchant 
knew their values in the hinterland of the Loango Coast. The Middelburg merchant’s priority 
would have been to include as many goods of little value in the negotiated “piece” as he could, 
whereas the Malemba merchant would have been concerned with obtaining objects of greatest 
value on the internal market. Third and lastly, Middelburg merchants recorded in their ledger the 
value of goods in Dutch currency; this information was held exclusively by the Middelburg traders. 
Thus the transactions themselves hold a key to the balance of power in negotiations. 
Another key element in the institutionalization of trade on the Loango Coast that is not mentioned 
in the discussion of trade negotiations above is the regulation of credit. Significantly, the MCC 
financial records do not offer evidence of Middelburg merchants receiving pawns on the Loango 
Coast in security for advances of trade goods. Although it is difficult to substantiate claims that 
pawnship was used regularly in the procurement of slaves on the Loango Coast, Lovejoy and 
Richardson cite James Fraser’s testimony to the British House of Commons as evidence of 
pawnship on the Loango Coast.214 The court transcript, which is dated 1790, reads: 
Is it the practice at Angola for European ships to take pawns? 
It is a practice, and a very bad one. It is the custom at Angola for the traders and 
inhabitants to pawn their Slaves, their children or relations to procure goods for 
different purposes – it is sometimes, I believe, the custom with some great men 
in the country to order some of their friends to order some of their friends, their 
relations, or families to be sold. 215 
Fraser went on to describe the “evil” of pawnship. Despite his assertions that pawnship was 
commonly practiced on the Loango Coast, he gave an example of pawnship on the Windward 
Coast rather than the Angola Coast: “When I was taken by a French man of war on the Windward 
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Coast, a Liverpool ship that happened to be taken, had a number of pawns on board.”216 Thus, 
Fraser seems to have been offering anecdotal evidence rather than speaking to his own 
experiences. In an additional question, Fraser was asked about the greater prevalence of pawnship 
throughout Africa: 
Does the account of the pawns you have given relate to the Trade in other 
parts of Africa, as well as at Angola? 
It relates to all parts that I know where the custom of putting pawns on board 
ships prevails. 
 Does that custom generally prevail? 
It does at Angola and the Windward Coast, to my own knowledge, and I believe 
in other parts – but seldom at Bonny. 
It is worth drawing attention to the fact that he does not link pawnship specifically to slave 
trading. Furthermore, he suggested that pawnship was rare at the Bonny, at the Bight of Biafra. 
This is consistent with Lovejoy and Richardson’s findings that credit in Bonny was secured by a 
centralized government rather than by the exchange of pawns. 
When asked to describe the slave trade earlier in his testimony, Fraser described a barter 
exchange rather than a credit exchange: 
In what manner are the Slaves purchased, on the Coast of Angola, by the 
Europeans? 
We commonly have factories on shore, at Melimba [Malemba], Cabenda 
[Cabinda], and Loango – the people on the Sea Coast act commonly as brokers – 
they are generally called Linguisters, and receive a commission, which were 
called Linguisters Wages – the people from the interior parts of the country, 
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who by their own accounts are sometimes a month, two months, and three 
month, on their journey down, come to our factories, attended by some of 
these brokers – our trade with them is a mere barter; we received their Slaves 
at a price fixed on – they get our goods in return, and sometimes we see them 
back again, in a month or six weeks, returning with slaves.217 
A second time the questioner asked Fraser to confirm what he meant by barter: 
In what manner is the barter you mentioned between Europeans and the 
natives conducted? 
The natives examine the European goods, and if the quantity and quality is to 
their satisfaction, and the Slaves to ours, the barter is complete. 218 
This testimony seems to indicate that while pawnship may have been used as a credit mechanism 
on the Loango Coast, it was not necessarily linked to the transatlantic slave trade. Furthermore, 
Fraser clearly identified barter as the primary method of acquiring slaves on the Loango Coast. In 
regards to the factories Fraser refers to at Malemba, Cabinda, and Loango, these most likely refer 
to temporary lodges set up when a ship arrived and abandoned when it departed. This question is 
further explored in Chapter 5’s discussion of the physical environment of the slave trade. 
In the region of Gabon, the trading region to the north, pawnship was commonly practiced, in 
contrast to the Loango Coast. An 1810 petition to the Portuguese Court protested the illegal 
seizure of pawns at Gabon for the sale at the Island of Príncipe. In these documents the author, 
José Baptista Velles, also cited a case of the illegal seizure of pawns at Calabar, which caused a 
strain on Portuguese-Calabar trading relations.219 Additionally, K. David Patterson found evidence 
in a Report of the Lord’s Committee, in evidence provided by David Henderson, which referred to 
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pawnship as a means of slave procurement on the Gabon Coast.220 Thus it is clear that while that 
pawnship was an established mechanism of trade in West Central Africa, it was not a dominant 
method of exchange. Rather it seems that barter was a more dominant method of slave trade on 
the Loango Coast in the late eighteenth century. 
African traders were important figures in the bartering process in the pattern of trade at the 
Loango Coast. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the majority of slave brokers 
trading with the MCC seemed to engage in this trade as a side line rather than a primary means of 
survival. Over the 27 year period of this study, 631 merchants sold 6,819 slaves in 3,154 
transactions at Malemba. Merchants conducted an average of five transactions; these transactions 
averaged two enslaved persons. Thus, merchants sold an average of 10 slaves to the MCC over a 
27 year period. While the MCC represented only nine per cent of the slaves boarded in this period, 
these data give us a better picture of the organization of trade on the Loango Coast in the 
eighteenth century. Specifically, the average Malemba merchant seems to have made a relatively 
small investment in the trade: the purchase of one to two slaves in a hinterland market probably 
in combination with the purchase of other goods such as ivory, copper, and redwood. These 
enslaved Africans were not only an investment for potential economic gain through resale, they 
were also sources of labour that could be exploited in local salt, cloth, or agricultural production 
while awaiting sale. In contrast, by the time Middelburg merchants had reached the Loango Coast, 
they had made a relatively large investment in terms of both the outfitting of the ship and the 
voyage from Europe. When they reached the Loango Coast they needed to exchange their goods 
for enslaved Africans or they faced the loss of investment made on the journey thus far. 
As already discussed in this chapter, the office of Mafouk was a marked exception to this pattern 
of small investment in slaves: Mafouks sold 7.6 per cent of the total enslaved Africans purchased 
by Middelburg merchants and thus assuming the largest risk in terms of investment. A Mafouk 
was able to support this significant investment in the slave trade through a position granted by the 
ruler in combination with substantial personal wealth. A similar pattern emerged on the Loango 
Coast as a whole between 1730 and 1790, in which a few merchants controlled a quarter of the 
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trade, while the remaining three-quarters were contributed by small merchants. 221 For a more 
in-depth discussion of the pattern of merchant engagement on the Loango Coast, see Chapter 4. 
If the merchants of the Loango Coast used internal financing to outfit slave trading caravans, this 
form of investment may have limited their ability to expand slave supply to meet the growing 
demand in the late eighteenth century. Although Lovejoy and Richardson’s categorization of 
trading systems is overly dependent on European credit to the exclusion of other key factors, their 
explanation of the role of credit in the expansion of the trade is particularly pertinent for the 
Loango Coast. As a market which seems to have depended heavily upon internal financing, at least 
in the slave trade, it is possible that the traders of the Loango Coast limited the growth of their 
slave supply. 
In contrast to Lovejoy and Richardson’s approach to three categories of trust, authority, and 
pawnship as exclusive models of trade, this evidence suggests a system of trade evolved on the 
Loango Coast which included three key elements of organization: barter-based transactions 
supported by internal financing; ship trade rather than permanent settlement; and trade 
guaranteed by a centralized Ngoyo government. Thus elements of authority and financing are not 
exclusive; they can overlap in a number of ways in a number of different contexts. In the case of 
Malemba, a barter-based system evolved where internal financing allowed the greater 
independence of Malemba traders from their European counterparts and negated the need for 
systems of credit. Ship-based trade may have delayed the loading times, as Africans not Europeans 
controlled the volume of trade, but the absence of permanent settlements also prevented 
European encroachment on Ngoyo power while simultaneously minimizing maintenance costs for 
European traders. Finally, a centralized government created the stability and regulation which 
allowed the trade to flourish without threat of default or trickery, both parties knowing the terms 
of negotiation are guaranteed by the Mafouk on the one side, as appointees of the local rulers, 
and the ship captain on the other, as representatives of the MCC. Thus, Western African 
transatlantic trade relations should not be evaluated only in terms of their relation to European 
credit but rather in terms of three dimensions: credit vs. barter, fort/castle trade vs. ship trade, 
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and centralized vs. autonomous trade. The range of financing, settlement, and authority structures 
present on the Western African coast, and the multiple possible combinations of these structures 
highlights the need to understand each Western African port within its own unique context, while 
at the same time acknowledging the common features which bind them together in the 
transatlantic slave trade. 
Conclusion 
Driven by initial demands for gold and luxury goods, European encounters with African merchants 
on the western coast of Africa were characterized by an early period of openness and flexibility on 
the part of the European merchants adapting to new markets. During this period, European 
merchants modified their mechanisms of trade, which had been developed in the European 
contexts, to meet the new challenges and demands of sub-Saharan ports. Examples of this 
negotiation on the Loango Coast show that although European vulnerability diminished over time, 
African merchants continued to set the terms for trade. The ability of European merchants to 
adapt to the ebbs and flows of African markets was a key factor in their successful exploitation of 
first luxury goods in European markets, and later slaves in transatlantic markets. 
By focusing on the challenges of long distance trade, this chapter has explored the barriers of 
trade and the strategies developed between European and Loango Coast merchants to both limit 
and sustain trade. Here it is argued that the early period of contact in the late fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries involved a cross-fertilization of European and African ideas to create new set 
of trade mechanisms on the Loango Coast. One strand of the development of trade mechanisms 
involves the use of medieval institutions such as nations, guilds, and merchant associations in 
developing Atlantic trading monopolies; followed by the gradual replacement of monopolies with 
free trade.  This adaptation of a European trading strategy involved multiple African factors 
including the settlement strategies available at different ports, the variations in political 
environment, and the types of market arrangements negotiated. Through an accumulation of 
collective knowledge Europeans were able to move beyond the most intense period of 
cultural/social misunderstandings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to establish the 
mutual trust and reciprocity necessary for the success of cross cultural trade in the eighteenth 
century; however their African counterparts constructed significant barriers to European control. 
Evidence from the MCC records suggests that the mechanisms of trade on the Loango Coast were 
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characterized by its barter-based, ship based exchanges and that a greater degree of internal 
financing was involved in these purchases than has hitherto been suggested by Lovejoy and 
Richardson. These mechanisms came together to build an “institution” which facilitated trade 
while insulating the communities of the Loango Coast from absorbing European models of 
economic and political organization. A Mafouk or Mambouk sat at the pinnacle of this institution 
as he was responsible for striking a balance between facilitating trade and maintaining these 
barriers at each Loango port. 
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Chapter 3: Maximizing Profit and 
Minimizing Risk: Transatlantic 
Shipping and the Loango Coast Slave 
Trade 
 
Whereas the discussion up until this point has dealt with the popularity of African ports and the 
mechanisms involved in providing ships from Europe and the Americas with human cargo, this 
chapter explores how Europeans calculated the risks and profits of these voyages. It sketches 
patterns of European trade on the Loango Coast, setting patterns of seasonality and slave 
procurement against a detailed analysis of the economic transactions of the MCC. In doing so, this 
chapter will expand upon the themes of merchant communities introduced in the previous 
chapter, while presenting the theme of knowledge accumulation, particularly focusing on the 
eighteenth-century experiences of the Dutch on the Loango Coast. 
Unlike the bilateral trade between Brazil and Angola, the English, French, and Dutch traders 
engaged in a triangular shipping route between Europe, West Central Africa, and the Americas to 
exchange textiles, weapons, and alcohol for African slaves and plantation commodities. As part of 
the minimizing risk, merchants would have continually calculated and compared seasonal trading 
patterns, the procurement rates of slaves on the African coast, and slave prices in both Africa and 
the Americas. This information would have circulated informally in the major European ports 
which outfitted the slave trading voyages. Shipping companies and investors monitored these 
fluctuations, as the more efficient the procurement process the faster the ship would return to 
port, reequip, and embark on another voyage. Efficiency increased the potential profit by reducing 
the risks of illness and death for both the crew and the cargo. 
This chapter explores the broader conclusions of Stephen Behrendt’s British Atlantic and Johannes 
Postma’s Dutch studies of seasonality as they pertain to the Loango Coast and contrasts these 
findings with more specific data collected from the MCC records for the period between 1732 and 
1797. Both Behrendt and Postma’s studies analyse records that focus on a triangular shipping 
cycle, and both British and Dutch traders focused their West Central African trading expeditions on 
the Loango Coast. To achieve these ends, this chapter will be divided into four sections: The first 
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section will describe the sources and highlight the importance of the Loango Coast to the 
Middelburg slave supplying venture; the second section will explore the decision-making 
processes of European traders as they prepared for their voyages in Europe and calculated an 
optimal time to sail to Africa; the third section will explore questions of profitability and 
procurement, the durations of the middle passage, and the volumes of slaves available on the 
Loango Coast, and how these factors influenced how long to stay in Africa and when to sail for the 
Americas; and finally, the fourth section will provide a detailed analysis of the role of slave prices 
in decision making. 
The Sources: The MCC on the Loango Coast 
The Middelburg Commercial Company was a privately owned slaving company which stepped in to 
fill the gap when the state-assisted West India Company (WIC) failed in the early eighteenth 
century. Postma asserts: “*The MCC+ was undoubtedly the largest of the free-trade slaving 
companies in the Dutch Republic.”1 The location of the company in Middelburg was the result of a 
longstanding commitment to long-distance trade. Located on the south-western coast of the 
Netherlands, Middelburg was the capital of the province of Zeeland. While Middelburg is better 
known for its connections with the Dutch East Indian Trading Company (the VOC), Middelburg’s 
local politics made it a staunch supporter of the Dutch West India Company (WIC) in the 
seventeenth century. In his major work Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola 
1602-1686, C. R. Boxer describes Zeeland’s tenacious support of the WIC during the Spanish/Dutch 
war in Brazil: 
Holland on her side was anxious for peace, but the province of Zeeland, which 
was deeply interested in the fate of the West India Company, refused to assent 
to the ratification of peace with Spain unless the other provinces consented to 
help the struggling West India Company in Brazil with large supplies of ships, 
men and money. Accordingly, in August 1647, the States-General resolved to 
assist the West India Company on a large scale, in return for Zeeland’s assent to 
                                                          
1 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 123. 
 
114 
peace with Spain, and the dispatch of fifty-three ships and 6,000 men was 
resolved on. 2 
In addition to their outspoken support of the WIC, the district of Middelburg also supported the 
Privateering Board of Zeeland which authorized and outfitted various expeditions for the Angolan 
coast where they attempted, and for some time succeeded in, thwarting Spanish-Portuguese 
trading efforts. 3 Despite the eventual failure of the WIC, Middelburg merchants reinvented 
themselves in the eighteenth century in the form of the Middelburg Commerce Company, 
reflecting the heavy financial support of Middelburg merchants in this venture.4 
The MCC records, which are currently housed in the Zeeuwse Archief (Zeeland Archives) in 
Middelburg, have been explored by scholars including W. S. Unger, Johannes Menne Postma, and 
L. R. Priester.5 However, these works have primarily focused on transatlantic trade and Dutch 
trading communities. The MCC records also have significant potential to reveal a greater 
understanding of African slaving ports. The Voyages Database currently contains a record of 114 
voyages of ships owned by the MCC. Of these 114 voyages, the database records 32 voyages which 
record Loango Coast ports as their primary port for the embarkation of slaves, 26 voyages to the 
Windward Coast, 24 voyages to either multiple ports or unspecified ports, 23 voyages to the Gold 
Coast, three to the Bight of Biafra, three to the Bight of Benin, two to Guinea broadly defined, and 
one to Sierra Leone (see Table 1 below). The Loango Coast thus appears as the single most 
frequent destination of MCC slaving voyages. For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on these 
Loango Coast voyages. Despite the progress in cataloguing these data and the richness of these 
sources, the MCC records have been underutilized in the study of African history. This thesis will 
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van Nederlandse slavenhandel II”); Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade; L. R. Priester, De 
Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de slavenhandel en slavernij, 1596-1863: Het gedrag van de 
slavenhandelaren van de Commercie Compagnie van Middelburg in de 18e eeuw (Middelburg : Commissie 
Regionale Geschiedbeoefening Zeeland, 1987). 
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address this gap and hereby expand our knowledge of both the Middelburg and Loango Coast 
merchant communities. 
In this chapter, I will engage in a more in-depth analysis of trade on the Loango Coast focusing on 
the MCC’s trade negotiation documents between 1732 and 1796. This time period is defined by 
the documents themselves, as the first MCC ship arrived on the Loango Coast in 1732 and the last 
MCC ship departed from the coast in 1796. Of the 32 voyages outfitted by the MCC, significant 
data have been preserved for 29 voyages. For each of these voyages, between two and eight 
documents have been preserved. These documents contain hundreds of pages of purchases and 
sales of materials on the European, African, and South American coasts; journals of anecdotes, 
sailing coordinates and weather patterns; crew lists and wage tallies; and even occasional packets 
of letters. Although every document has a story to tell, this chapter focuses on the transaction 
records between Loango merchants and MCC captains. These data have been sorted and 
organized into a database which records ships’ names, captains’ names, the names of African 
merchants, ports of transaction, days of transaction, numbers of slaves exchanged (men, women, 
boys, and girls), and values of European goods exchanged. These data represent approximately 30 
per cent of MCC ships which engaged in slave trading on the Western African Coast and contain 
records of approximately 10,000 slaves sold in 5,000 transactions. 
Table 1: Primary Embarkation Regions of MCC Slaving Voyages 
 
Embarkation Region Number of Voyages 
Loango Coast 32 
Windward Coast 26 
Other Africa 24 
Gold Coast 23 
Bight of Biafra and Gulf of Guinea islands 3 
Bight of Benin 3 
Guinea 2 
Sierra Leone 1 
Total: 114 
 
Sources: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query: 
Vessel owners - Middelburgsche, accessed 19 July 2011 and Unger, Het Archief 
der MCC, pp. 30, 45, 81 & 104. 
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Decision Making: From Europe to Africa 
This section will expand upon the theme of merchant communities, which was introduced in the 
previous chapter, while developing the theme of knowledge accumulation, particularly focusing on 
the eighteenth century experiences of the Dutch on the Loango Coast. In contrast to the bilateral 
alcohol-slave trading cycle which came to dominate the Angola-Brazil slave trade, the English, 
French, and Dutch traders engaged in a triangular shipping route loading trade goods in Europe, 
slaves on the Loango Coast, and plantation commodities in the Americas. This section tests 
Behrendt and Postma’s findings about shipping patterns in the transatlantic slave trade against the 
MCC evidence on the Loango Coast between 1732 and 1797. In doing so, it begins to trace the 
decision making process in leaving Europe and approaching the African coast. 
Using the data from the Voyages Database, it is possible to track the arrival of the majority of 
slaving voyages on the Loango Coast. Focusing on the period of MCC trade on the Loango Coast, 
1730 to 1795, Graph 1 (below) tracks the arrival of 816 known voyages to the Loango Coast for the 
purpose of procuring slaves, which means an average of 12 ships per year. 6 While this graph 
shows constant engagement of Europeans on the coast at a rate of 5 to 20 ships arriving on the 
coast, four periods of particularly sparse trade and six periods of particularly dense trade emerge. 
These four periods of sparse trade include 1734 to 1736, 1746 to 1747, 1757, and 1779 to 1782. 
During these periods, fewer than five slave trading ships were present on the coast in any one 
year. The six periods of particularly dense trade occurred in 1749, 1764 to 1768, 1770, 1772 to 
1774, 1777, and 1784. During each of these 12 years more than 20 ships arrived on the Loango 
Coast in search of enslaved Africans. While internal supply and competition among other African 
ports played parts in these fluctuations, European events also played their role. 
                                                          
6 In his description of the methods used to establish the period in which a slave voyage traded in Africa, 
David Eltis explains that when hard evidence was insufficient, the Voyages Database includes an estimate: 
“There are also imputed variables for both voyage dates and on numbers of captives. Because most slaving 
voyages lasted for many months or even years, and no voyages have complete information for all ten date 
variables, we have created three definitions of "year" in the full downloadable database from which users 
can choose for purposes of analysis: the year in which the voyage originated, the year of embarkation of 
slaves, or the year of arrival at point of disembarkation. In the Voyages Database only “YEARAM” or “year of 
arrival” is provided. We created imputed year values when the sources did not record the years when 
voyages departed their homeport, or departed the African coast, or the year when vessels arrived in the 
Americas.” David Eltis, “Construction of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database: Sources and Methods” in  
(Emory University, 2010), available at http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/methodology-10.faces 
Accessed 24 July 2011. 
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Graph 1: Number of Slaving Ships Arriving on the Loango Coast, 1730 to 1795
 
Source: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query - Principal place of slave purchase: Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River, Rio Zaire, Kilongo, Loango, Malembo, 
Mayumba, and   Mpinda Accessed: 12 March 2010.
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In Behrendt’s analysis of sailing hazards during wartime he calculates that British ships were at the 
greatest risk of capture during the following periods: 1689 to 1697, 1744 to 1745, 1777 to 1782, 
and 1793 to 1794. 1 These periods of unrest on the sea increased the risk of an unsuccessful 
trading voyage while simultaneously triggering lenders to tighten the restrictions on credit, 
particularly between 1778 and 1779, and again in 1793. Presumably, this also resulted in higher 
premiums among insurers or an unwillingness to extend insurance altogether. These periods of 
pronounced shipping risks correspond to two periods of sparse trade on the Loango Coast: 
between 1746 and 1747, and between 1779 and 1782 (which overlaps with the Anglo Dutch War 
1780-1782). Significantly, 1777 stands out as a year of particularly dense trade despite Behrendt’s 
suggestion of pronounced hazards. This delayed response to shipping hazards in 1777 could be 
explained in part by the possibility that numerous ships had set sail before word of increased 
hazards reached British ports. 
However, Behrendt’s analysis of European wartime threats does not address the diminished trade 
on the Loango Coast between 1734 and 1736 and in 1757. Equally, Phyllis Martin’s work on the 
Loango Coast fails to shed light on the 1734 to 1736 reduction. However, 1734 to 1736 is the very 
period in which the MCC began trade on the Loango Coast – presumably due to the lack of 
competition. For 1757 we have a more comprehensive picture. Interestingly, while the Seven 
Years War (1756-1763) may account for the spike in slaving voyages between 1764 and 1777 to 
make up for the preceding gap, the only year significantly affected by the war was 1757, when no 
ships arrived on the Loango Coast. For the remainder of the war, between 5 and 12 ships arrived 
on the Loango Coast per year. In addition to the conflicts in Europe during this period, 1757 was a 
significant year on the Loango Coast itself. Phyllis Martin reported that in the 1750s two French 
warships were dispatched for Cabinda: “From there they sailed northwards to Malemba, Loango 
Bay, and Mayumba, attacking rival ships en route. When they arrived off the Loango Coast in 
March 1757, the French succeeded in clearing the area of Dutch and English traders.”2 Thus the 
French seemed to have extended the Seven Years War in Europe to the Loango Coast by 
attempting to forcefully secure a monopoly by dispatching two warships. 
                                                          
1 Stephen D. Behrendt, “Markets, Transition Cycles, and Profits: Merchant Decision Making in the British 
Slave Trade,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 58, No. 1, New Perspectives on the 
Transatlantic Slave Trade. (Jan., 2001) p. 173. 
 
2 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 84-85. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, 1764 to 1777 marks the period of heaviest concentration of 
ships trading on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century, with additional but unsustained 
peaks in 1749 and 1784. While the latter might be explained in part by the ending of the high risk 
shipping periods of 1746-1747 and 1779-1782, the former may be linked to events on the other 
side of the Atlantic Ocean. Behrendt suggested the demand for slaves in the Americas increased 
with the emergence of a more liberal credit system. Demand for slaves in the Americas was 
highest for the following periods, in which planters had the greatest access to credit: post 1763 in 
Grenada, Dominica, and St. Vincent; Jamaica and other possessions post 1792.3 This surge in the 
availability of credit significantly increased demand for slaves in the Americas. This increased 
demand for slaves, post 1763, corresponds directly with the 1764 to 1777 boom in trading on the 
Loango Coast. Thus, it might be concluded that a significant rise in the extension of credit to 
plantation owners in the Americas had a significant impact on the volume of trade on the Loango 
Coast, which was tempered only by the Anglo Dutch War of the early 1780s. Nevertheless, this 
boom in trade could not have occurred without the mechanisms of coordination and supply which 
had developed on the Loango Coast. (These mechanisms will be further discussed in Chapters 4 & 
5.) It is important to note that the 1764 boom was not limited to the Loango Coast but appeared 
throughout Western Africa. However, the Loango Coast was particularly successful in responding 
to this boom, as will be argued below. 
European merchants were required to balance these issues of risk and demand in order to make a 
profit. While the discussion above has focused on the fluctuations over the years, it will now turn 
to the fluctuations of trade in a 12 month cycle. The MCC records include much of the details 
necessary to fill in this picture. While the data discussed above included estimates on when ships 
arrived on the Loango Coast calculated from their departure dates, the data in the MCC records 
are more precise, giving the month of arrival for 28 voyages and details of the time spent on the 
Loango Coast for 26 of these voyages. Graph 2, below, traces the data for these 28 voyages to the 
Loango Coast. Although this dataset is small, it clearly shows a bimodal pattern in trade on the 
Loango Coast: The first peak, from December to April, was in March and represents 13 voyages; 
the second peak, between July and October, centers in September and represents 14 voyages. 
During the months of May, June, and November, no MCC ships landed on the coast. 
                                                          
 
3 Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits” p. 174. 
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Graph 2: Arrival of MCC Ships on the Loango Coast by Month 
Source: MCC 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 
1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289, & 1308. See Appendix A. 
These patterns suggest that the MCC merchant calculated the risks of when to leave Europe in 
hope of arriving in Africa at optimal trading periods. These calculations involved knowing when to 
hire a crew and when to hire and provision a ship. Behrendt calculates that late European summer 
to early autumn was the optimal period to hire sailors and skilled workers for a voyage, as it was a 
down period for other British shipping interests. Thus ships were in greatest supply between July 
and September. Slightly more complicated was the procedure of obtaining  a ship and outfitting it 
with provisions and trade goods: lumber was in greatest supply June through November; rice was 
imported between November and May; textiles were in short supply in the winter months; and 
pulses were harvested twice a year: April/May and August/September. 4 Behrendt comes to the 
conclusion that June through September was the optimal time for outfitting a slaving voyage in 
England.5 
                                                          
4 Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits”, pp. 176-80. 
 
5 Ibid., p. 181. 
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Once a ship was outfitted and the weather allowed, the ship would set sail for Africa. Using data 
for 90 MCC voyages to the Western African Coast, Johannes Postma calculated that MCC voyages 
took as little as one month and as long as 11 months to reach their African destinations, while the 
average voyage took 76 days.6 Using the 27 MCC voyages with sufficient data, I have calculated a 
voyage from Middelburg to the Loango Coast took between two and nine months, with the 
average ship taking 4.7 months. The modal, or most frequent, timing for a voyage was even less, at 
four months.7 As one might expect for the slave trading region farthest from Europe, MCC voyages 
to the Loango Coast took slightly longer than the average 2.5 months calculated by Postma. The 
variations in shipping times show that although European merchants might have a preference for 
when they might aim to arrive on the Loango Coast, weather, currents, conflicts, and accidents 
could intervene to slow down the voyage. 
Interestingly, Behrendt suggests that the prime time for outfitting a ship with enough food for a 
slaving voyage in England corresponds with the English pulse harvest in April/May. Given the 
proximity to the Netherlands, we can assume a similar crop cycle. Equally, he suggests that Loango 
Coast did not produce foodstuffs for export.  It is also possible that local conditions, for example 
the use of foodstuffs to manipulate the departure of ships, may have discouraged Europeans from 
purchasing food on this coast. Whatever the case, ships bound for Loango tended to provision in 
Europe. If a ship were outfitted with foodstuffs in the North Sea in April/May, it could reasonably 
expect to reach the Loango Coast in August/September. This correlation may partially explain the 
disproportionate number of ships arriving on the Loango Coast in September and the resulting 
high numbers engaging in trade in October. 
Calculating seasonality in Western Africa was not as clearly defined. Behrendt highlights two 
African regions with coordinated “seasonal slaving and provisions networks” in Sierra Leone and 
the Bight of Biafra. In both regions, Behrendt provides evidence of local efforts to coordinate 
supplies of slaves reaching the coast with local harvest seasons. The key seasons of supply for 
Sierra Leone fell between October and March, and again in July, whereas the slave supply in the 
                                                          
 
6 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 152. 
 
7 The data for this calculation were derived from the following documents: MCC 215-223, 333-337, 398-403, 
410-413, 455-460, 516-536, 574-578, 793-799, 823-829, 929-942, 978-983, 984-993, 1009-1022, 1103-1110, 
1222-1233, 1286-1292, 1307-1311. 
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Bight of Biafra and the availability of slaves peaked between August and October at the same time 
as yams were in ample supply. In contrast, Behrendt argues that the Loango Coast, which he refers 
to as “the coastal areas north of Luanda where the Britons traded”, produced foodstuffs for 
domestic consumption only or made it difficult for Europeans to purchase foodstuffs, and 
therefore the supply of slaves need not be coordinated to harvest times. He goes on to suggest 
that the trade on the Loango Coast had no distinct pattern, allowing the British greater flexibility in 
timing their arrivals. It is also possible that the lack of British strategy in determining when they 
should arrive on the coast meant that local traders had to be perpetually prepared for trade. The 
success of Loango Coast merchants in procuring slaves is evident in Behendt’s conclusions. He lists 
Anomabu, Whydah, Bonny, Old Calabar, Loango, and Malemba (the latter two both ports of the 
Loango Coast) as “the more efficient *slave+ markets” of the transatlantic slave trade based on 
provisioning cycles and shipping times. Still, Behrendt highlights the success of the British on the 
Loango Coast, particularly between 1791 and 1794, as owing to the retirement of the Dutch from 
the trade and the French preoccupation with revolutions in France and St. Domingue.8 Thus, he 
concludes it was the lack of competition more than the convenient supply of slaves which drew 
the British to the Loango Coast at that moment. 
Graph 3 below shows the numbers of MCC ships present on the Loango Coast in a given month. 
The data peak twice, first in April, recording 16 voyages trading through April and second, and 
more significantly, in October recording 19 voyages lasting through the month of October. Thus, 
October was the most popular month for MCC trade on the Loango Coast, representing almost 10 
per cent of stays on the coast. This pattern of increased trade in July through November was not 
confined to the Loango Coast. It is also reflected in Herbert Klein’s study of Portuguese trade on 
the Angola Coast, which includes data from 549 ships in an overlapping time period: 1723 to 
1771.9 Despite the distinct nature of the Loango and Angola Coast as trading regions, their 
proximity meant that they shared similar environmental factors in provisioning the slave trade. 
The similarity between Klein’s findings for trade in Angola with the MCC records for the Loango 
Coast suggests that these environmental factors where important in provisioning slaves.  
  
                                                          
 
8 Ibid., pp. 184, 186-188, 191. 
 
9 Klein, “The Portuguese Slave Trade from Angola in the Eighteenth Century,” pp. 894-918. 
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Graph 3: Number of MCC Ships Present on the Loango Coast, by Months 
 
Source: MCC 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 
1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289 & 1308. 
 
Graph 4: Numbers of MCC Slaves Purchased, by Months 
713 771 741
557 573 558
414
485
732
1326
1246
812
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
 
Source: MCC 216, 286, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 
1013,1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1289, 1308. 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
January February March April May June July August September October November December
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
S
h
i
p
s
 
124 
September/October was the beginning of the rainy season on the Loango Coast that lasted well 
into April.10 Richard Steckel and Richard Jensen’s analysis of slave mortality in the transatlantic 
slave trade indicated that the rainy season was at its height in the Congo area between December 
and February. During this period crews and slaves were at the highest risk of deaths from 
gastrointestinal diseases and malaria.11 The link between the rainy season and illness may partially 
explain the slight reduction of ships trading on the coast in these months, as exhibited in Graphs 2 
and 3. 
Regardless of season, Postma found WIC reports which noted that fresh water was easily obtained 
on the Loango Coast, “in contrast to the Gold Coast and the Slave Coast, where it was often 
difficult to obtain water.”12 Thus the procurement of fresh water would not have impacted the 
decision-making process involved in European shipping on the Loango Coast. Despite these 
potential explanations for the ebbs and flows of trade in this region, it is important to note that 
Middleburg merchants arrived on the coast in most months and traded in all months of the year, 
reflecting the relatively steady supply of slaves to Loango Coast markets. In addition to these local 
factors, pull factors in the Americas, such as avoiding the hurricane season and arriving during high 
demand for labour, would have influenced the departure time of the ships. 
Graph 4, above, sorts the numbers of slaves purchased by the MCC by month. While highlighting 
the sales of slaves throughout the year, it identifies October and November as months of greatest 
supply. While this pattern can be partially explained by the greater concentration of ships on the 
coast during this period, as detailed in Graph 5 above, the October ratio of 19 ships to 1,326 slaves 
purchased shows a significantly higher rate of procurement than April, when 16 ships purchased 
557 slaves. Although these data are collected from a fairly small sample (28) of all (816) of the 
ships trading on the Loango Coast between 1730 and 1795, they suggest that MCC merchants 
procured slaves at a faster rate in October and November. Table 2, below, calculates the speed 
with which ships procured cargoes of slaves depending on when they arrived. It calculates that 
while an average ship procured a cargo in 5.3 months, ships arriving in October might procure a 
                                                          
 
10 Miller, Way of Death, p. 14. 
 
11 Richard H. Steckel and Richard A. Jensen, “New Evidence on the Causes of Slave and Crew Mortality in the 
Atlantic Slave Trade,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 46, no. 1, (Mar. 1986) pp. 55-77. 
 
12 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 158. 
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cargo within 2.5 months. (The difference between these calculations and Postma’s calculations will 
be discussed below.) Given the large percentage of MCC ships arriving on the coast between 
August and September, it is possible that MCC merchants calculated the advantage of greater 
supplies and aimed to arrive on the coast during this period and achieve this objective with 
relative success. However, the MCC shipping data presents a very small number of the total ships 
present on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century.  Further research into shipping data from 
other Dutch, French and/or English ships is required to verify whether this pattern was confined to 
MCC ships or whether it had broader application. 
Table 2: Procurement Times of MCC Ships on the Loango Coast 
 
Month 
Number 
of Arrivals 
Total 
Months 
Present 
Average13 
Months 
Present 
Jan 1 10 10.0 
Feb 3 17 5.7 
Mar 5 32 6.4 
Apr 1 7 7.0 
May 0   
Jun 0   
Jul 3 20 6.7 
Aug 5 30 6.0 
Sep 4 25 6.3 
Oct 2 7 3.5 
Nov 0   
Dec 2 11 5.5 
 26 159 6.1 
 
Source: MCC 216, 286, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 
1013,1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1289, 1308. 
 
Decision Making: From Africa to the Americas 
Just as an expectation of high availability of slaves might have attracted ships to a port in a certain 
period, the expectation of diminishing slave availability could have motivated a captain to set sail 
                                                          
13 This is a measure of how many months a ship was present rather than how many 30-day periods therefore 
the first and last month are both counted. 
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for the Americas. Slave mortality was another factor in evaluating when to leave the African Coast. 
This section will examine the Loango Coast’s broader trends of mortality and procurement and 
how those factors influenced the decision making process of European slave merchants. 
Postma notes that turn-around times for WIC slave ships ranged from 11 days (on the Slave Coast) 
to 8 months (on the Loango Coast). Using a dataset of 125 ships, he estimates the average Dutch 
ship spent 128 days or 4.3 months on the Western African coast procuring slaves (see Table 3 
below).14 In a similar study of British slaving voyages, Galenson concludes: “An African stay of four 
months was usually calculated to obtain a cargo of slaves; among 36 voyages made on behalf of 
the Royal African Company during 1719-25, the shortest stay in Africa was 33 days, the longest 
was 9.5 months, and the median stay was just under 3.5 months.”15 Returning to Table 3, Postma 
calculates that the MCC ships travelling to the Loango Coast (all of the ships being directed to 
Central Africa north of the Congo River) had a substantially faster average loading rate than their 
counterparts on the West African Coast. My calculations above (see Table 2) differ slightly from 
Postma’s figures. Whereas Postma suggests an MCC ship could load a cargo of slaves in an average 
of 4.8 months, my figures show that loading a cargo of slaves took closer to 5.3 months. This small 
discrepancy can be explained by noting that Postma used a sample of 13 MCC voyages to calculate 
his figure, whereas my calculations included data for 26 voyages, making use of data from the log 
books when the data in the financial records were insufficient. Nevertheless, this figure still 
remains well below the 7.2 months which it took to load a cargo of slaves on the West African 
coast. 
The merchants of the Loango Coast were able to maintain this speed of embarkation while 
procuring cargoes of at least 100 more enslaved Africans per voyage than their counterparts to the 
north. The data from the WIC and the Royal Africa Company (hereafter the RAC) both reflect faster 
loading times of almost 1.5 months on the Loango Coast, particularly in the earlier period of trade; 
however these faster loading times are more of a reflection on the small numbers of ships arriving 
on the Western African Coast in the earlier period rather than a diminished capacity of African 
traders to procure enslaved Africans. Indeed, by returning to Graph 1, we can see that the 
numbers of ships on the Loango Coast increased dramatically in the second half of the eighteenth 
                                                          
14 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 142. 
 
15 David W. Galenson, Traders, planters, and slaves: market behavior in early English America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 26. 
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century, as was the case throughout Western Africa. This pattern of increased presence on the 
Loango Coast is equally reflected in the increase of MCC voyages (see Appendix A). The increasing 
number of European ships arriving resulted in the procurement rates increasing dramatically, 
though not quite as quickly as the demand. During this period of increased demand, we see a 
decrease in loading speeds throughout the Western Coast of Africa. Nevertheless, Dutch ships still 
procured slaves faster on the Loango Coast than in West Africa.  
 
Table 3: Procurement Efficiency in the Dutch Trade 
 
Period Carrier Sample  Average 
per Ship 
Days in 
Africa 
Loaded 
per Day 
1687-1735 WIC 19 436 90.4 4.8 
1700-1734 WIC 49 397 93.4 4.3 
      
1732-1802 MCC (Central Africa) 13 361 143 2.5 
  MCC (West Africa) 42 256 217 1.2 
  MCC (All) 57 284 200 1.4 
Total  125 372 128 2.9 
 
Source: Figures from Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 142. 
The length of time spent in procuring slaves was of importance to European merchants as time 
passing increased mortality and decreased profits. Furthermore, the length of the middle passage 
and related slave deaths would have been key considerations to profit margins. To this end, 
Postma argues: 
The significance of the duration of the middle passage is further illustrated by 
the discrepancy in mortality rates between consignments obtained on the 
Guinea coast compared to those from the Loango region. The latter showed 
consistently lower death rates, both in the WIC and in the free trade, although 
Loango is farther from the Caribbean than Guinea...  the western winds and 
currents along the Guinea Coast made it necessary for ships to sail east and 
south to Cape Lopez (above Loango) before they could pick up the eastern 
winds suitable for the Atlantic crossing. These ships had to cross the equator 
128 
twice with their cargo of slaves, thus lengthening their crossing by an average of 
several weeks at least.16 
As a result, the average “Dutch slavers carrying a slave cargo from the Loango-Angola region 
registered considerably shorter middle passage durations than their counterparts from the Guinea 
coast. WIC slavers averaged fifty and free traders forty-seven days for the crossing from Loango, 
compared with eighty-one and seventy-one days, respectively, for overall averages for the middle 
passage.”17 Postma demonstrates, as we can see in Table 3, “that slave ships sailing from Loango, 
compared to the Guinea coast, had lower mortality rates but also significantly larger slave 
consignments.”18 This analysis concurs with Postma’s findings that fast procurement, short middle 
passages, and large cargoes contributed to the success of the Loango region as a major source in 
of slaves for the transatlantic market.19 
Having obtained their supply of enslaved Africans, captains had two major concerns when 
approaching markets in the Americas: first and foremost, captains sought to avoid hurricane 
season which peaked in late August early September, and second, captains aimed to land when 
slaves were in the greatest demand. The latter was defined by crop seasons: Caribbean sugar 
plantations required large amounts of unskilled labour between November and May; North 
American tobacco reached its most labour intensive between April and May and again in August 
and September; North American rice required intensive labour from April to October. Caribbean 
sugar would be most relevant to predicting trading cycles from the Loango Coast, as Behrendt 
notes that the majority of enslaved Africans embarked by the British in West Central Africa 
disembarked in Jamaica.20 The importance of the sugar season is confirmed by the MCC records 
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18 Ibid., p. 255. 
 
19 Ibid., p. 276. 
 
20 Behrendt, “Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits”, pp. 192, 195. 
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which list St. Martin, St. Estatius, Suriname, Paramaribo, Curacao, Demerara, and Essequibo as the 
destinations of slaves from the Loango Coast.21 
Using these criteria, Behrendt calculates that the optimal British slave shipping cycle involved an 
early summer departure to purchase slaves in Africa during the October harvest, which coincided 
with the best availability of enslaved Africans. If the ship stayed on its course and African 
transactions went smoothly, it would arrive in the Caribbean or North America during the sugar 
season between November and May, avoiding the hurricane season between August and 
September, and return to England in the following Spring to restart the cycle. However, many 
elements of risk were involved in this calculation, including travel time and adequate supplies. 
Additionally, loading, negotiating, and selling periods were dependent on cycles of supply and 
demand in three locations. Should one of these elements throw off the schedule, the next cycle 
had to be recalculated. If British captains left England at a less optimal time, they were likely to 
avoid ports which had a seasonal pattern of supply and sail for regions such as West Central Africa 
which had a consistent supply of slaves throughout the year, or at least a consistently 
unpredictable supply.22 This study shows that Middelburg merchants chose an early summer 
departure for West Central Africa slightly more than any other time of year. This preference of the 
Loango Coast over West Africa will be discussed further below. 
These seasonal patterns, in addition to qualifying factors of political instability in Europe, piracy on 
the high seas, fluctuating slave prices, and commodity demand in Western Africa, were keys to the 
development of merchant strategies in Europe and Brazil. Even seasonal patterns shifted over long 
time horizons and merchants’ strategies evolved as they gained more information in newspapers, 
customs documents, and by word of mouth.23 Behrendt suggests that it was the British merchants’ 
ability to coordinate their shipping routines to optimal schedules, their ability to predict ebbs and 
flows in African trade in multiple markets, and their flexibility to adapt to the demands of the 
trade which allowed the British to dominate the transatlantic slave trade at the peak of its 
expansion. The growing success of the British may have been one of the factors in the decline of 
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the Dutch on the Loango Coast in the 1780s and its eventual death in 1796 during the Napoleonic 
Wars. 
Slave Sex and Age in the Price Data on the Loango Coast 
Beyond calculating the optimal time to buy captives and to sail for the Americas, captains also had 
to grapple with the question of which American market to choose. In addition to providing faster 
loading rates and a shorter middle passage, Postma suggests: “Slaves from the Loango-Angola 
coast and the Bight of Biafra were generally purchased at lower prices than the slaves from the 
Guinea coast … the consignments from Loango produced prices on average 20 per cent less per 
slave.”24Graph 7, below, traces the patterns of slave prices on the Loango Coast. The dark grey line 
represents data from the Voyages Database on fluctuations in prices for slaves originating on the 
Loango Coast. These values are defined in the database as the “average price of slaves 
standardized on sterling cash price of prime slaves sold in Jamaica”.25 These figures show the 
prices of slaves remaining fairly steady from 1681 to 1750, fluctuating between 17.5 and 26.9 
pounds sterling. In the 1751 to 1755 period, the price of Loango Coast slaves rose to 35.1 pounds 
sterling, followed by a minor correction in slave prices between 1756 and 1765 and a significant 
jump in the 1766-1770 to an average of 45.4 pounds sterling per slave. From this point, slave 
prices rose steadily until 1786-1790, when the value of a Loango Coast slave peaked at 77.9 
pounds sterling. For the last three periods, 1791-1805, prices remained steady at 71 to 72 pounds 
sterling per slave. Whereas the Voyages price data have been collected in the Americas, the MCC 
price data have been collected from the African transactions. 
Without comparative data, it is difficult to tell how representative the MCC price data is of the 
broader slave trade on the Loango Coast between 1746 and 1776. The MCC data were derived 
from 29 voyages during which over 10,000 slaves were purchased. However, the sample size for 
prices is limited to the 3,263 transactions in which slaves of a single category, man, woman, boy, 
or girl, are represented. In the remaining transactions include a combination of two or more 
categories of slaves (man, woman, boy, and girl) within a single transaction, which does not allow 
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25 The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database SPSS Codebook: Expanded Dataset, 2010 edition. Available at: 
http://slavevoyages.org/downloads/Codebook2010.pdf P. 32. Accessed 27 June 2011. 
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a separate costing based on gender or age categories.   In these transactions, the value is 
expressed in the Loango Coast currency of account, the “piece”.26 Thus in Graph 5 below, two 
slave prices are expressed, in two currencies: the piece and the sterling pound. Slave prices have 
been calculated here, not on the nominal price of a prime male, but on the average of all slaves: 
men, women, boys, and girls. However, for the purposes of this study it is the trend in slave prices 
rather than the values of slaves which is of importance. The fluctuating difference in prices is 
represented in how many points exist between the two measures. This highlights the divergence 
and convergence in prices.  Although the MCC data are fragmented, they follow the general trend 
of the numbers from the Voyages Database. In the earliest period, 1731 to 1735, the prices are 
only 4.4 points apart. Between 1746 and 1765, the difference between these sets of numbers 
remains almost constant, ranging between 7 and 11 points. However, in the 1766 to 1770 period 
the rise in prices recorded by the MCC is far sharper than the increase reflected in the Voyages 
Database, as the gap doubles to 20 points. Between 1771 and 1775 both sets of prices continue to 
increase, but with a diminished gap of 16 points. By the 1776-1780 period they have recovered to 
differences more consistent with the 1731 to 1735 period, being only five points apart. The overall 
pattern which emerges is that slave values on the Loango Coast remained fairly stable until the 
1751 to 1760 period when there was an initial peak. This peak is followed by a slight reduction in 
prices in the late 1750s and a steady increase in slave prices until 1790. The MCC data parallel the 
price data for the Americas. This strong relationship between African and American prices 
suggests European traders may have been more willing to pay higher prices in Africa when they 
anticipated higher profits in the Americas. Alternatively phased, Europeans were likely to have 
outfitted more ships when they judged demand to be highest in the Americas.  
Given the length of the period covered by this data, inflation must be taken into consideration in 
calculating the extent of value increase in a slave. According to an online calculator, available at 
http://www.measureingworth.com, which has been set up by Economics Professors Lawrence H. 
Officer and Samuel H. Williams of the University of Illinois at Chicago, the best way to index the 
fluctuating value of an unskilled labourer is by using a “historical standard of living” index. This 
index measures “the purchasing power of an income or wealth in its relative ability to purchase a  
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Graph 5: Prices of Slaves Originating on the Loango Coast 
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Sources: The data combine two sources: http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query – 
Principal place of slave purchase: Boary, Cabinda, Congo North, Congo River (Rio Zaire), Loango, Malembo, 
Mayumba; Table Function – Rows: 5-year period; Columns: Embarkation Ports; Cells: Sterling cash prices in 
Jamaica. And a database compiled from MCC records 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 533, 
575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289 & 1308. See 
Appendix B for a more details on these slave prices. 
  
(fixed over time) bundle of goods and services.”27 Using this index, a slave costing £18 in 1681 (at 
the low point of slave prices) would have been worth a bundle of goods to the values of £18 in 
1681 and £21 16s in 1786. However, according to the Voyages data, an average male slave from 
the Loango Coast was worth an average of £78 by 1786, at the peak of slave prices. According to 
the same measure, the 1786 value of £78 was worth £64 in 1681. This is a difference of £46 in 
1681 values. Thus when indexed according to a historical standard of living, the cost of one slave 
in 1786, at the peak of slave prices, was equivalent to the cost of approximately three slaves in 
                                                          
27 Measuring Wealth Online Calculator available at http://www.measureingworth.com. Accessed on 1 May 
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1681 at the lowest slave price. Unfortunately, the lack of information to index the Loango Piece to 
a historical standard of living prevents a similar calculation for the second set of data. However, 
fluctuations in inflation may account for the slight deviations between these data sets. Thus, this 
comparison is most useful to show a broader trend in the common trajectory of slaves purchased 
in at the Loango Coast, and the Loango Coast slave sale prices in the Americas.  
In the past 30 years, discussions over the relative significance of gender and age have dominated 
historical inquiries into fluctuations of slave prices in the Atlantic World. While Johannes Postma 
has provided the most comprehensive analysis of the Dutch data on slave prices available for the 
Loango Coast, no one has done a more in-depth analysis into gender and age categories. 28 This 
chapter begins to address this deficiency in the literature. Broader studies on the gender patterns 
of slave cargos include David Eltis and Stanley Engerman’s 1992 article “Was the Slave Trade 
Dominated by Men” and G. Ugo Nwokeji’s article on “African Conceptions of Gender and the Slave 
Traffic.” Both studies have sought to explain the preponderance of male slaves in the transatlantic 
market. Eltis and Engerman have suggested: “The desires of planters in the Americas and those of 
the power elites in Africa … dovetail in a preference for male slaves.”29 Nwokeji concurred with 
this position, arguing: “Planters forced black men and women alike into labor in the fields, and the 
price differential between males and females was generally much lower in the Americas than in 
Africa.”30 Nwokeji goes on to suggest that within African cultures there was a premium on the 
value of female slaves, and therefore women were retained in the internal market and men were 
funnelled into the external market. 31 If Atlantic markets showed a clear preference for male 
slaves, as Eltis and Engerman have suggested, one might expect to find consistently higher prices 
paid for male slaves in African ports. However, the discussion below indicates that the differences 
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29 David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman, “Was the Slave Trade Dominated by Men?” The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1992), p. 238. 
 
30 G. Ugo Nwokeji, “African Conceptions of Gender and the Slave Traffic,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 
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31 See: Nwokeji, “African Conceptions of Gender and the Slave Traffic”; and, Paul E. Lovejoy and David 
Richardson, "Competing Markets for Male and Female Slaves: Prices in the Interior of West Africa, 
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in male and female slave prices on the Loango Coast were more representative of the patterns 
which Nwokeji has described for the Americas. 
Furthermore, Paul Lovejoy has argued that non-economic considerations also may have impacted 
gender ratios of slaves entering the transatlantic slave trade through Muslim trading networks. 
While Muslim ethics would not have had an impact on West Central African trading patterns 
during the transatlantic slave trade, it is possible that other non-economic factors still impacted 
who was and was not be sold.32 Calculations from the Voyages Database on gender ratios for the 
Loango Coast indicate that a slightly smaller percentage of females embarked on slave trading 
ships than in the broader transatlantic trade. Whereas transatlantic voyages average 35.4 per cent 
female slaves, the Loango Coast averaged 31.2 per cent female slaves. Additionally, the Loango 
Coast exported a high percentage of children, 28.7 per cent, compared to the overall average of 
20.9 per cent.33 However, MCC sales of 10,069 slaves suggest a different pattern between 1732 
and 1797, when women made up 37.3 per cent of slaves boarded and children accounted for 28.5 
per cent.34 Although the percentages of children in the MCC data match those calculated from the 
Voyages Database, the percentage of female slaves is seven per cent higher, indicating that MCC 
ships loaded larger percentages of women than both the averages for the Loango Coast and the 
transatlantic slave trade as a whole. This seems to indicate that the MCC had a weak bargaining 
position on the Loango Coast, as female slaves were generally less profitable in the Americas. 
However, a more in-depth study of MCC profit margins on female slaves in the transatlantic slave 
trade could suggest other factors in this make up of slaving cargoes. 
Graph 6, below, shows the differences between the costs of men, women, boys, and girls on the 
Loango Coast. In analysing these data, it is important to note that the years on the horizontal axis 
do not proceed with a consistent scale as the data are intermittent. Two basic patterns emerge: 
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first, the price difference between adult male and female slaves is marginal; and second, the 
average price of child slaves differs even less than adults along sex divisions, with only a slight 
deviation in the early 1770s, when in a single year boys were more expensive, and then next year 
girls were more expensive. The overall average price for adult male slaves between 1732 and 1776 
was 27 pieces per slave; the average for adult female slaves was 25 pieces; the average price for a 
male child was 18 and a female child cost 16 pieces (see Appendix B). (See Chapter 5 for additional 
information on how Europeans circulated information of slave prices for the Loango Coast.) 
 Postma’s analysis of the whole Dutch Atlantic slave trade led him to conclude: “Prices fluctuated 
in response to supply and demand, and the price differential between the sexes tended to 
decrease during the eighteenth century as females and youthful slaves came to be in greater 
demand.”35 However, this change in gender and age ratios may have been a result of internal as 
much as external factors. The growing volume and potential profits of the slave trade may have 
encourage Loango Coast merchants, or indeed merchants in the interior, to part with female 
slaves who had previously been retained to supplement local productive and reproductive cycles. 
The data in Graph 8 suggest that, at least in their dealings with MCC merchants, the traders of the 
Loango Coast demanded consistently high prices for female slaves, and occasionally, as in 1755, 
1758, and 1770, the most expensive slave purchased was an adult female rather than an adult 
male (see Appendix B).  As MCC captains and crew members were expressly forbidden to purchase 
slaves on their own accounts, it seems unlikely that these women purchased based on 
attractiveness for long term sexual exploitation.36 However, captains may have had shorter term 
goals. A difference of two pieces between the values of a male and female slave is quite consistent 
throughout the period, with the exception of 1776 when the average male slave was worth 11 
pieces more than the average of female slave. This exception aside, the difference in male and 
female prices did not rise and fall as a constant percentage of the total prices but rather remained 
almost fixed, suggesting it was a social convention rather than a result of supply and demand. As 
the Loango Coast began to supply increasing numbers of slaves as the eighteenth century 
proceeded, this region came to represent a larger proportion of overall slave sales thereby 
influencing the overall statistics to a greater degree. This increased demand for slaves may 
                                                          
35 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 265. 
 
36 MCC 816. Also see Postma’s comment on the broad availability of such regulations among MCC officers: 
Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 366.  
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account in part for the diminishing differences between male and female slave prices observed by 
Postma. 
Graph 6: MCC Data on Slave Prices on the Loango Coast Measured in Pieces 
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Comparing the price data by sex in Graph 6 to the fluctuating number of ships on the Loango 
Coast, as represented in Graph 1, can help to understand some of these fluctuations in slave 
prices. For example, the decrease in slave prices in 1748 may have been influenced by the 
particularly dangerous shipping conditions in the 1746 to 1747 period. Equally the peak of prices in 
1755 corresponds with the first unusually high concentration of European ships on the coast, 
suggesting that competition drove the price upward. The dip in prices between 1757 and 1762 
corresponds to the Seven Years War which again destabilized shipping. The period from 1762 to 
1774 marked a steep rise in prices which corresponds with the period of highest concentration of 
European competition on the Loango Coast. These results validate Phyllis Martin’s hypothesis that 
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the Loango Coast slave trade peaked around 1763 to 1793.37 Given the early stage of the research 
of the scale of the transatlantic slave trade when Martin wrote this and the sporadic nature of 
Martin’s data on slave prices, Martin’s conclusions are remarkably true to this more detailed 
analysis. The increased European competition among slave traders on the Loango Coast increased 
slave prices during the late eighteenth century. The pace of these transformations offered new 
challenges in the decision making process of the transatlantic slave trade.38 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an analysis of outfitting strategies in Europe, provisioning and trade in 
the West African and West Central African Coasts, the duration and mortality of the middle 
passage, the destinations and commerce in the Americas, and the return and re-provisioning in 
Europe. In doing so, it highlights the importance of developing a “culture of knowledge” and how 
this knowledge allowed both the European and African traders to optimize profits and minimize 
risks. Middelburg and Loango Coast merchants built upon a foundation of trade laid by free 
merchants and WIC traders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The consistent flow of 
information between Loango and Middelburg markets allowed Middelburg merchants to engage 
in a risk assessment based upon provisioning, labour, and shipping cycles in Europe, with 
procurement rates and slave prices in on the African coast. 
Trade on the Loango Coast was characterized by the challenges of disease in the rainy season, 
greater distance from Europe, and scarcity of foodstuffs, counterbalanced with provision of 
reliable supplies of water, the efficient procurement of enslaved Africans, and a short middle 
passage. MCC records indicate patterns of trade on the Loango Coast were influenced by external 
events: they were disrupted by periodic warfare throughout the eighteenth century, particularly 
during the Seven Years War and the Anglo Dutch War. Equally, trade boomed during periods of 
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greatest access to credit in the Americas. As these events affected the volume of trade, they also 
influenced slave prices, which diminished when demand was low and increased when competition 
was at its peak in the late eighteenth century. 
Whereas these external factors of trade influenced events everywhere along the African Coast, a 
number of factors specific to the Loango Coast also influenced the volume of trade there. 
Although Behrendt’s suggestion that there was a seasonally unpredictable supply of slaves on the 
Loango Coast, MCC records indicate that Middelburg merchants experienced the most success in 
procuring slaves in October. During this month, the rate of procurement, which was generally the 
fastest on the Western African Coast, was cut in half. However, the small sample of these data 
requires corroboration through additional studies on other Dutch, French and English shipping 
records to further elaborate on the diversity of shipping patterns in this period. Postma’s research 
also indicates that ships were able to obtain larger cargoes on the Loango Coast than in other 
Western African slaving regions, suggesting that the Loango Coast was able to adapt to increased 
European demand as readily as the Bight of Biafra, noting these two regions as exceptional in their 
ability to expand the supply of slaves to the transatlantic trade. In addition to the fast loading 
times and large cargoes, favouring winds allowed ships leaving the Loango Coast to reach their 
destinations in the Americas faster than ships sailing from more northerly trading regions, 
reducing overall mortality among slaves in transit. These factors facilitated a mutually beneficial 
trade between Loango Coast and Middelburg slaving merchants leading Middelburg merchants to 
send the largest number of the voyages they sent to Africa to the Loango Coast. However this 
arrangement did not benefit everyone on the Loango Coast. Chapter 4 will discuss the 
consequences of the trade for the political organization of the Loango Coast. 
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Chapter 4: Cross-Cultural Exchange 
and the Transformation of the Loango 
Coast Merchant Communities, 
1732-1797 
 
Whereas previous chapters have focused on broad patterns of change across time, this chapter 
examines the detailed day-to-day trading activities of the MCC merchants on the Loango Coast. In 
doing so, it begins to explore the political world in which European and African merchants met. 
While much has been written on the European trading partners, the identities of the African 
trading partners for the most part have remained obscure.39 Using the MCC sources, this chapter 
lists 593 Loango Coast merchants who traded with the MCC between 1732 and 1797. Each of 
these merchants is identified by a personal name or a title, or both. Therefore, this list makes both 
a major contribution to the identification of economic actors on the Loango Coast as well as 
increasing our knowledge of key figures within Loango, Ngoyo, and Kakongo political structures. 
Beyond the efforts of Phyllis Martin in 1972, few authors have attempted to make sense of the 
political structures discussed in the writings of the travellers and compilers of the time, authors 
such as Andrew Battell, Pieter van den Broecke, Olfert Dapper, Abbé Proyart, Samuel Brun, Louis 
de Grandpré, Bishop J. Cuvelier, and Eduard Pechu l-Loesche. This chapter begins to address this 
deficiency in the literature. 
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This chapter goes some way towards filling this formidable gap in our understanding of precolonial 
African polities and their transformations during the slave trading era. To achieve these ends, it 
compiles and organizes the current data on the polities of the Loango Coast to identify a 
significant list of Loango merchants who engaged in cross cultural exchange and to understand 
how wealth and power shifted on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, it 
weaves together a more comprehensive picture of the interconnections between Loango Coast 
merchants, emphasising the importance of key political offices in obtaining personal wealth. In 
doing so, it argues that two key transformations took place on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth 
century: first the separation of the polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo from the sphere of influence of 
Loango, and second, the redistribution of wealth and therefore power within each polity. Both of 
these transformations can be linked to the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on the Loango 
Coast. While Phyllis M. Martin has advanced the second thesis for the nineteenth century, this 
chapter traces the beginnings of this transition back to the eighteenth century.40 
To achieve these ends, this chapter is organized into five sections: the first section outlines the 
basic structures of the key trading ports, the polities, and the peoples of the Loango Coast and 
how they interacted between 1535 and 1800. The second section compiles fragmented 
information on the political leaders of these polities, offering an updated list of rulers for two of 
the communities, and measuring the engagement of these rulers in the transatlantic slave trade. 
The third section examines the role of the Mafouk as both a regulator and supplier in the 
transatlantic slave trade. The fourth section examines the substantial list of Loango Coast 
merchants and speculates about the nature of slave supply to the Loango Coast. Finally, the fifth 
section discusses the transformative nature that the slave trade played on the Loango Coast, first 
in the redistribution of wealth and second in the redistribution of power. 
The Ports, Polities, and Peoples of the Loango Coast 1535 to 1800 
Due to the absence of common knowledge about the political organization of the Loango Coast, a 
brief description of the political landscape of this region will provide a backdrop for this chapter’s 
discussion of political transformations. Building upon the description of the Loango Coast in 
Chapter 1, Table 1 below sets out the links between ports, polities, and peoples on the Loango 
                                                          
40 Phyllis M. Martin, “Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda” Journal of African History, Vol. 28, 
No. 1, (1987) pp. 65-86. 
 
141 
Coast which are discussed in this chapter. It begins with a description of the polity of Loango and 
goes on to provide an outline of the polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo. When the Portuguese arrived 
at Loango Bay in 1535 they encountered the polity of Loango. The members of this community 
referred to themselves as Vili whereas their neighbours to the south referred to them as Muburi. 
Their ruler was called the Maloango. These people spoke a Kikongo dialect, which belonged to the 
larger category of West Bantu languages.41 
To the south of Loango Bay was the port of Malemba. Malemba was the dominant Atlantic port 
for the polity of Kakongo. Their leader was called the Manikakongo and their people the Kotchi. 
Prior to 1650 Kakongo paid tribute to the dominant polity of Loango. By the mid-eighteenth 
century, their financial success in slave trading diminished their ties to Loango giving them greater 
autonomy. Between Malemba and the Congo River was the Bay of Cabinda, which was the key 
port of the polity of Ngoyo and was ruled by the Mangoyo. The people of Ngoyo were known as 
the Woyo. Like the Kakongo, the Ngoyo paid tribute to Loango in the seventeenth century but 
emerged as an independent polity in the eighteenth century, primarily due to their success in slave 
trading. Like the Vili to the north, both of these communities spoke variations of Kikongo. 
These three polities shared a Kikongo language group and religious ethos, which facilitated trade 
and political cooperation even after tributary relations were severed. As rulers of tributary polities 
of Loango in the period of early contact, the Manikakongo and the Mangoyo followed the lead of 
the Maloango in organizing trade relations with European traders. While at first these leaders 
dealt directly with European merchants, in the mid-seventeenth century the Maloango began 
employing a Mafouk to be the main point of contact between European and Vili traders. The 
Manikakongo and the Mangoyo seem to have followed this principle but added one layer of 
administration: They appointed a Mambouk to oversee the Mafouk. These Mafouks acted in the 
same capacity as the Mafouk of Loango Bay. In this configuration, the Mafouk remained the 
primary contact for European merchants but reported to the Mambouk who in return reported to 
the Manikakongo or Mangoyo. Furthermore, Mafouks of the primary ports could appoint Mafouks 
in the lesser ports of their polity. These Mafouks of the lesser ports answered to the Mafouks of 
                                                          
41 A. Doutreloux, “Les Kongo” in Jan Vansina (ed) Introduction à l’et nogra  ie du Congo (Bruxelles: CRISP, 
1966) pp. 115-116; Loëmbe, Parlons Vili, pp. 26-29. 
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Loango Bay, Malemba, or Cabinda Bay. The following two sections discuss these political roles in 
more detail. 
Table 1: Guide to Political Terminology on the Loango Coast 
Port: Loango Bay Malemba Cabinda Bay 
Polity: Loango Kakongo Ngoyo 
Status of Polity: Dominant Polity of 
the Loango Coast 
(1535-1650) 
Independent Polity 
(1700s) 
Tributary Polity of 
Loango (before 
1650) 
 
Independent Polity 
(1700s) 
Tributary Polity of 
Loango (before 1650) 
 
Independent Polity 
(1700s) 
People:42 Vili/Muburi/Fioti Kotchi/Muburi Woyo/Muburi 
Ruler: Maloango Manikakongo Mangoyo/Maningoyo 
Seat of Government: Buali (3 miles from 
the Coast) 
Kinguele (35-40 
miles inland from 
Malemba) 
Mbanza Ngoyo (two 
days from Cabinda) 
Primary European 
Contact: 
Mafouk (1)Mambouk 
(2)Mafouk 
(1)Mambouk 
(2)Mafouk 
Language Group: Kikongo, a West 
Bantu Language 
Kikongo, a West 
Bantu Language  
Kikongo, a West 
Bantu Language 
 
Sources: Compiled from Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870, pp. 72-74 ; Doutreloux, “Les Kongo,” pp. 115-116; Loëmbe, 
Parlons Vili, pp. 26-29; Frank Hagenbucher-Sacripanti, Les Fondements Spirituel du Pouvoir au Royaume de Loango 
(Paris: Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, 1973) pp. 17-28, 73; and Martin. The External Trade 
of the Loango Coast, p. 3, 5,10, 29-30, 98-99. 
 
Rulers of the Loango Coast: Political Power and Economic Engagement 
In exploring the history of the Loango Coast, no single coherent narrative emerges of how the 
polities of the Loango Coast evolved prior to the nineteenth century. Existing accounts are based 
on a combination of artifacts, oral history, and myth and were recorded by misguided and ignorant 
European travellers whose tales often grew and distorted with retelling. From these sparse and 
challenging sources, few historians, most notably Phyllis Martin on the Vili people and more 
recently Zdenka Volavka on the Ngoyo, have attempted to sift through the evidence to construct a 
                                                          
42 Just as Muburi is used to describe all of the peoples of the Loango Coast, Vili can also be used to describe 
all of the inhabitants of the Loango Coast from Gabon to the Congo River as discussed in Chapter 1. 
However, this thesis only describes Vili in the more specific context of members of the polity of Loango. 
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skeleton of political and economic actors on the Loango Coast.43 Using the transaction records of 
the MCC, this section tests and contributes to a greater understanding of the political structures 
on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. Although understanding the roles of these leaders 
still requires reliance on imperfect anecdotal sources, the names of rulers that can be identified in 
the financial transactions and the dates associated with those names can offer more reliable 
evidence. 
During the early period of European trade, the influence of the Maloango extended beyond the 
boundaries of the polity of Loango to the smaller polities of Kakongo and Ngoyo to the south. 
Andrew Battell explains this relationship in a roundabout way: "Anciently the King of Kakongo [the 
Manikakongo], before he assumed his kingship was bound to marry a princess of the blood royal 
of Kongo, whilst he of Luangu [Loango] married a princess of Kakongo; yet the ruler of Luangu was 
highest in rank, for he enjoyed the title of nunu ("aged person"), whilst his brother of Kakongo had 
to be contented with the inferior title of nkaji ("spouse")."44 In contrast to the title of the 
Maloango as the “aged person” or husband and the title of the Manikakongo as the “spouse” or 
wife, the Mangoyo was called the “Itemma” or priest. In addition to these symbolic titles, the 
Kakongo and Ngoyo presented tribute to the Maloango in this period.45 Thus, particularly in the 
formative period of European/African trade on the Loango Coast, before the political separation of 
Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo circa the eighteenth century, the policies which the Maloango 
developed in relation to Atlantic trade had resonance throughout the entire coast. 
In addition to this role, the Maloango was the political, social, and spiritual leader of the polity of 
Vili at Loango: “The Maloango was the key figure in the structure of this powerful Loango 
kingdom. He was the Supreme Lawgiver and Protector of the people, the ultimate sanction of all 
administrative activities on a local and national level. The Vili believed that he had a semi-divine 
status, because of a unique relationship with Nzambi, the creator. The Loango ruler’s position was 
exemplified in such titles as Ntotela, the Supreme Ruler, Nganga Mvumbi, the Guardian of Spirits, 
                                                          
43  See: Phyllis Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870; idem. “Power, Cloth and Currency 
on the Loango Coast” African Economic History, (1986), no. 15, pp. 1-12; idem. “Family Strategies in 
Nineteenth-Century Cabinda,” pp. 65-86; idem. “The Cabinda Connection,” pp. 47-59; and Zdenka Volavka’s 
Crown and Ritual: The Royal Insignia of Ngoyo (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1998). 
 
44 Battell, Strange Adventures, p. 104. 
 
45 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 31. 
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and Ntinu, the Supreme Judge.”46 Phyllis Martin identifies two main themes in the origin myths of 
the Maloango: the unification of Loango, and the appointment and succession of individuals to 
rule this polity. “One group of traditions link the appointment of the first ruler directly to the 
volition of the Manikongo at Mbanza Kongo...Dapper gives a different tradition …that the 
Maloango came originally from Zarry, a territory on the north bank of the Congo River...If the 
Maloango was indeed closely related to the Kongo royal family, it is reasonable to suppose that he 
originated from the same region of the southern Mayombe."47 
Although our primary interest here is in the economic and political role of the Maloango, Phyllis 
Martin asserts: "The spiritual and ritual significance of the Maloango's office and person can hardly 
be overemphasized. Indeed, it was a basic reason for the enormous respect that he commanded 
over a wide area. Some of his spiritual powers even seemed to have been passed on to his people, 
for among other Kongo groups itinerant Vili traders and porters were feared for their magical 
powers."48 Linda Heywood and John Thornton suggest: "The king [or Maloango] had an important 
religious role, being described as a "great magician" and a rainmaker. In this way he dominated 
ultimately the entire chain of shrines and religious offices."49 These skills also impressed European 
visitors. Broecke records with some surprise the Maloango’s ability to predict the details of his 
trading expedition: "The king himself is a great magician and often speaks with the devil. He knew 
of my coming long before my arrival, and precisely on which day my ship would anchor in the bay; 
also that I would bring certain goods to him, which turned out to be exactly right."50 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 19. 
 
47 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 6-7. Also see, Dapper, Beschrijvinge, p. 143; Merolla, A 
Voyage to Congo, p. 651; Cavazzi, Istorica descrizione de' tre regni Congo, Matamba et Angola, p. 564; 
Dennett, Notes on Folklore of the Fjort, p. 1-2; idem. Seven Years among the Fjort. pp. 50-7; 
Pechuel-Loesche, Volkskunde, pp. 167-9, 184; Cuvelier, Traditions congolaises, pp. 480-4, 487; Balandier, 
Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire, p. 285; Jan Vansina, "Notes sure l'origines du royaume de Kongo," The 
Journal of African History, Vol. 3, No, 1 (1963) pp. 33-8; Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, pp. 5-8; 
William Graham Lister Randles,  L'ancien royaume du Congo des origines à la fine du XIXe siècle (Paris : 
Mouton and Co., 1968) pp. 17-18. 
 
48 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 20-21. 
 
49 Thornton and Heywood, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and America, p. 106. 
 
50 Broecke, p. 65. 
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Perhaps as part of this spiritual role, "The Maloango lived a secluded life in his palace at Buali.” 
When the people of Loango sought his judgment in civil disputes or crimes, they waited in the 
square in front of his palace. “He arrived accompanied by nobles and announced by the royal 
trumpeters who played instruments carved from elephant tusks. He sat in great splendor upon a 
throne on a raised dais. Here, he [also] received homage and tribute from Vili leaders who came 
from all parts of the kingdom.” Much of the Maloango’s business was conducted in this public way 
including legal judgments, diplomatic affairs, and trade negotiations.51 While the centralized 
authority of the Maloango at Loango mirrors the political authority of the rulers of Ashanti (Gold 
Coast), Dahomey (Slave Coast), and Benin (Bight of Benin), the Maloango was more successful in 
maintaining its control over the port of Loango Bay and sustaining the peaceful conditions 
necessary for a high volume slave trade.52 
The Maloango delegated many of the more tedious tasks of governance to lesser officials. Early 
records indicate the appointment of four or five key officials. In the early 1600s Andrew Battell 
records the presence of “four princes” governing the “four Lordships” of Loango: “The first is Mani 
Cabango, the second Mani Salga, the third Mani Bock, and the fourth Mani Cay. This Mani Cay is 
next to be king, and hath his train and court as a Prince. And when the King dieth, he cometh 
presently into the seat of the King.” The editor’s footnote explains: "the mani (mwana, or princes) 
mentioned by Battell are those of Chibanga, Selanganga (of the family of the Petra Paria of Kenga), 
Mbuku, and Kaya, in Chikamba."53 This seems to identify “mani” or “mwana” as the office or 
political designation and the second part as a family name suggesting the mani were selected from 
among the elite families of Loango. If so, this may explain why only a couple years later in 1610 
Pieter van den Broecke lists Manni Vasja, Manni Macase, Manni Queboute, and Mannij Quingie as 
the four “principle nobles” of the Maloango’s court. Fifty years later in the 1660s Dapper records 
the names of three primary officials: Manibas (Manibanze?), Makinga (Maquimbe?) and 
                                                          
 
51 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 21. Also see: Dapper, Beschrijvinge, pp. 164-7; Proyart, 
Histoire, p. 139;and,  Battell, Adventures, p. 44. 
 
52 On Ashanti see: Margaret Priestley, West African Trade and Coast Society: A Family Study (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969) pp.73-74; and, Larry W. Yarak, Asante and the Dutch 1744-1873 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990). On Benin see Mann, Slavery and the Birth of an African City, p. 27. On Dahomey see: Law, 
Ouidah, pp. 119-122. 
 
53 Battell, Adventures, p. 50. 
146 
Maboma.54 While Martin suggest that these names represent offices, it is more likely that in this 
early period the prefix “Ma” “Mani” or “Manni” represented the offices while the second part 
represented the identity of a family or individual. Where names reoccur, this is more likely that 
consecutive members of the same family were appointed “Mani” or princes, rather than the 
consistency of a title of office. This would also account for differing descriptions of functions given 
to officials with similar names. Over time, these positions acquired official titles. In 1776 Proyart 
identified five “principle ministers” the Ma-ngovo [or Mangove], the Ma-npoutou, the Ma-kaka, 
the m-Fouka [or Mafouk] and the Ma-Kinba.55 These titles had been standardized not only in 
Loango but also in Cabinda and Malemba. 
Successors to the Maloango were appointed by the Maloango from within this select group of 
officials/princes. Martin explains: “the succession to the throne had both elective and hereditary 
feature. The heirs were chosen from a certain clan, usually that of Kondi, and from among the 
nephews *the sister’s sons+ of the ruling Maloango.”56 Given the matrilineal pattern of succession, 
it is unlikely that the Kondi is the only family group from which a Maloango could have been 
chosen as that would require the marriage of the Maloango’s sisters only within the Kondi group. 
It is important to note that the Maloango, like the Manikakongo and the Mangoyo [leader of 
Ngoyo], is an office not an individual. Unfortunately, European sources often do not mention the 
name of the individual who is filled the office; therefore, multiple individuals can be represented 
by a single title. However, Phyllis Martin has attempted to reconstruct a list of individuals who 
filled this office (see Table 2 below). Though she lists rulers between the seventeenth and 
twentieth century, this chapter is most interested in the period between 1600 and 1800. During 
this period Maloangos did not have a particularly long reign. Martin lists between seven and nine 
rulers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: Gembe (Gymbe, Njimbe); Tati of Konde; 
Bicullu; Makussu; Nombe; Puati of Chibanga; Yambi; Mutati (possibly the same as Tati of Konde); 
                                                          
 
54 Dapper, Beschrijvinge, pp. 164-7. 
 
55 Proyart, Histoire de Loango, p. 124. 
 
56 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 175-6. 
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Bicullu Unkangebange (possibly the same as Bicullu). Unfortunately, she is unable to give time 
periods for these rulers or even to place them in chronological order. For the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the chronology is clearer: Ntangu preceded Makosse who is known to have 
died in 1766; between 1766 and 1773 there was no ruling Maloango; Buatu (Puati) ruled for 14 
years between 1773 and 1787; and for the period from 1787 into the 1800s, two names are 
documented: Maloango Tait and Maloango Makawso Masonga – the presence of two names could 
be explained by two complementing titles for the same individual or by one or another source 
being inaccurate. 
This suggests that the Maloango may have been referred to in the MCC trading documents 
between 1732 and 1797 as Ntangu, Makosse, Buatu or Tait/Makawso Masonga. An analysis of the 
MCC documents shows no reference to a trader in Loango named Ntangu. However, Koning Stolck 
(Koning being the Dutch word for King, which is used interchangeably with Maloango in the MCC 
sources) appears in multiple entries of the Snauwschip de Drie Gezusters’ slave trading records at 
Loango Bay between 1757 and 1758. During this period Stolck sold 22 slaves in six transactions.57 
Though it goes without saying that the Dutch captain struggled to spell unfamiliar African names, 
Stolck does not bear any resemblance to Ntangu, who Martin proposed came before, or Makosse, 
who Martin proposed came after. This leaves us with the options of Stolck being either an 
alternative name of either Ntangu or Makosse, a ship captain mistaking Stolck’s status, or Stolck 
being a third Maloango between the two. In the absence of evidence for the first two options, 
Stolck will be assumed to be Makosse’s predecessor. Makosse Koning appears 13 years after Stolck 
in the Snauwschip De Welmeenende’s slave trading records on 4 May 1771 as providing Captain 
Cornelis van Haijen with one man and one boy slave at Loango Bay.58 Though numerous other 
Makosses appear throughout the data trading at Malemba and Cabinda, none of them appear to 
be the Maloango himself as convention restricted the movement of the Maloango.59 While it is 
possible that these traders could have been family members or clients of Maloango Makosse, it is 
also possible that these traders were free agents. 
                                                          
57 MCC 488. 
 
 
58 MCC 1013. 
 
59 Martin, find page number. 
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Table 2: P yllis Martin’s Provisional  ist of  oango Rulers 
Date Maloango (Ruler of Loango) 
c.1600 Gembe (Gymbe, Njimbe); Tati of Konde; Bicullu; Makussu; Nombe; Puati of Chibanga; Yambi; Mutati 
(possibly the same as Tati of Konde); Bicullu Unkangebange (possibly the same as Bicullu)
60
 
? Ntangu 
?-1766 Makosse 
1766-73 No ruling Maloango 
1773-87 Buatu (or Puati) 
1787-18??
61
 Tait Tait Makawso Masonga 
 Luemba Mancossu Makawso Manawnbo  
 Macossu I Umpuati Makawso Matukila of Kondi 
 Puata I Nyambi Man’anawumbo 
 Puati II Mancossu  
 Macossu II Nombe (Lemba Kambeninsiko)  
 Macossu III Luemba Mawalla  
  Gamwo Macossu Manombe  
  Gamwo Umpuati Umbunje  
  Yamba Muinsa  
  Puati Umtomba  
  Macossu Matukula  
  Makossu  
?-1874 Nombe (Numbi) 
1874-82/83 Ntatu 
1882/83- ? Macosso Chicusso 
?-? Prati 
1898-? Luemba 
 
Sources: Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 175-6. Also see: Battell, Adventures, pp. 44-45; Proyart, 
Histoire de Loango, p. 130; Cuvelier, Traditions congolaises, pp. 21, 100; Grandpre, Voyage a la cote occidentale 
d'Afrique, i. 116; Bastian, Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste, i. 64, 266-7; Pechuël-Loesche, Volkskunde von 
Loango, pp.155, 185, 188; Dennet, Notes on Folklore of the Fjort, pp. 5-7, 15; and, Appendix C. 
At the same time on the very same ship, “King Pombe Jobbe” appears as a slave trader. He 
engages in three transactions between March and June involving seven enslaved persons. The 
captain noted such purchases as taking place at Loango.62 Martin provides corroborative evidence 
for Makosse as Maloango during this period. If the European captain was accurate in identifying 
Pombe Jobbe as a political ruler, the identity of Pombe Jobbe proves to be a problem. The most 
obvious answer would be that Pombe Jobbe was either a visiting political ruler from one of the 
surrounding polities of Kakongo or Ngoyo, or that the Snauwschip de Welmeenende sent smaller 
                                                          
 
60 Chronological order for these names is uncertain. 
 
61 For this period Bastian provides two possible lists of secession and Dennet provides a third. 
62 MCC 1308. 
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boats down the coast to supplement purchases on the Loango Coast and expedite shipment. 
Unfortunately, this author was unable to obtain even a rough list of rulers for Kakongo. However, 
Zdenka Volavka has compiled a rough list of rulers in Ngoyo (see Table 3 below). Although no 
direct match is found, Pombe Jobbe bears some similarities to the names Jimbe and Gimbi, which 
reoccur throughout the lists. It is possible that a MCC captain may have interpreted this Kikongo 
name differently than one of their European colleagues. However, this meagre evidence is by no 
means conclusive and further research into the ruling dynasties of the Loango Coast is necessary 
before the identity of Pombe Jobbe can be confirmed. 
Returning to the question at hand, the fourth known Maloango during the MCC trade at Loango 
Bay was Buatu (or Puati) who ruled for 14 years between 1773 and 1787. The MCC records do not 
show anyone by that name trading within that period, though they do contain multiple entries for 
a Batje Claas trading at Loango Bay between 1769 and 1771.63 If this is the same man, it is possible 
that the new demands of office altered his trading prospects. Whatever the case, we do not have 
a record of Bautu trading while holding the office of Maloango. 
For the final Maloango to hold office while the Vili traded with MCC two names are documented: 
Maloango Tait and Maloango Makawso Masonga. The only merchant(s) trading with the MCC 
bearing any resemblance to either name is Kok Tate/Tate who supplied one man and two boys to 
the Fregatschip Philadelphia at Loango Bay in 1762.64 However, this is unlikely to be the same 
individual who later became the Maloango as an official trading at Malemba during the same 
period is also recorded as Mafoeke Tate and Kok Tate.65 The minimal interaction of Maloangos in 
the transatlantic slave trading documents of the MCC raises some questions about the nature of 
the office of Maloango. Although the Maloango appears to be a minor figure in the eighteenth 
century MCC trading records, he appointed the Mafouks and ruled the court of last appeal in trade 
disputes at Loango Bay. Thus, it is in his legal capacity rather than his economic capacity which is 
most important in the eighteenth century slave trade. 
                                                          
63 See MCC 335, 488 & 1013. 
 
64 The names “Kok Tate” and “Tate” may represent the same individual trader or two different traders. For 
more information see MCC 488. 
 
65 See MCC 400, 524, 795, 825, 938, 980, 1286 & 1289 
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Unfortunately, despite the detailed lists of Mangoyos which Volavka provides (see Table 3 below), 
identifying the Mangoyos in the Cabinda data seems all but impossible: this is partially due to the 
lack of dates in Volavka’s chronology and partially due to the spelling variations making a positive 
match difficult. However, some similarities do present themselves. Volavka’s list contains the 
name Pukuta/Pucuta; similar names appear in the MCC list: Paketapo, Pieketa Loende, Pieketa 
Pee, and Pieketapo. Further research may show a link between these names. Additionally, there is 
the possible connection between Cabinda and Pombe Jobbe at Loango Bay, which appears above. 
Due to the sparseness of the MCC data on Cabinda, it is difficult to make valuable conclusions 
about the power structure at Ngoyo beyond the fact that it seemed to mirror the structure of 
Loango Bay with the Mafouk acting as the Mangoyo’s chief representative in foreign trade. 
The absence of data on Malemba is even more pronounced than the lack of data on Cabinda 
despite Malemba’s prominent role as the dominant procurer of slaves for the MCC on the Loango 
Coast. Thus, it is difficult to procure a list of Kakongo’s Manikongos, or leaders, to check against 
the MCC records. However, the documents still lend some clues as to the type of involvement of 
the Manikakongo. Between 1772 and 1774, six slaves were sold in six separate transactions in 
which a Markedoor, or middle man, represents the Manikakongo (whom the Dutch refer to as the 
“Koning”). During the same period, the Manikakongo’s son or his proxy engaged in an additional 
three transactions. Obviously this merchant’s position as the Manikakongo’s son had some 
importance for the MCC merchants as they make a special note of this relationship. However, it is 
uncertain whether this merchant is acting in his own interests or in that of a family member. A 
third merchant present in the records with the word “Koning” which the Dutch use in reference to 
local leaders is Pieter Koning (1757) and likely the same trader Pieter King (1759). This merchant 
engaged in six transactions selling six slaves. Although it is most likely that King was an European 
merchant trading on the coast or an African merchant with an Anglicised name, it has been 
included as a possible connection to the Manikakongo because it does match the name of any 
slave trading captain known to be trading in this period.66 These data indicate that the 
Manikakongo had a small direct investment in the transatlantic slave trade which he negotiated 
using markedoors and possibly his son as proxies. Whereas the Manikakongo may 
 
                                                          
66 MCC 216, 219, 533, 795, 985. 
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Table 3: Zdenka Volavka’s Provisional and Incom lete  ist of Ngoyo Rulers 
 
Sources: This data is a synthesis of a table which appears in the appendix of  Zdenka Volavka’s Crown and Ritual: The Royal Insignia of Ngoyo (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1998) pp. 305-7. Cited by Volavka: 
Adolf Bastian. Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küst  Vol. I (Jena:Hermaan Costenoble, 1874) p. 215, 217-20; Domingos José Franque. Nós, os Cabindas  (Lisbon: Editora Argo, 1940) p. 15-35, 43-8; Pierre 
Mandemvo, “Notes sure le royaume de Ngoyo” in Ngoyo Kongo I (June 1960) ; and, Evaristo Martins Campos, “Monarquia do Ngoyo” in Portugal em Africa (July-Aug. 1956) p. 197-210.
Order MaNgoyo (Ruler of Ngoyo)   Additional Political Figures 
1 Lilu Ma-Impinda 
 
Moe Panzo Mue-Panzo I Mibimbi Pukuta Mbenzi Luemba (MaNgoyo’s assassine) 
2 Bursi/Bunsi 
 
Sinda Umkalla Moe Pucuta Mue-Púcuta I Panzu (real 
MaNgoyo) 
Mbenzi Luemba (pretender) 
3 Kanga a/ 
Musolo-ngo 
Maluemba Moe Benci 
Luemba 
Mue-Bénci-Luemba 
I 
Pukuta Ieze/Jeze (MaNgoyo’s Wife) 
N’Zingo/Nzingo (MaNgoyo’s Son) 
4 Saltind-inga/ 
Muni Ilemba 
Mani Jimbe Cito Tafi Mue-Ncito-Táfi Cito Tafi Ngeta 
Kalombo 
Mocata Calombo/Mocata-Colombo (kin of 
MaNgoyo); Sengo N’Dula (MaNgoyo’s Wife, 
kin: T’chingo, from Mayombe); Maitica 
(MaNgoyo’s and N’Sélo’s son, pretender, 
appointed Mangovo)  
5 Muni Jimbe Mani Baschi Moe Gimbi 
N’Pandi Sili 
 Ngimbi Pandi Sili N’Pandi Sili (Father of MaNgoyo, kin of 
Prince of Sambo) 
 
6 Muni Leamba 
(Poabo)  
Umkongo Pucuta Poabo Púcuta Puabo I Poaboa Muni-Fumo N’Poabo/Muni-Fuma-Mpuabo 
(Father of MaNgoyo) 
Mangovo Maitica (proposed Pucuta Poabo 
for MaNgoyo) 
7 Mani Bashi 
Umkongo 
Mani Baschi Inyongo/ 
Mangoy Manimbatchi 
Concató 
Bat’Chi N’Congo Mue-Bátchi-Ncongo Mbatshi Nyongo  Mancata and Jack (kin of MaNgoyo) 
8  Mangoy Mani-Jimba/ 
Manni-Jimbe 
Bat’Chi-Nhongo Mue-Bátchi-Nhongo Mpongo Nganga  
9   Moe N’Pongonga Mue-Mpongonga Forgotten Puna (Kin of MaNgoyo) 
10   Moe Gimbi Mue-Gimbi II Moe Gimbi Puna (Kin of MaNgoyo) 
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have benefited in an indirect way from the slave trade through taxation or investing in caravans, 
he is not listed as a prominent slave merchant in the MCC records. 
The minor role which Loango Coast rulers play in procuring slaves for the transatlantic slave trade 
is in stark contrast to the role of the ruler of Ouidah. In Robin Law’s extensive studies of slave 
trade at Ouidah, he concluded: “The kings of Dahomey retained a privileged position in the trade, 
selling their own slaves first, before private merchants could trade, and receiving higher prices for 
them.”1 While the rulers of Dahomey occasionally used proxies to sell their slaves, they received 
the profit. In contrast, the MCC records indicate that the rulers of the Loango Coast neither traded 
in large numbers nor retained the profits acquired by their appointed officials but rather 
periodically requested a portion of the Mafouk’s earnings as will be discussed in the next section. 
The key to this difference in distribution in profits may lay in procurement of slaves. Whereas the 
slaves sold at Ouidah were primarily acquired through wars and thus the property of rulers of 
Dahomey to be distributed as he wished, the majority of slaves sold at Loango Bay, Cabinda Bay, 
and Malemba were brought to the coast in caravans, which meant the profits lay primarily with 
the merchant who provisioned the journey.2 
Mafouks and the Regulation of Cross Cultural Exchange 
Though the Maloango was the most senior political actor in Loango, he was not the primary 
contact of Europeans at Loango Bay. He appointed the Mafouk to engage in economic affairs on 
his behalf. F. Denis Carli, an Italian, Catholic missionary, was among the first Europeans to record 
the presence of a Mafouk on the Loango Coast. In his 1666-1667 “Account of Congo” he wrote: 
As I passed though the Kingdom of Angola, one of the aforesaid forts of the Oath called 
Bolungo was administered [by] a Mafucca (so they call the Receiver among the Whites) a 
                                                          
1 Robin Law, “The origins and evolution of the merchant community in Ouidah” in Robin Law and Silke 
Strickrodt (eds) Ports of the Slave Trade, Bights of Benin and Biafra (Stirling: Centre of Commonwealth 
Studies, University of Stirling, Occasional Paper Number 6, October, 1999) p.56. 
 
30
 Ibid., pp. 57-59. For a further discussion on provisioning see section four of this chapter. For a more 
detailed discussion on caravans see Chapter 5. 
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relation to the King of Congo, and to him of Loango, one of the powerfullest among that 
Coast, and whose sone, as they told me, was to succeed.3 
Even at this early stage, the power of the Mafouk and the importance of his role in cross cultural 
exchange was quite clear. According to Martin, "The sale of offices was one of the principal 
sources of revenue for the Maloango by the late eighteenth century.” The man whom the 
Maloango appointed to the office of Mafouk was expected to reciprocate with a sizable gift to the 
Maloango, a gift equal to the potential gains of such a politically and economically advantageous 
position. Though the recipient of the post may not “belong to the class of princes”, as Martin 
describes it, he could obtain great wealth. As the collector of trading taxes and duties, the Mafouk 
was expected to provide a portion of this income to the Maloango. As this was not a fixed sum but 
a negotiable payment, a strong Mafouk may pay a small fee whereas a weak Mafouk may be 
coerced into forfeiting a greater share of the profits.” 4 Miller describes the Mafouks and 
Mambouks as appointed as “ministers of trade to administer the foreigners’ affairs in the 
markets.” He goes on to highlight “the principal danger for the trading kings was that the officers 
they appointed as market administrators would enrich themselves so much that they became 
powerful in their own right.”5 
To aid in his tax collecting and market regulating duties, the Mafouk appointed the Markedoors or 
African brokers who were middle men in the coastal trade. However, “he alone settled the 
payment of taxes with Europeans, discussed and fixed the initial price of slaves and goods, held 
tribunals to adjudicated disputes that arose between Europeans and African traders.”6 European 
merchants were careful to maintain the favour of the Mafouks of Loango Bay, Malemba, and 
Cabinda as they were truly the door keepers of the trade. To engage in trade, European captains 
and brokers had to engage in very specific protocol. The Mafouk was at the centre of this protocol: 
"On arrival off the Loango Coast, it was customary to give a salute of several cannon shots in 
honour of the dignitaries of the country; this also warned the Mafouk of the arrival of a new ship. 
                                                          
3 Angelo and Denis, “Account of the Congo”, p. 679. 
 
4 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 101. 
 
5 Miller, Way of Death, p. 184. 
 
6 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 101. 
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Often the Mafouk and his retinue might go on board to welcome the captain and to open 
discussions on trading arrangements. Once these were agreed on, the captain went ashore to 
make more specific contacts with the brokers to negotiate the sale of slaves."7 
In addition to these powerful Mafouks at Loango Bay, Malemba and Cabinda, Mafouks also 
represented smaller communities within each trading region: 
Lesser Mafouks were appointed by this principal Mafouk in villages that were trading 
centres, often by rivers, lakes or on the coast. In Loango, for example, there was one at 
the Chilogo River in the northern part of the kingdom, where Europeans sometimes sent 
small boats to collect a handful of slaves, from their ships anchored at Loango Bay. These 
were minor positions, however, compared to the Mafouk at Loango Bay who dealt with 
Europeans and organized the trade. 8 
Thus, the Mafouks of the primary ports held the most sway both over their own port and over the 
lesser ports where they appointed officials. Whereas the Mafouk of Loango was a closest advisor 
to the Maloango, in Kakongo and Ngoyo the Mafouk was in charge of external trade with the 
Mambouk functioning as their overseer, chief advisor to the throne, and primary heir to the 
throne. 9 
Identifying the Mafouk of the key trading ports of Loango Bay, Malemba, and Cabinda using the 
MCC records does not come without its difficulties. Table 4 below lists all of the traders at Loango 
Bay who held the title of Mafouk and who engaged in slave trading activities with the MCC. This 
list includes 15 Mafouks. The variation in spelling ranges from Mafoeke, Mafoenge, maVoenge, 
Mafoek, Maffoeque and Mafoeque to Maphuka (see below). For the sake of consistency and 
clarity, this author will follow the lead of Phyllis Martin in retaining the spelling “Mafouk” from this 
point forward when the sources do not specify alternative spelling. 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
 
8 Ibid., pp. 97-8. Also see: Proyart, Histoire, pp. 124-5, 131-2; Grandpre, Voyage, pp. 121-2, 189-91, 199-205; 
Cuvelier, Documents, p. 20, 22; and, Merlet, Annie, Autour du Loango, XIVe-XIXe siècle: histoire des peuples 
du sud-ouest du Gabon au temps du Royaume de Loango et du "Congo français" (Libreville: Centre culturel 
fran ais Saint-Exupéry-Sépia, 1991) p. 55. 
 
9  Ibid. 
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Table 4: Mafouks Trading at Loango Bay 1757 to 1774 
 
 
Sources: MCC 219-223, 333-337, 929-935, 1013-1017, & 1307-1311.
Mafoukes Trading in Loango First Year Last Year Number of 
Transactions 
Number of 
Years with Data 
Mafoeke Claas/Mafoeke Klaas 1757 1758 24 2 
Mafoeke melemme 1757 1757 2 1 
Willem Mafoenge/Willem maVoenge 1757 1758 5 2 
Mafoeke deijk/Mafoeke Dik 1758 1762 5 2 
Mafoeke Bleinboo/Mafoeke Bliembo/Mafoeke Blienbo/Mafoeke Blienboo 1762 1762 22 1 
Mafoeke Fabba 1762 1762 16 1 
Mafoeke Kobbole/Mafoeke Kobele/Mafoeke Kobole/Mafoeke Koebel/Mafoeke Koebele/Mafoeke  
Koebeloe/Mafoeke Koebole 1762 1762 39 1 
Mafoeke Kombij 1762 1762 5 1 
Mafoeke Robben/Mafoeke Robijn/Mafoek Robijn/Maffoeque Robbin/Mafoeque Robbin/Maphuka Robben 1762 1774 37 5 
Mafoek Calli 1769 1769 2 1 
Mafoeke Batje 1770 1770 4 1 
Maffoeque Emanuel/Mafoeque Emamice/Mafoeque Emanuel/Maphuka Manuel 1771 1774 13 2 
Mafoeque Fammer 1771 1771 1 1 
Mafoeque Malemba 1771 1771 4 1 
Maphuka Pesso 1774 1774 1 1 
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Establishing which Mafouks were visiting trade representatives and which Mafouks were the 
dominant negotiators of trade in a situation where at least 6 of 15 Mafouks are engaged in a 
significant number of transactions proves challenging. The approach is simple; it takes three 
considerations: first and foremost, Mafouks were appointed by the political ruler of the polity on 
the Loango Coast, and therefore if the ruler changed, it was most likely that the Mafouk changed; 
second, the Mafouk of a key port was more likely to be present in that port over more than one 
trading period; and finally, the key Mafouk was likely to engage in multiple transactions due to 
their key role in trade negotiations and the highest potential for profit. By applying these criteria 
to the MCC records, a rough but by no means conclusive list of Mafouks emerges for the mid 
eighteenth century. 
Between 1757 and 1774, the MCC records provide five lists of transactions conducted at Loango 
Bay collected by Captain Hendrik Vandleven between 1757 and 1758, Captain Phillippus Verdonk 
in 1762, Captain Cornelis Pieterszen between 1769 and 1770, Cornelis van Haijen in 1771, and 
Skipper Johannas Bakker in 1774.1 Vandleven reported to have traded with Mafouks Klaas, 
Melemme, and Willem. Four years later Verdonk reported trading with Mafouks Blienbo, Fabba, 
Koebole, Kombij, Robijn, and Calli. After a seven year gap in the records, Pieterszen also recorded 
transactions with Mafouk Robijn as well as with Mafouks Calli and Batje. The next year Haijen 
continued trading with Mafouk Robijn, adding Mafouks Emanuel, Fammer, and Malemba to the 
list. Three years later Bakker reported trading with Mafouks Robijn, Emanuel, and Pesso. 
Based on the criteria established above, Mafouks Claas, Bienbo, Fabba, Koebole, Robijn, and 
Emanuel emerge as traders engaged in large numbers of transactions. As Mafoeke Claas is the 
only Mafouk trading at Loango Bay in significant numbers in the 1757-58 period, he emerges as 
the most likely Mafouk of Loango Bay in the period. However, after this period he disappears from 
the records. In 1762, Mafouks Blienbo, Fabba, Koebole, and Robijn all appear to be trading at 
Loango Bay simultaneously. Though Blienbo, Fabba, and Koebole engaged in a substantial number 
of transactions, 22, 16 and 39 respectively, their presence at Loango Bay for only one trading 
cycle, as opposed to Mafouk Robijn who was present for five periods of trade with 37 transactions, 
leads me to believe Mafouk Robijn was the more permanent fixture at Loango Bay and most likely 
                                                          
1 MCC 219-223, 333-337, 929-935, 1013-1017, & 1307-1311. 
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the highest ranking Mafouk. Mafouk Robin continues to trade in the 1771 and 1774 periods when 
Mafouk Emanuel is also trading at Loango Bay. 
Thus Mafouk Claas emerges as the Mafouk of Loango Bay 1757-58 during the reign of Koning 
Stolck who appears in the MCC records for the same period. He was followed by Mafouk Robijn 
who traded between 1762 and 1774. During this period the MCC records report Makosse Koning 
as Maloango in 1771. This evidence challenges Martin’s list of Maloangos which suggest Maloango 
Makosse finished his reign in 1766 and that there was no ruling Maloango between 1766 and 
1773. This new evidence suggests that Maloango Makosse was still around until at least 1771 with 
Mafouk Robijn acting as the Makosse’s chief representative in foreign trade. Thus the MCC records 
are a valuable source in refining Martin’s rough time line of Maloangos and in adding valuable 
information on the Mafouks of Loango Bay as well as the leaving a record of the Mafouks within 
an feasible commute of the trading port. Still, much work remains to be done on the 
reconstruction of eighteenth century political stage of the Loango Coast. Additionally, these MCC 
records indicate that the Maloango had minimal personal engagement with the transatlantic slave 
trade during the peak of slave trade on the Loango coast. Both Koning Stolck and Makosse left the 
majority of slave trading to the Mafouks of Loango Bay (Claas and Robijn) and their regional 
counterparts (including Mafouks Bienbo, Fabba, Koebole, and Emanuel). 
Unfortunately, the MCC data for Cabinda is less helpful in reconstructing the political and 
economic structure of trade of the Ngoyo. In 1770 the Fregatschip de Geertruijda en Christina 
traded at both Malemba and Cabinda. The 196 transactions recorded by this ship are the only data 
available on Cabinda traders in the MCC data. Although this makes it difficult to make any 
observations for Cabinda alone, it is not impossible. As data for the port of Malemba contains 
3,156 transactions, these data can be used to exclude the Malemba merchants from the first list. 
As the Geertruijda en C ristina’s list of transactions only contains three possible Mafouks, this 
further simplifies the process. As Mafoek Blima exist in the records exclusive to the Malemba 
trade and Mafoek Mabaka only appears once, Maphaka Waba (or Mafouk Waba) seems to be the 
most likely candidate for the position of Mafouk for Cabinda in 1770. Mafouk Waba appears five 
times in the trade data and provides seven slaves (three men, three women and one girl) to an 
overall cargo of 320 slaves. 
Despite its shortcomings where Cabinda is concerned, the MCC data on Malemba have the richest 
African merchant data of the entire coast and is consequently an excellent case study for the 
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development of Mafouks on the Loango Coast. Table 5, below, organizes these data based on 
period of trade, number of transactions, and total slaves sold. With the exceptions of Mafouks 
Malimbe and Louwango (Malemba and Loango) who engaged in five transactions in 1749, 
Mafouks do not begin to dominate the Malemba trade until 1755. A strong case can be made for 
Mafoeke Blienbo as Mafouk of Malemba between 1755 and 1776. Blienbo both the most 
consistent Mafouk on the coast during this period being present for nine trading periods, and 
Blienbo was far and away the most prolific trader engaging in 68 transactions for the sale of 171 
slaves. If Blienbo was indeed the Mafouk of Malemba, it is highly likely that the 1755-1771 entries 
simply listed as “Mafoeke” are short form for Mafouk of Malemba and since these two categories 
completely overlap it would follow that the categories of “Mafoeke” and “Mafoeke Blienbo” could 
be combined to equal an impressive 173 transactions for the sale of 316 slaves. This represents at 
least three per cent of all 10,077 slaves recorded to have embarked on 30 MCC ships. This easily 
would make Mafouk Blienbo the most important Loango trader for the MCC who held a political 
post. In addition to these totals for Malemba, Blienbo is also recorded to have traded at Loango 
Bay in 1762 and at Cabinda Bay in 1770 where he is listed as Blima. Blienbo was not the only 
Mafouk who left his post to trade to the best advantage: “Mafoeke Robin” who the Loango 
records suggest was Mafouk of Loango Bay from 1762 to 1774 appears to be trading on at 
Malemba in 1759. As this does not contradict the Loango Bay records above and as no records 
exist for that year, it is likely that Mafouk Robin’s tenure can be extended to 1759 through 1774. 
Mafouks Fabba and Kombij also appear on both the Loango and Malemba coasts suggesting that 
they were appointed as Mafouks of small settlements somewhere between the two ports. Also, 
according to Malemba records “Mapuka Wabben”, who was likely to have held the post of Mafouk 
of Cabinda in 1770, was still trading small numbers of slaves in 1772 and 1773. This suggests he 
was still active in Cabinda during this period. Mafouks Cousin, Boosman, Tate, Tom Pollo, Pollen, 
and Pieter, represented here by small numbers of transactions, were likely lesser Mafouks of 
nearby communities governed by the Maloango, Manikakongo, or the Mangoyo. 2 
  
                                                          
2 MCC 216, 219, 456, 524, 528, 533, 795, 825, 938, 980, 985, 990 & 1289. 
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Table 5: Mafouks Trading at Malemba 1749-1774 
Mafouks Trading at Malemba First Year Last Year Number of 
Transactions 
Number of 
Years with Data 
Mafoeke Malimbe 1749 1749 4 1 
Mafoeke Louwango 1749 1749 1 1 
Mafoeke 1755 1771 105 5 
Mafoeke Bliem/Mafoeke Bliembo/Mafoeke Blienbo/Mafoeke Blienboo/ 
MafoekeBlim/Mafoeke Blimbo/Mafoeke Blinbo/Mapjuka Blimba/Mafoeke Cliem 1755 1776 68 9 
Mafoeke Cousin 1757 1757 1 1 
Mafoeke Robin 1759 1759 1 1 
Mafoeke Boosman 1759 1759 1 1 
Mafoeke Fabba/Mafoeke Fabbaa 1764 1764 13 1 
Mafoeke Koembie/Mafoeke Kombij 1764 1776 16 3 
Mafoeke Tate 1769 1770 6 2 
Maphuka Tom Pollo 1772 1772 3 1 
Mapuka Wabben, Waba 1772 1773 2 2 
Mafoeken Pollen 1773 1773 4 1 
Maphuka Pieter 1774 1774 1 1 
 
Sources: MCC 216, 219, 456, 524, 528, 533, 795, 825, 938, 980, 985, 990 & 1289.
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Merchants of the Loango Coast 
However important the big men of history, the economic records of the MCC give us a clearer 
glimpse of how these big men fit into the broader merchant community of the Loango Coast. The 
MCC records have detailed information on 593 Loango Coast merchants who engaged in 4,192 
transactions for the purchase of 7,912 slaves between the years 1749 and 1776. This sample 
represents almost 80 per cent of the individual slaves recorded in the MCC data. So we know the 
identity of at least 80 per cent of slave merchants who were trading with the MCC during this period. 
This does not necessarily preclude these merchants from engaging in a greater proportion of the 
trade, it simply means we cannot connect the remaining 2,095 slaves to slave merchants known or 
unknown. 
Appendix C includes a list of the before mentioned 593 Loango Coast merchants, including data on 
the multiple spellings of their names, the date range in which they appear in the MCC records, the 
numbers of individual transactions and slave sold, as well as the transactions and slaves which were 
sold in a joint venture with one or more other merchants. Using these numbers the author has 
calculated two different rankings: a ranking based on an average total of slaves sold per year, a 
ranking based on an average total of transactions per year. These rankings help to construct a 
picture of the overall importance of each merchant to the MCC slave trade throughout the 27-year 
period. (See Table 6 below. Also see Appendix C for a full list of Loango Coast merchants.) 
According to the first index of based on the total number of slaves purchased, 43 Loango Coast 
Merchants stand out as the most important trade partners of the MCC in this period: Mat Intjee, 
Prins Thom, Mafoe [Mafouk] Bliem, Manuel, Coffij, Prins Majelle, Prins Macolle, Prins Maponda, 
Timpolle, Jan Claase, Mafoeke [Mafouk] Claas, Tim Candie, Prins Mangoeve, Maffoeque [Mafouk] 
Robbin, Mafoeke [Mafouk] Fabba, Maboba, Boense Basa, Pieketa Pee, Logie Jongen, Conde Samboe, 
Batij Claas, Andries, Tom Pollo, Gomma Konings Zoen *Gomma, King’s Son+, Prins Tom Crib, Tincosse, 
Tam Pollo, Bon Claaijs Monebee, Masanse, Moenemoese Eerste Jonge [First Son of Moenemoese], 
Magoffe Dick, Prinses Mamtevi, Prins Wille Bort Mattijentie, Prins Jmbico, Tam Beelei, Mafoeken 
Pollen, Lange Piet, Maffoeque Emanuel, Prins Mavoege, Pieter Claas, Puket, Coebeloe Loeboe, 
Gouverneur Mapello.1 As you might expect, this list includes merchants who supplied large numbers 
of slaves: Mat Intjee supplied 391 slaves, Prins Thom supplied 374 slaves, Mafoe [Mafouk] Bliem 
                                                          
1 There are often multiple spellings of each name present in the MCC data, for simplification the spelling listed 
here is the first in an alphabetical list. For a more complete list of spellings see Appendix C. 
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supplied 195 slaves, Manuel supplied 170 slaves, Coffij supplied 165 slaves, Prins Majelle supplied 
141 slaves, Prins Macolle supplied 140 slaves, Prins Maponda supplied 134 slaves, Timpolle supplied 
120 slaves, and Jan Claase supplied 110 slaves. Each of these traders supplied slaves over more than 
one year, with Timpolle spending a minimum of two years trading with the MCC and Mat Intje 
spending a maximum of at least 10 years trading with the MCC.  (See Table 6 below. Also see 
Appendix C for a full list of Loango Coast merchants.) 
Table 6: Overall Procurement Rates versus Procurement per Year for Loango Coast 
Merchants Trading with the MCC, 1749-1776  
 Top 10 Merchants: 
Total Slaves 
Total Slaves  Top 10 Merchants: 
Slaves/Year 
Slaves/Year 
1 Mat Intje 391 1 Timpolle 60.0 
2 Prins Thom 374 2 Prins Thom 53.4 
3 Mafoe Bliem 195 3 Prins Tom Crib 41.0 
4 Manuel 170 4 Mat Intje 39.1 
5 Coffij 165 5 Mafoeke Claas 36.0 
6 Prins Majelle 141 6 Prins Macolle 35.0 
7 Prins Macolle 140 7 Logie Jongen 34.5 
8 Prins Maponda 134 8 Tincosse 33.0 
9 Timpolle 120 9 Masanse 30.0 
10 Jan Claase 110 10 Moenemoese Eerste Jonge 29.0 
 
Source: Appendix C. 
However, a second analysis of traders based on the rate of slave supply produces a different rank 
ordering of merchants, involving both some of those noted above as well as some others: Timpolle, 
who had been ranked second last jumps to first place with 60 slaves per year; Prins Thom remains a 
solid second trading 53.4 slaves per year; Prins Tom Crib, who did not rank in terms of total slaves, is 
third highest in the new ranking with 41 slaves per year; Mat Intje drops from first place to fourth 
place in the rankings with 39.1 slaves per year; Mafoeke Claas, who also did not rank in the top 10 
total slaves, appears fifth highest with 36 per year; Prins Macolle rises from seventh in total slaves to 
sixth in slaves per year, supplying 35 per year; and Logie Jogen, Tincosses, Masanse, and 
Moenemoese Eerste Jonge all appear for the first time in seventh through tenth place respectively 
supplying 34.5, 33, 30 and 29 slaves per year. While a few traders engaged in a large percentage of 
the trade, many traders engaged in a very small percentage of the trade.This is consistent with the 
inequality analysis below, which shows that the majority of Loango Coast merchants who traded 
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with the MCC in the mid-eighteenth century engaged in small numbers of slave sales while a small 
minority of traders controlled a disproportionate of the supply. 
Using an inequality analysis (see Graph 1 below) we can examine the pattern of individual 
investment of Loango Coast merchants in the slave trade with the MCC. While the Line of Equality 
traces the pattern which would have occurred if each trader engaged in the same number of 
transactions or provided the same number of slaves, the lines of cumulative transactions and slaves 
purchased, represent the divergence from the equality line. Over the 27 year period covered by this 
data, the first set of 500 merchants engaged in sales of groups of 19 slaves or less and contributed 
some 30 per cent of the total. Put another way, 85 per cent of merchants sold less than one slave 
per year on average. Merchants 501 through 568 each sold between 19 and 62 slaves contributing a 
further 30 per cent of total sales. This means that some 10 per cent of merchants sold an average of 
fewer than three slaves per year. Merchants 569 through 593 contributed the remaining 40 per cent 
of slaves, each provisioning between 65 and 319 slaves. These 25 merchants, equivalent to 15 per 
cent of Loango Coast merchants dealing with the MCC, sold on average 2-12 slaves per year to MCC 
ships. However, this is only an average rate. This did not mean a merchant could not sell in excess of 
12 slaves per year, this calculation is simply meant to trace broad patterns. The analysis of 
transactions, closely follows this trend, identifying a few merchants engaging in the majority of 
transactions, while the bulk of merchants engage in small numbers of transactions. While it is 
possible that the merchants who traded small quantities of slaves for the MCC were busy trading 
larger quantities with the French and English ships which frequented this coast during this period, it 
is impossible to know without locating and examining other detailed records. For now, we will 
concentrate on the data relating to the MCC trade. A more nuanced interpretation of the data is 
available by calculating the rank of each merchant. 
To begin understanding the large concentration of slave transactions in the hands of a few traders, it 
is possible to calculate the importance of merchants who are known to serve both a political and 
economic function in the slave trade. Where it has been established above that the most prominent 
political figures on the Loango Coast, the Maloango, the Manikakongo, and the Mangoyo had little 
direct influence on either the political or economic functioning of the slave trade, the Mafouks have 
been identified as playing a crucial political role. Table 8 below measures the economic importance 
of the Mafouks against two other groups: merchants with recognizable titles (including prince, or the 
prefixes “Ma” “Mani” or “Manni”) and merchants without recognizable titles. In understanding this 
table it is important to recognize that identifying the second category of titles is an imprecise science 
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based on limited sources, as has been discussed above; Europeans struggled both to understand the 
political context of the Loango Coast and to 
Graph 1: Cumulative Percentages of Transactions and Slave Purchased by the MCC on the Loango 
Coast, 1749-1776 
Source: Appendix C. 
convey their understandings in European languages. This table identifies 30 Mafouks who engaged 
in 447 transactions which involved 837 slaves. These 30 Mafouks account for the highest number of 
slaves traded per year, the highest number of transactions per merchant, and the highest overall 
average of slaves per merchant. In all three categories, merchants with other titles rank second, and 
merchants with no political status rank last. This suggests that merchants who held the title of 
Mafouk were the most prominent merchants in the trade with the MCC. 
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Table 8: African Merchants and Political Status in Slave Transactions with the MCC, 1749-1776 
Merchant 
Status 
Merchants Transactions Slaves Avg. Slaves 
per Year 
Trans. per 
Merchant 
Slaves per 
Merchant 
Mafouk 30 447 837 8.9 14.9 27.9   
Other Title 265 2327 4617 6.8 8.8 17.4 
 No Title 297 1418 2458 5.0 4.8 8.3 
   592 4192 7912 6.0 7.1 13.4   
 
Sources: MCC 216, 219, 456, 524, 528, 533, 795, 825, 938, 980, 985, 990 & 1289. 
These data have implications on both how we envision slave procurement and mechanisms of credit 
on the Loango Coast. While the supply of the big merchants can be easily explained by Phyllis 
Martin, Joseph Miller, and Jan Vansina’s evidence of caravans running between the Loango Coast to 
Stanley Pool and beyond (which will be describe in detail in the next chapter), it does not necessarily 
account for the 95 per cent of merchants who supplied 60 per cent of slaves traded. While it is 
possible that some of these slaves were obtained from caravan traders once they arrived on the 
Loango Coast, it is also possible that men employed to carry goods and or provide security were paid 
in slaves upon completing their journey. 
In the procurement process, Phyllis Martin provided proof that “An important limitation on the sale 
of Vili to Europeans was contained in a law which prohibited the sale of anyone born in Loango.” 
With the exception of slaves who were disloyal or who had become a slave as punishment for a 
crime, this law was “strictly enforced by the Mafouk and his brokers.”2 Thus, local people would 
have access to slaves who had been found guilty of murder, theft, adultery, or who had unpaid 
debts. Another form of enslavement more common on other parts of the coast was enslavement 
through kidnapping and war. Due to the limited number of conflicts on the Loango Coast during the 
eighteenth century, it is unlikely that wartime conflicts were a major source of slaves. In John 
Thornton’s book on Warfare in Atlantic Africa, the only significant conflict which he records on the 
Loango Coast prior to the nineteenth century is the failed attempt of the Portuguese to dominate 
the Cabinda market by force.3 Phyllis Martin corroborated this finding: 
                                                          
2 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 167-168. 
 
3 Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, p. 104. 
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Large-scale wars were unusual. An army of 200 was a considerable size. There was seldom a 
pitched battle. Vili armies preferred to use surprize and ambush. Once prisoners were taken, 
they could be used as a bargaining counter for the fortunate side. Campaigns seldom lasted 
more than a few days, for the soldiers did not like to go far from their home. They usually 
carried sufficient food with them. Or if they were close to home they were supplied by 
women.4  
Despite the infrequency of conflicts, this does not completely discount the possibility of occasional 
occurrence of enslavement through war on the coast. Furthermore, it is possible that some slaves 
were obtained by kidnapping. However, the only documented occurrence of kidnapping I have been 
able to locate involved one African merchant seizing the slaves of another African merchant.5 Still, 
the very fact that a law existed banning the selling of local residents and that it was part of the 
Mafouk’s responsibility to prevent this occurrence suggests that the possibility existed. As this was 
considered a matter of internal governance in a society which did not maintain written judicial 
records, the absence of proof is not surprising.6 
In addition to questions in connection with procurement, these data also raise questions, and 
perhaps some answers, about financing. Building upon the evidence from Chapters 2 and 4 which 
indicates that the bulk of trade was conducted in barter relations, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that it would be too risky or not cost effective for European slave traders to offer advances of goods 
to Loango Coast traders who offered a small number of slaves. As 568 of 593 traders provided 70 per 
cent of slaves at a rate of less than 13 slaves per year, it is unlikely that credit was extended for 70 
per cent of 5,000 slave transactions. This would suggest, that if pawnship (which is defined by Toyin 
Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy as “a system in which individuals are held in debt bondage as collateral for 
loans”)7 was used as a method of extending credit on the Loango Coast, it is unlikely to have been 
widely used for 70 per cent of MCC trading transactions. The question of the remaining 30 per cent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
4 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p.24. 
 
5 Ibid., p. 114. 
 
6 The ideas about the large numbers of small scale traders being linked to the possibility of enslavement as 
punishment and particularly debt enslavement were developed in conversation with Judith Spicksley on, 01 
July 2011.This possibility requires further analysis. 
 
7 Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy, “Pawnship in Historical Perspective” in Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds) 
Pawnship , Slavery, and Colonialism in Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003) p. 1. 
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of traders who supplied large numbers of slaves by provisioning caravans to the interior will be 
addressed in the next chapter in a specific analysis of slave procurement. 
At this point we can conclude that while a small number of African merchants provided an 
extraordinary number of slaves to MCC ships, a large number of smaller traders also engaged in the 
trade. This suggests a large financial commitment to the transatlantic slave trade through multiple 
levels of society on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth century. While previous studies of merchant 
communities have focused primarily on the big merchant in the African slave trade, perhaps there is 
an underlying story of minor merchants yet to be discovered in Western African history, a history of 
small merchants who worked alongside the Aro in the Bight of Biafra or the major trading families in 
Ouidah. Mariana Candido has also indicated in a study of Benguela, that although a small number of 
big men, and even some prominent women, dominated the trade, “there were also many smaller 
merchants who handled only a few slaves at a time.”8 Unfortunately, it is the big men of history 
whom the records allow us to remember best. 
Power and Wealth: Transformations on the Loango Coast 
In 1966 Jan Vansina suggested that the Loango Coast followed an unusual path in response to 
encounters with Europeans. Unlike their neighbours to the south, the polities of the Loango Coast 
experienced a relatively peaceful period during the transatlantic slave trade. That is not to imply that 
the transatlantic slave trade did experience a great deal of external pressure due to the growing 
demands for slaves. 9 However, in 1990 Vansina goes on to argue that the disruption of political 
systems caused, at least in part, by external events on the Loango Coast in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century were repaired by falling back on traditional power structures based authority in 
matriclan, “house”, or association structures.10  This chapter has aimed to reimagine how the 
transformations which took place in the political and economic spheres contributed to this peaceful 
transition on the Loango Coast. 
By comparing the activities of the local rulers to their appointed Mafouks, it quickly becomes 
apparent that the rulers themselves were reluctant to make a large direct investment in the 
                                                          
8 Candido, Enslaving Frontiers, p. 100. 
 
9 Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, pp. 196-197. 
 
10 Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest, p. 236. 
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transatlantic slave trade. Whereas the Mafouks invested in large numbers of slaves, the Maloangos, 
Mangoyos and Manikakongos are listed only infrequently in the MCC records. While it is possible 
that they engaged more frequently with English or French traders, their absence in the 5,000 trade 
transactions with the MCC is conspicuous. Creating a system where exchanges were controlled by 
one man, who had no access to leadership promotion, where exchanges happened on the outskirts 
of town, and where profits were largely concentrated with one individual rather than the community 
as a whole, it is possible that the Maloango, the Manikongo, and the Mangoyo shielded, or 
insulated, their communities from external economic, religious and social influences. Miller 
described this relationship: 
Mafouks or mambouks appointed at first to manage trade on the beaches on 
behalf of the monarchy gradually applied their growing wealth to take over the 
levers of political power in the realms for themselves. The royalty, which had 
begun by insulating itself from the commercial sphere, found itself compelled to 
remain distanced from the new sources of power.11 
However, the evidence available does not speak to the intentions of these leaders in creating this 
system. It is possible that the trade simply became too complex and time consuming to manage 
alongside the other economic, political and religious obligations of the Loango Coast rulers. 
Whatever the intent and however strategic or accidental this process was, the Loango Coast resisted 
the integration of new religious practices, at least in the short term. In her study of religion in Ngoyo 
entitled Crown and Ritual, Zdenka Volavka argues that the people of the Loango Coast maintained 
“certain deeply rooted social and cultural values during times of fundamental change.”12 Heywood 
and Thornton confirm this finding in their exploration of West Central Africa. Noting the lack of 
permanent European settlement during the period of the transatlantic slave trade, they argue that 
the Loango Coast was not “creolized” in the same was as other Atlantic trading regions.13 Thus the 
Loango Coast insulated itself from direct contact and perhaps even more profound change in their 
philosophies on authority. This could partly be explained through the appointment of Mafouks 
                                                          
11 Miller, Way of Death, p. 185. 
 
12 Volavka, Crown and Ritual, pp. 6-7. 
 
13 Thornton and Heywood, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, p. 207. 
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which was consistent with the policy of keeping Africans in charge of the trade on the Loango Coast 
and not allowing Europeans to maintain a permanent status on the Coast. 
However, this concentration of the bulk of the profits came at a cost to the leaders in the region. As 
wealth began to be distributed among a new class of people, most notable the Mafouks, the leaders 
became less credible as centers for the redistribution of wealth. The eighteenth century slave trade 
provided a context of destabilization of Ngoyo. While the ruler of Ngoyo was not permitted to travel 
to the coast, the great men of Cabinda increased their wealth trading slaves with Europeans, and as 
their wealth grew, they gained authority. This led to a crisis of leadership when profits from the slave 
trade diminished and disappeared towards the end of the nineteenth century14 
Martin further described the crisis of Ngoyo leadership: “Unable to participate fully in the trade, too 
weak to control the powerful families at Cabinda and overburdened with the expenses of the office, 
the Ngoyo rulers found themselves in an economic and political crisis.”15 Beyond the power of the 
ruler, the Mafouks began to expand their influence in Cabinda through “a judicious mixing of 
economic activities of a capitalist kind, namely commerce with foreign slave-traders and investments 
in a more traditional mode.” 16 Although the slave trade was one element in the disintegration of 
central power, internal factors also may have played a role. Although it is difficult to establish to 
what extent the slave trade stimulated change in the political situation or the political situation 
shaped the slave trade, it is evident that these two patterns are inextricably linked. 
Conclusion 
Through an examination of the MCC slave trading transactions, it quickly becomes evident that the 
Mafouk of Malemba, and to a lesser degree the Mafouks of Loango and Cabinda, held pivotal roles 
in intercultural exchange, benefiting hugely in both economic and political terms. This transition 
transformed the political structure of the Loango Coast. However, as argued above, this 
transformation occurred within a traditional framework of problem solving. In the eighteenth 
century, the role of Mafouk insulated the Maloango, the Mangoyo, and the Manikongo from the 
                                                          
14 Martin, “Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda,” p. 69. 
 
15 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
 
16 Ibid., p. 70. 
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religious and cultural transformations which took place in Angola. Equally, it allowed these leaders 
to indirectly benefit from the financial profits of the economic exchange while diminishing the 
effects intercultural exchange. However, the increasing profits and prestige gained by the Mafouk, 
an appointee without natural paths of access to leadership himself, and the growing dependence of 
the Loango Coast leaders on these brokers eventually created unforeseen consequences in the next 
century. When the profits of the transatlantic slave trade dried up, the authority of the Mafouks that 
was built on those profits diminished. This transformation undermined the political stability of the 
region and leaving it more vulnerable to European interference in the late nineteenth century. 
In this region, a pattern of slave trade evolved which concentrated on procurement through indirect 
enslavement via long distance caravans to internal markets in contrast to regions such as Angola and 
Dahomey where slaves were supplied through direct wartime enslavement. Perhaps this caravan 
dominated slave supply, which drew from multiple interior sources and was supplemented by 
smaller but steady streams of slaves from minor traders, provided a more diverse and therefore 
possibly more consistent slave supply providing a viable and attractive alternative to the major 
slaving ports of Ouidah and Luanda. This theme of slave procurement will be further explored in the 
next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Negotiating Cross-Cultural 
Trade: From Coastal Markets to the 
Interior 
 
Whereas previous chapters have attempted to make sense of the actors in the transatlantic slave 
trade at both a collective and individual level, this chapter concentrates on the spaces in which these 
encounters happen and what happens when those actors meet. In doing so, it will provide a more 
focused analysis of the mechanisms of the slave trade, the frequency of exchanges, and the 
functions of those African actors holding key political roles. By tracing the journey of slaves 
backward from the Loango Coast through the caravans to the slave markets, this chapter will 
examine the role which European commodities play in African markets and communities. To achieve 
this end, this chapter will be divided into four parts: the first section explores the role of 
geographical factors in the slave trade on the Loango Coast; the second section examines the 
transactions between Middleburg and Loango traders from the arrival to the sailing of the ships 
focusing on qualitative rather than quantitative data; the third section discusses commodities and 
demand cycles on the Loango Coast in contrast to other African slave trading regions; and, the 
fourth section explores the journey of the caravans to the markets of the interior. This chapter 
explores the relevance of knowledge accumulation in negotiating the barriers and the obligations of 
trade partners. It is only through the creation of a cross-cultural understanding of limits and 
expectations that the Loango Coast was able to sustain and expand its supply of slaves into the 
transatlantic system throughout the eighteenth century. 
Furthermore, this chapter argues that it was the Mafouks, rather than the local rulers, who 
facilitated and controlled the Loango Coast slave trade. This provided a barrier between European 
merchants and the local trade communities, slowing the impact of cross-cultural exchange on the 
local religious and cultural norms. However, this also allowed the Mafouks to amass enough 
personal wealth and political influence to undermine the power bases of local rulers. 
The Geographical Context of the Loango Slave Trade 
171 
 
By the mid-eighteenth century, Europeans and Africans had developed a complicated protocol for 
beginning trade on the Loango Coast. Due to strong winds and ocean currents ships arrived on the 
Loango Coast by one of two routes. The first route was favoured by the Portuguese ships that sailed 
in a “C” shaped pattern west out of Portugal and then south on the Atlantic Ocean passing close to 
the Brazilian coast before turning east from there to Benguela and north to the Loango Coast.17 
Dutch, English, and French captains did not often favour this route as it took them through 
Portuguese dominated waters. Instead they preferred the second route that held much more tightly 
to the western African coast stopping first at Mayumba, a small slave trading port to the north of 
Loango Bay, or even Gabon before proceeding southward to the Loango Bay, Malemba, or Cabinda 
Bay. This was the most common route in the eighteenth century. This section explores the physical 
geography which Europeans encountered at these ports. 
 As already established in previous chapters, after a series of failures to maintain permanent 
settlements on the Loango Coast Europeans had settled into a pattern of ship based trade in the 
eighteenth century. This meant that European merchants generally set up a temporary trading base 
on the periphery of Loango Coast towns or ports. The location of these temporary factories, as 
illustrated below in J. Kip’s 1732 drawing of Cabinda Bay, was often on the fringes of local 
settlements. Although little information is available about Kip himself, Kip’s diagram of Cabinda Bay 
is an exceptional document for the western coast of Africa. Although other historians have 
attempted to reconstruct descriptions and maps of the geography of ports, few have such excellent 
source material. For example, Robin Law’s meticulous study of the port of Ouidah includes a 
reconstruction of historical locations onto a modern map of the city and a physical description of 
where the European factories and forts where likely to have been located. Likewise, Paul Lovejoy 
and David Richardson use Kannan Nair’s 1972 map of the historical port of Old Calabar in 
combination with various British sources to reimagine the port of Old Calabar. 18 
                                                          
17 Candido, Enslaving Frontiers, p. 23. 
 
18 Law, Ouidah, pp. 11, 31-41; and, Lovejoy and Richardson, “Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History,” pp. 332, 
347-348. 
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Thus, although historical images of Africa produced in this time period are notoriously unreliable, 
Kip’s diagram is an excellent starting place.19 The relative location of the temporary factories at 
Cabinda is corroborated by Martin’s description of the bay: 
Cabinda had the most room and safe anchorage on the Loango Coast. The sea was 
deep close to the shore, the bay was sheltered, wood and water were plentiful. 
This was the most convenient place for a base for the repair and refitting of ships. 
There was a village called Cabinda, but around the bay towards the Point of the 
Palmar were other smaller settlements which were also part of the Cabinda 
complex. The only disadvantage was that the climate of Cabinda was not as good 
as that of Malemba and most captains preferred to sleep on board ship.20 
On Kip’s drawings we can see marshy grounds, “wood pyles”[ a wall of large pointed sticks], a 
fishermen’s village, and a fresh water river separating the “Town of Cabinda” from the Factories. 
This seems to indicate that not only were the Europeans on the edge of town, but also that they 
were separated from town by both natural and manmade barriers. Presumably, these barriers would 
be for the protection of the indigenous inhabitants rather than Europeans, as they are positioned 
next to the “Town of Cabinda” rather than around the factories. Robin Law confirms this separation 
between indigenous towns and foreign merchant spaces both in Ouidah and in the coastal regions of 
Western Africa as a whole though he does not make mention of a physical barrier between the 
indigenous towns and the Europeans’ lodgings.21 Furthermore, Joseph C. Miller supports this 
interpretation in his analysis of trade in West Central Africa: “Quarantine of the often aggressive 
foreign traders and their crew of unruly slave guards and bearers within the  
                                                          
19 For a discussion on the difficulties of representing “others” in art see: Dipti Desai, “Imaging Difference: The 
Politics of Representation in Multicultural Art Education,” Studies in Art Education, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Winter, 
2000), pp. 114-129. 
 
20 Point of the Palmar is also known as Pont do Palmar. The editor’s note in Andrew Battle’s Strange 
Adventures reads: “This is Red Point or Ponta Vermelha, where there is a grove of palms” p. 42. Martin, The 
External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 95. 
 
21 Law, Ouidah, pp. 32. 
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Illustration 1: Cabinda Bay 
 
Source: Kip, J. Mouth of the River Congo and Cabinda Bay (G241:4/23), Macpherson Collection, National Maritime 
Museum, Greenwich, UK. Also available at http://www.nmm.ac.uk/collections/explore/object.cfm?ID=G241%3A4%2F23 
Accessed on 31 March 2011. Reproduced with permission from the National Maritime Museum. 
 
market settlements helped to insulate the surrounding neighbourhoods from the unsettling 
influence of foreign trade.”22 
Even farther along the point we find “Negro’s Town”. Reference to a “Negro’s Town” can be found in 
a drawing of Fort James, the English fort at Accra. The drawing includes a location for both “Negro’s 
Town” and “The landing place”.23 Perhaps this is where the slaves were housed before embarking. 
                                                          
22 Miller, Way of Death, p. 183. 
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Another possibility is that this is where the local inhabitants lived when they had a labour contract 
with European traders. These are by no means exclusive options, nor are they the only possible 
explanation for these “towns”. Whatever the case, these “Negro’s Towns” seem to be directly 
related to the presence of European forts or factories. Another factor involved in the location of the 
factories is implicit in the map: the vulnerability of European health. Two features, the proximity of 
fresh water and the relative distance from the mosquito infested marsh lands, inevitably were 
negotiated with recognition of poor European adaptation to the climate and the need for fresh 
water at the end of a long voyage from Europe. While the town of Cabinda is located on high 
ground, the elevation of the factories is not clear from this diagram; higher ground usually was 
associated with healthier living conditions. If the factories were located at low elevation, this may 
account for the unhealthy conditions reported by European travellers.  
Like Cabinda, Loango Bay had a reputation for being “unhealthy”, though Martin suggests that “such 
tales were often a ruse to discourage Europeans from trying to establish more permanent factories 
ashore.”24 As was the case for Cabinda, Loango Bay and Malemba also had small areas for European 
trade on the periphery of town. At Loango Bay European factories sat upon the top of a small hill 
referred to as the ‘Point’; at Malemba European factories sat at the top of Malemba Hill, with the 
northern side being referred to as ‘Dutch Hill’ and the southern side ‘French Hill’. In contrast to 
Cabinda and Loango, Malemba’s climate was relatively healthy. At least, European traders were 
willing to risk sleeping on shore and the factories were of a more permanent nature. Perhaps these 
small comforts had an impact on the growing popularity of Malemba in the late eighteenth century. 
Yet even before the boom in the slave trade in the late eighteenth century, European travellers were 
attracted to the port of Malemba. F. Denis Carli, an Italian missionary to Kongo and Kakongo 
between 1666 and 1667, offered the following description of Malemba and the Kakongo people: 
The first and most famous of these [ports] is that of Loango, the second of 
Capinda [sic], and the third and last that of Cacongo [Malemba] itself, but which is 
not very secure. This kingdom for the most part is flat, with air indifferently 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
23 “The Fort James, English at Accra A. Negro's town B. The landing place C. A large canoe” (London, Printed by 
assignment from Messrs. Churchill for H. Lintot and J. Osborn, 1744-46. vol. 5, Available at: Beinecke Rare Book 
and Manuscript Library, Yale University, Bibliographic Record Number: 2031576.) 
 
24 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p 95. 
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wholesome, and soil not unfruitful, by reason of frequent showers, and the 
moulds being generally black, whereas in other parts of Ethiopia [meaning Africa] 
it is either sandy or chalky. The Inhabitants of this country, considering they have 
been born pagans, are more courteous and humane than ordinary, and though 
they are Infidels, they cherish and respect our priests.25 
While admitting the less secure anchorage for ships off the coast of Malemba, Carli’s descriptions of 
the healthy climate and his warm reception from the Kakongo people are more useful than his moral 
pronouncements. Though, it seems clear that Carli’s religious motivations did not unsettle the 
people of Cabinda. This contact occurred seventy years before the arrival of the MCC at Malemba. 
Just as Carli before them, the MCC found a positive reception at Malemba conducting their most 
successful slave trading endeavours at this port. 
Day to Day Negotiations on the Loango Coast 
Using a compilation of travel documents and shipping logs, Phyllis Martin constructs a picture of 
what Europeans encountered upon their arrival: first the captain fired a volley of cannon shots to 
signal their arrival; second, the Mafouk either sent a messenger to the ship or went to the ship 
himself to set the terms of trade, at this point a fixed price might be set; third, the captain went 
ashore to establish the availability of slaves, the level of competition, and to seek news of the other 
local ports; if the conditions were favourable, his crew would hire local porters and canoes to set up 
shop on the coast.26 While Chapter 2 has outlined the resistance to permanent factories on the 
Loango Coast in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in this context a factory refers to a 
temporary store house which the Europeans used while anchored off shore and abandoned once the 
ship was fully provisioned and set sail for the Americas. Johannes Postma refers to the factories of 
the Loango Coast as “mere trading lodges that could operate only with the approval of the 
indigenous African authorities.”27 This description seems consistent with the MCC’s trade patterns 
on the Loango Coast. 
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26 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 101-102. 
 
27 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 65. 
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While Martin has given us a solid starting point for imagining how trade proceeded on the Loango 
Coast, there is a significant problem in her description of these events. While it is evident in her 
footnotes, Martin does not acknowledge the time differences between her documents which range 
from sixteenth century to late eighteenth century. Thus Martin does not sufficiently explore the 
possibility of change over time. Although Dutch trader Pieter van den Broecke, English trader 
Andrew Battell, British Captain Charles Wilson, and the MCC representatives experienced similar 
elements in their reception on the Loango Coast, an almost two century time difference 
undoubtedly resulted in differing expectations between the two men. In his published journals 
Broecke records asking the Maloango for permission to trade upon arrival but does not mention 
saluting with a cannon upon his arrival. 28 Neither does Andrew Battell mention a salute as part of 
the customs of trade at the Loango Coast. 29 
Almost 200 years after Broecke and Battell visited the Loango Coast, Europeans continued to follow 
a similar, though presumably more institutionalized, protocol. This protocol is described in a 1783 
letter from Leyland, Penny and Co. of Liverpool to Captain Charles Wilson of the Brig 
Madampookata: “On your arrival off Cabinda, or should you first fall in with Malimba [Malemba], 
and find ships there, take care not to approach too near, until you are informed if they are Friends or 
Enemies – We apprehend you will meet with no ships at Cabinda; on your coming near the Bay 
anchor without in five Fathom, the canoes will come along beside and by them send for Prince 
Mambooka Madampookata [Mambouk+, and the Mamfooka *Mafouk+.” (For a full transcription of 
the letter see Appendix D). Although this document also notes the requirement to seek permission 
to trade before going ashore, it contains a notable difference. By the eighteenth century it was the 
Mafouk to whom European traders appealed upon their arrival on the Loango Coast rather than the 
Maloango, or in this case the Mangoyo who was the ruler of Cabinda. Once the office of Mafouks 
had been established, Europeans only had access to the rulers of the Loango Coast in exceptional 
circumstances. 
Likewise, between Broecke’s voyage in the early 1600s and Wilson’s voyage in the 1780s, the 
volume of European trade to the Loango Coast had increased significantly in response to the 
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external demand for captives. Outside of his own trading expedition, Broecke does mention at least 
one other ship on the coast. This is in contrast to the year the Madampookata arrived on the Loango 
Coast when the Slave Voyages Database records five other slave trading ship on the Loango Coast. 
However, during the entire 1604 and 1614 time period of Broecke’s travels, the database records no 
slaving ships on the coast.30 While the concentration of ships on the Loango Coast was undeniably 
lower in the early 1600s than it was in the 1780s, it is important to remember that not all ships 
arriving on the Loango Coast in either period were slaving ships. Prior to 1670, most Europeans 
trading on the Loango Coast sought redwood, ivory, and cloth. Nevertheless we can conclude that 
between these two periods, the volume of institutional knowledge about trade on the Loango Coast 
increased exponentially in Europe, as exhibited in Captain Wilson’s letter, while at the same time the 
people of the Loango Coast were adjusting their trade mechanisms to accommodate an ever 
growing European demand for trade goods, primarily slaves. 
In L. R. Priester’s analysis of the MCC records, he found a journal entry from Johannes Bakker, 
Skipper of the Fregatschip Aurora, in April of 1772. This entry records that upon arrival Bakker 
ordered the cannons fired: five times to salute the ruler of Malemba and seven shots twice to salute 
the Mafouk of Malemba. Priester also mentions MCC captains using this signal at Nazareth and 
Popo. 31 Nazareth was the name for the Ogooué River which is located at Cape Lopez the northern 
most point of the Loango Coast. Popo was located to the west of Ouidah on the Slave Coast. The 
diversity of places where this signal was employed raises the possibility that it was a signal arranged 
by the Europeans rather than the people of Loango. This signal would have expedited gaining the 
permission required to commence trade. 
Priester found the following description in Hendrik Vandleven’s logbook for the Snauwschip de Drie 
Gezusters in October of 1758. This is a translation of Priester’s argument which is originally written in 
Dutch: 
                                                          
30 http://www.slavevoyages.org Query: Time Frame - from 1783 to 1783; Principal Place of Slave Purchase - 
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[Congo River],]’ 
 
31 L. R. Priester, De Nederlandse houding ten aanzien van de slavenhandel en slavernij, 1596-1863: Het gedrag 
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[African and Europeans] both favour commercial techniques which involve the 
kidnapping of people and the seizure of goods, to prevent [their trade partners 
from not] fulfilling their trade promises. When Hendrik Santleven wanted to go 
from Loango to Cabinda or Malemba to find slaves, the [Loango] traders seized his 
*Santleven’s+ trade goods plus a number of crew. Only one month later, when 
there were over 170 slaves added [to the cargo], both were released.32 
This is an example of Dutch crew members and cargo being taken to ensure Dutch traders would 
return to continue buying slaves. To describe this relationship Priester uses the Dutch word 
“bemanningsleden” which translates roughly as pawnship. Although this arrangement could not 
strictly be called pawnship by Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy’s definition as it does not involve an 
explicit debt nor does it require the seized person to perform labour, this might be better 
understood as “hostages” being voluntarily offered or “pledged” to guarantee a business 
arrangement.33 It is difficult to tell from the source if this was indeed a “voluntary” action or a 
seizure of goods and persons because the merchants of Loango feared Vandleven [or Santleven] 
might be tempted to violate an agreement. If the seizure was involuntary, it comes closer to Robin 
Law’s definition of panyarring: “by which a creditor could hold a community collectively responsible 
for a debt contracted by one of its members, by seizing another member as security for 
repayment.”34 In fact, Law provided an example of Europeans being seized in a similar manner as the 
example given by Priester: 
On occasion, indeed, African creditors could even invoke the sanction of 
panyarring against European debtors. In 1722, the King of Allada, pursuing his 
claim for the debt of 100 slaves’ value which he claimed was owed to him by the 
Royal African Company, thus detained Bulfinch Lambe, an employee of the 
Company’s factory at Jakin, then the port of Allada, and told the Company’s chief 
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33 For a more in-depth discussion of the boundaries of defining a slave see Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy, 
“Pawnship in Historical Perspective” in Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds) Pawnship, Slavery and 
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factor there that “if he did not forthwith pay him this debt, he would make Mr 
Lambe a slave.”35 
While Law’s corroborating example indicates that the use of Europeans as hostages in the 
negotiation of the slave trade was not an isolated example, we cannot extrapolate from these two 
examples that this style of negotiation was common place either in these specific ports or in 
Western Africa as a whole. It does, however, indicate the vulnerability of Europeans while trading on 
the Loango and Slave Coasts. 
The most complete record of trade on the Loango Coast appeared in series of letters from an 
American slave trader reprinted in the Brownsville Valley Sunday Star-Monitor-Herald in 1938. This 
unidentified author wrote the following directions for trade on the Loango Coast circa 1812: “In 
running in for the land in the night, there is no danger to run into nine or ten fathoms of water or 
any part of the coast. The anchorages are all good. In being seen from the land, in the night, the 
Natives will immediately come off and show you the anchoring place.” 36 Although there is no 
mention of a cannon signal, the letter continues to describe a scene very similar to the one outlined 
by Martin above. This account reinforces and confirms six key themes of trade discussed this far. 
Firstly, it confirms the role of the Mafouk in greeting foreign merchants, negotiating the conditions 
of trade, maintaining order, and establishing merchants on the coast. Secondly, this reinforces the 
suggestion that Mafouks and European merchants engaged in price fixing before transactions began, 
at least by the early nineteenth century. Thirdly, this account corroborates reports that merchants 
trading at Loango Bay slept aboard ship at night thus engaging in shipboard trade. This leads us to 
the fourth theme, the use of local factories only as warehouses rather than as accommodation. 
Furthermore, this letter confirms the practice of foreign merchants being required to hire local 
labours as “factory boys” and guards for their factories. Finally, this letter reinforces an emphasis on 
barter trade in the context of an organized market involving the immediate exchange of goods.37 
Although trading protocol inevitably changed with time, Martin’s conclusions, in combination with 
the evidence from Broecke, Wilson, Bakker, and this unknown American slave trader, help to 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 63. 
 
36 Minne Gilbert, “Rare Glimpse of Slavery is Given in  Letters Found in Valley Attic,” in Valley Sunday 
Star-Monitor-Herald (Brownsville, Texas: 9, 16, 23 January 1938). Many thanks to Bruce L. Mouser for bringing 
these documents to my attention. 
 
37Ibid. 
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reconstruct a picture of how trade was established in the early seventeenth century and how this 
trade evolved to the state of trade which existed the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Using this evidence, we can begin to imagine how slave trading occurred between MCC and Loango 
Coast merchants. In February of 1759 MCC Skipper David Mulders of the Fregatschip Middelburgse 
Welvaren II landed on the Loango Coast to begin slave trading at the port of Malemba. In just over 
two short months, Skipper Mulders embarked 424 slaves and set sail for Curacao. In September of 
the same year Captain Adriaan Jacobse of the Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde began trade at the 
same port. By the end of November he had departed the coast for Suriname with 472 slaves on 
board. 38 Drawing upon these records we can begin to get a clearer picture how trade negotiations 
proceeded. After anchoring off the coast from Malemba, signaling with their cannons, and 
negotiating for trading privileges, Skipper David Mulders and Captain Jacobse would have spared no 
time in establishing themselves on the above mentioned Dutch Hill. This might take days or in best 
case scenario, a number of hours. Once established, trade negotiations began immediately. 
Illustrations 2 and 3 below are transcriptions and translations of the first two trade transactions of 
each of these ships. While the majority of MCC transactions are recorded in a standard format 
containing very similar information, two examples are given to show the types of slight variations in 
style between captains. These records have been chosen by four criteria: first and foremost, they 
were chosen for legibility; second, they were chosen roughly in the middle of the MCC’s trading 
period on the coast; third, they have been chosen from the records of transactions at Malemba Bay; 
and four, they have been chosen on the first day of trade to control for fluctuations in both slave 
availability and European trade goods. An analysis of these documents will help us to understand the 
nature of a business transaction between a European and an African in eighteenth century 
Malemba. 
Several things can be observed by a cross comparison of these documents. First and foremost, 
although the formats are quite similar, they do include subtle differences which complicate the 
standardization of data collection. For example, the first document contains details including the 
date, the Malemba merchant’s name, the number of slaves involved, and the rate of remuneration 
                                                          
38 For more information on these voyages see Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II’s trading records, MCC 
793-799 Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfdes’ trading records, MCC 989-993. Also see: 
http://www.slavevoyages.org Query: Voyage 10872, Middelburgs Welvaren (1759) and Voyage 10960, Prins 
Willem de Vijfde (1760). 
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per slave, whereas the second document simply lists the name of the Malemba merchant. The cross 
comparison of these documents also give us a sense of variation between slave prices and the 
bundles which these prices represent. 
Furthermore, the listing of the number of pieces per slave in Illustrations 2 and 3 suggests a 
pre-negotiated fixed price. A further analysis of the data for Skipper David Mulders’ records shows 
that with the exception of two male slaves purchased for 14 each and two male slaves being 
purchased at 7 ½ each, the remainder of 192 male slaves were purchased for 15 pieces; with the 
exception of one female purchased for 15 pieces, the remainder of 113 female slaves were 
purchased for 14 pieces. For children the statistics are more complicated, presumably due to varying 
ages: whereas one boy was purchased for 15 and another for 14, the majority of children, including 
112 slaves both male and female, were purchased for between 9 and 13 pieces each. These data 
seem to support the suggestion that Skipper Mulders prearranged a fixed-price for male and female 
slaves and perhaps even a price range for children, before trading commenced. Other sources 
indicate the price range for slaves had some flexibility in the negotiation of a fixed price. 
British Captain Charles Wilson’s 1783 letter of instructions from his employer Leyland, Penny and Co. 
reads: “make them this offer that if they will agree to give you prime slaves for 14 pieces with 2 or 3 
pieces wages you will continue and make your whole purchase, nay rather give them 15 or 16 
pieces, with 2 or 3 Pieces wages than go farther for we conceive what you’ll gain in dispatch will be 
adequate to the difference in price.”39 Whereas this suggests that fixing slave prices was a common 
practice, the fixing of prices did not necessarily result in Malemba merchants receiving merchandise 
worth a fixed amount in guilders, as exhibited in Illustration 2 where Banse receives approximately 
164 guilders worth of guns, ammunition, textiles and miscellaneous goods equaling almost 55 
guilders per slave, whereas Jan Flink receives less than 54 guilders in trade goods per slave. This 
letter also suggested that in the 24 years between the sailing of Mulders’ 1759 voyage and Wilson’s 
1783 voyage, prices at Malemba remained fairly stable in terms of the piece currency. However, this 
does not stand up against a more sustained analysis of price data over time. 
                                                          
 
39 See Appendix D below. 
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Illustration 2: Translation and Transcription of the first two Trade Negotiations of Skipper David Mulders at Malemba, 1759 
Source: MCC 79
                                                          
1 The guilder is a historical Dutch currency. It was divided into 20 stuivers, each of 16 penningen. Thus the first subtotal would read: seventy-six guilders, seventeen 
stuivers, eight pennigen. 
 
2 An anker is 10 gallon measure of wine, spirits or beer.  
Transaction No. Male Female Boy Girl Quantity Malemba Merchants / Trade Goods  Pieces Guilders
1
 
1 1     Mafoeke   
     3 Barrels of Gunpowder 3 12   
     2 Guns 2 6 18  
     1 Blue Guinea [textile] 3 11 6  
     1 Sitz [?] 3 9 5  
     1 Tapseils [textile] 2 9 10  
     1 Company Nicanes [textile] 2 6 5  
     1 Half Ankers
2
 [alcohol] 1 4 10  
     1 Half Seylone [Silesias, textile] 1 ½ 5 5  
     1 Ysene[?] Slave
 
½ 1 10  
     5 Cannen ½  8 8 
     1 E. Baay [textile?] 1 7   
     1 Kelder[Beer] 1 3   
      Subtotal 20 ½ 76 17 8 
2   1   Jan Klaasen     
     2 Barrels of Gunpowder  2 8   
     2 Guns 2 6 18  
     1 Blue Guinea [textile] 3 11 6  
     1 Fooklas [Folhinhas, cotton from Balghat, India] 2 7 15  
     1 Company Nicanes  2 6 5  
     2 Kelder[Beer] 2 6   
     ½ Seylone [Silesias] 1 ½ 5 5  
     1 Ysene[?] Slave ½ 1 10  
     5 Cannen ½  8 8 
      Subtotal 15 ½ 53 7 8 
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Illustration 3: Translation and Transcription of the first two Trade Negotiations of Captain Adriaan Jacobse at Malemba, 1759 
Number of Slaves Male Female Boy Girl Quantity Transaction Details / Trade Goods with individual prices Pieces Guilders 
3 3     1 February 1759 at Malemba from the merchant Banse 3 male slaves @ 
15 pieces per slave 
  
     6 8lbs Barrels of Gunpowder  @ 4 6 24,   
     3 Soldier’s guns @ 3,13 3 10, 19  
     3 Blue Guinea Textile @  11 ¼  9 33, 15  
     1 Large Cavalry Chelloes @ 8 ¾ 2 ½ 8, 15  
     2 Long English Nicanes
 
@ 9 ½ 4 19,   
     1 Compt [possibly VOC or MCC]  Nicanes @ 6 3/8 2 6, 7 ½  
     3 East India Tapseils @ 9 6 27,   
     2 Blue Bajutapauts (textile) @ 9 ½  5 18, 10  
     3/17 Ells Bright Blue (textile)@ 48 ½
 
1 2, 8 ½  
     5/16 Ells Blue Piece (textile) @ 48 ½  15  
     2 Kelders [?] @ 6 jugs malt [beer] @2 ¾ 2 5, 10  
     6 doz Packages iron knives@ 14 1 ½ 4, 4  
     6 Glass Tankards @ 6 1 1, 16  
     1 Earthenware Pots @ 8 ½ 1 ½ 1, 5 ½  
      Subtotal 45 164, 5, 8 
1 1     On the same date from Jan Flink one man slave at 15 pieces    
     2 8lbs Barrels of Gunpowder  @ 4 2 8,   
     1 Soldier’s guns @ 3,13 1 3, 13  
     1 Blue Guinea Textile @  11 ¼ 3 11, 5  
     1 Long English Nicanes
 
@ 9 ½ 2 9, 10  
     1 Compt *MCC+ Nicanes @ 6 ⅜ 2 6, 7 ½  
     1 Course Blue (textile) @5 ½ 1 ½ 5, 10  
     1 Alf Anker malt *beer+ @ 4 ⅕ 1 4, 5  
     2 doz Packages iron knives@ 14 ½ 1, 8  
     3 Glass Tankards @ 6 ½  18  
     3 Earthenware Basins @ 6 ½  18  
     1  Zere
*
 Slave @ 33 ½ 1, 13  
     1 Earthenware Pots @ 8 ½ ½  8 ½  
      Subtotal 15 53, 16  
Total Slaves 4     Total Cost 60 218, 1, 8 
Source: MCC 990.
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While Mulders and Wilson’s records are very useful in establishing the nature of transactions, the 
composition of bundles, and the MCC methods of recording purchases, their information on price 
data is limited and, it is useful to fit these into a broader context. Appendix D in Chapter 3 includes 
a more systematic analysis of slave prices from the MCC records between 1732 and 1776. Two 
major patterns emerge from this appendix: the first occurs from 1732 to 1766, and the second 
occurs from 1767 to1776. In the first period prices begin at an average of 17.5 pieces per slave in 
1732; they drop to 13.1 in 1748, peak at 26.8 in 1755, drop to 13.7 in 1759, and stabilize between 
18.1 and 19.8 for the remainder of the period. During this first period, 1755 stands out as an 
anomalous year. During the second period, slave prices start at an average of 24.3 in 1767, 
climbing steadily to 32.6 in 1770, briefly correct in 1771 to an average of 27 pieces per slave, then 
climb to a high of 48.6 in 1776. Comparing these data to Mulders data we find that Mulders 
purchased his cargo of slaves at the cheapest rate obtained by the MCC in the eighteenth century. 
In contrast Wilson’s letter comes 10 years after this data, we can draw one of three conclusions: 
first, it is possible that the British were obtaining slaves at lower prices than the Dutch; second, it 
is possible that events of the late eighteenth century caused prices to drop (although this 
conclusion would contradict the patterns of slave prices from the Voyages Database which is 
illustrated in Graph 6, Chapter 3); third, it is possible that Leyland and Penny were working with 
old information, dating from before the explosion in slave prices circa 1766. Phyllis Martin’s 1972 
analysis of slave prices on the Loango Coast, compiled from French, English and Dutch sources, 
corresponds with the price trends exhibited in the MCC records and extend into the 1780s at 
which time prices range from 40 to 54 pieces per slave. This suggests that Captain Wilson likely 
encountered prices between 25 and 30 pieces per slave rather than the 15 or 16 pieces Leyland, 
Penny and Company led him to expect.1 
Moving beyond slave prices to method of payment, a careful reading of the samples from the 
Mulders and Jacobse records suggest that the date of the negotiation was also the date of the 
exchange of slaves for goods. Here it is important to note that the format of the original 
documents has been preserved in the transcription and translation of these documents. Each 
transaction included a date. Multiple entries are given for each week. If merchants were accepting 
credit, it would seem most likely that multiple slaves would be contracted at a time and the 
                                                          
1 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 113-114. 
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merchant would not return for multiple days. However, in these transactions it is not unusual to 
see the same merchants recorded making multiple within the same month. For example Skipper 
Mulders engages in 29 transactions with Malemba merchant Tate and 76 transactions with Prins 
Tom. Furthermore, while the price slaves could have been fixed before the Middelburg merchants 
arrive on the shore, the composition of a bundle was not. There is no reason to suppose that these 
bundles were negotiated in advance of the transfer of slaves.  Equally, if these goods are not being 
exchanged at the time of negotiation, why is there no mention of goods being owed at a later date 
nor any further documents remarking that these payments have been made? Negotiating for such 
specific bundles without immediate distribution would require meticulous running inventories of 
Dutch merchandise. Promising goods that were not available would have created difficulties in 
maintaining trust. Additionally, no records of are made of delayed payments are available in the 
extensive records of the 31 MCC ships on this coast. 
This runs contrary to Martin’s description of trade on the Loango Coast: 
When the slave trade was completed by a ship, the gong was rung to advise all 
the brokers to come for the payment of their fees. This was often a time of 
much hard bargaining on both side and the Mafouk and other captains might be 
needed as mediators. The adjustment of payments in relation to advances and 
to hostages was a particularly thorny problem. A broker frequently asked for 
advances in order to commence the purchase of slaves from inland merchants, 
and captains usually had to comply since they would be outplayed by their 
competitors if they did not. Sometimes a captain was able to insist on hostages 
as surety and the broker, if he was in debt, might have trouble in recovering a 
member of his family or a friend detained by a European.2 
Although Martin presents a compelling and colourful description here, unfortunately she does not 
offer corroborating evidence in the form of footnotes. Martin may have evidence from other 
sources; however, the MCC financial records remain silent on the issue of pawnship, with the 
notable exception of the 1772 voyage of the Aurora, discussed above, which records the seizure of 
                                                          
2 Ibid., p. 103. 
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European goods and crew by local merchants who feared the Aurora would not honour their 
agreements. 
Thus, in the absence of evidence of Loango Coast merchants seeking credit from European traders 
and in light of multiple transactions between the same parties in a concentrated time frame, we 
can conclude that MCC slave traders in the eighteenth century exchanged goods for slaves on the 
transaction date. Furthermore, evidence from the letters of an unidentified American slave 
merchant above and from English Commander James Fraser discussed in Chapter 2 provide more 
evidence for a barter based trade then a trade based on the extension of European financing of 
African slaving expeditions. Martin’s conclusion that slaves were transferred immediately after an 
agreement was struck, also support this hypothesis of barter trade: “Once in the hands of the 
European buyer, the slave was usually kept over-night in the prison below the factory, and then 
transferred by canoe to the ship the next morning.”3 As soon as slaves were loaded onto the ships 
the slaves began their Middle Passage even if the ship did not leave the coast for several months. 
From this point MCC merchants were responsible for the nutrition and health of the slaves; any 
slaves who died would result in a loss of profit. Thus, fast procurement was the highest priority. 
In the Western African slave trade, profits also depended on a series of costs beyond the individual 
payments for slaves. Portuguese sources suggest that the taxes demanded from African 
authorities who controlled the trade from Ambriz north to Mayumba, including the key ports of 
Loango Bay, Cabinda and Malemba, were substantially lower than their Portuguese counterparts 
in Luanda and Benguela.4 Also unlike their Portuguese counterparts to the south, there was some 
flexibility in the negotiation of taxes on the Loango Coast. Captain Wilson is instructed by his 
employer Leyland, Penny & Co.: “you may with much propriety plead (being a small vessel you 
cannot afford to pay the same customs and presents and let the aforementioned gentlemen ratify 
such agreement ~ All this must be done before you send your Boat onshore.”5 This is not to 
suggest that such payments were avoidable, simply negotiable. 
                                                          
 
3 Ibid., p. 104. 
 
4 Martin, “Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda,” 73. 
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As not to overstate the importance of the evidence arrived from the analysis of two MCC records, 
we should further contextualize our knowledge of these two voyages in our earlier discussion of 
the Dutch transatlantic slave trade. Upon their departure from the Loango Coast both ships had 
been loaded in approximately two months, well under the 4.3 month average. While Mulders 
embarked an above average number of 424 slaves, Jacobse embarked a substantially higher 464 
slaves. Both ships also maintained a relatively low death rate, with Jacobse’s crew only losing zero 
point two per cent of slaves on the middle passage, and Mulders’ crew losing zero point nine per 
cent.6 Yet, even if these voyages are exceptional in the broader context, they still describe the 
processes taking place in 1759 and can thus be compared with other sets of data to create a more 
complete view of the Loango trade. 
This brings us back to the theory proposed in Chapter 2, which suggested the purchase of slaves 
involves three levels of knowledge and three corresponding power relations: the establishment of 
a price in a local currency, pieces, where the local merchant has the advantage; the exchange of 
pieces for European goods, where Middelburg merchants know the value of the goods in Europe 
and Loango Coast merchants know the value of goods in the internal market; and, the calculation 
of the bundle in guilders, where Middelburg merchants have the advantage. These records 
indicate that the Mafouk successfully negotiated a fixed price for slaves, which balanced his 
exclusive access to knowledge of internal slave markets and his desire to keep European 
merchants from moving on to more profitable slave markets. Equally, if the Europeans did not 
agree to these terms, they risked prolonging their voyage and a loss of reputation with the local 
Mafouk. In the case of both the Loango and the Middelburg merchants, experienced traders had 
the edge in these negotiations. Yet by the eighteenth century, inexperienced traders on both sides 
had access to larger bodies of institutional knowledge, which helped to protect them from rash 
decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Appendix D below. 
 
6 See Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II’s trading records, MCC 793-799 Fregatschip Prins Willem de 
Vijfde’sVijfdes’ trading records, MCC 989-993. Also see: http://www.slavevoyages.org Query: Voyage 10872, 
Middelburgs Welvaren (1759) and Voyage 10960, Prins Willem de Vijfde (1760). For further details on the 
average cargo sizes and mortality rates of ships see Chapter 3. 
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Commodities 
These bodies of institutional knowledge included an understanding of European demand for slaves 
among Loango Coast merchants and an understanding for the demand for textiles, guns, and 
alcohol on the Loango Coast commonly held among merchants of the MCC. To trade on the 
Loango Coast, a Middelburg merchant must have been aware of both the traditional cloth market 
and the demand for new and innovative trade goods. Despite the abilities of both trade parties to 
manipulate their institutional knowledge to their best advantage, the illustrations of trade 
negotiations above indicate a regular pattern in the distribution of goods involved in each 
“package” or “bundle” of trade goods exchanged. Joseph Miller suggests that the “assortment” of 
these bundles was dictated by the African consumers and that offering the appropriate 
assortment was integral to successful trading transactions. 7 
In Illustrations 2 & 3, above, I have included two samples of trade transactions to establish the 
variables involved in each exchange of a bundle for one or more slaves. In both sets of 
transactions the sample is taken from the first day of trade and thus the quality of slaves and 
variety of European merchandise should both be relatively good. Presumably, having chosen one 
year from which to examine these transactions will control for the influence of both African and 
European political events as well as the relative fluctuations in market demands. Thus, from these 
transactions we can make the following assumptions about an average bundle circa 1750. 
First, each transaction contained at least one barrel of gunpowder (each barrel containing eight 
pounds of gunpowder) and one firearm (referred to by Jacobse as a soldier’s gun). In each case, 
the barrels of gunpowder were valued at one barrel to one piece, and each gun was obtained in 
the Netherlands for four gilders. This suggests that there was little flexibility for European profit on 
these goods, as the cost and the exchange rate remained fairly stable. In contrast, while guns were 
equally valued at one gun to one piece, Jacobse reported the cost of each gun at 3,13 guilders 
whereas Mulders reported a cost of 3,9 guilders suggesting that Mulders made a marginally higher 
profit on guns. An average male slave could be purchased for 15 guns or 15 barrels of gunpowder.8 
                                                          
7 Miller, Way of Death, pp. 66-70. 
 
8 See Illustrations 4 & 5 below. 
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These items are consistently listed at the top of each list and therefore presumably the first items 
offered or requested. However, they only made up an average of 21 per cent of the value of each 
of the four trade bundles above. This finding is slightly lower than the combined figure of 23 
percent which combines Unger’s figures for guns, at 9 per cent, and gunpowder, at 14 per cent. 
The sale of guns on the Loango Coast did not seem to stem from a desire among Dutch merchants 
to arm their enemies, as Postma suggested was the case on the Gold and Slave Coasts.9 On the 
Loango Coast there is little evidence of armed forces above 200 men, yet each slaving ship 
delivered an approximate ration of one gun and one to two barrels of gunpowder per slave 
purchased.10 This raises the question, why did Loango Coast merchants want guns? Miller argues 
that one of the driving forces behind the composition of a bundle on the West Central African 
Coast was the demand for assorted goods at Malebo Pool (also known as Stanley Pool). 11 Miller, 
Newson, and Minchin emphasize the continued reluctance of the Portuguese to trade guns and 
gunpowder to African merchants.12 With limited supply of munitions available at the trade port of 
Luanda and the perpetual conflict in the interior of Angola, this may have stimulated some of the 
demand for guns on the Loango Coast which found their way into Angola markets.13 In addition to 
war, Alpern suggested several non-war-related motivations for purchasing firearms including 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 92. 
 
10 See Chapter 4 regarding army size. 
 
11 Miller, Way of Death, p.180. 
 
12 In the 1770s, the sale of gunpowder was banned in Luanda to protect the local Luso-African merchants 
from attacks from the interior, Ibid., p. 607. This is consistent with reports that the Portuguese were 
reluctant to sell firearms to their African trading partners in the earlier centuries of trade. See: Linda A. 
Newson and Susie Minchin, From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in 
the Early Seventeenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2007) p. 45. 
 
13Miller, Way of Death, p. 77. For a description of conflicts in Angola in the eighteenth century see: 
Thornton, Warfare in Africa, pp. 122-124. 
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hunting, protection from wild animals, noise making, as well as projecting an image of prestige and 
power. 14  
The second set of items to appear is textiles. While at least nine different varieties of cloth appear 
in these lists, Blue Guinea, Tapsiels, and Company Nicanes are the only varieties traded in both 
sets of documents. As with the guns, Blue Guinea cloth is valued differently between Jacobse at 
11,6 guilders per cloth and Mulders at 11,5 guilders per cloth, while both are valued consistently 
at one cloth for three pieces. For Tapsiels, Jacobse reports a cost of 9,10 guilders per cloth and 
Mulders reports a cost of 9 guilders per cloth, while Tapsiels consistently traded on at Malemba 
for one cloth for two pieces. Company Nicanes cost Jacobse 6,5 while Mulders paid 6,7½. Again, 
value was more consistent at the Malemba market where Company Nicanes was exchanged in 
both cases at one cloth for two pieces. In this sample of transactions, textiles represent 64 per 
cent of the average bundle. This is approximately eight per cent higher than Unger’s findings. This 
concurs with Jan Gewald’s findings that the proportion of textiles was higher in bundles 
negotiated on the Loango Coast. 
This dominance of textiles in trade bundles is consistent with broader patterns throughout 
Western Africa. Drawing upon English, Dutch, and French sources, Marion Johnson described the 
importance of textiles: “The item imported into Africa most regularly and in the largest quantities 
was cloth in various forms.”15In Linda Newson and Susie Michin’s study of seventeenth century 
trade on the Upper Guinea Coast, they also suggested that cloth was the primary trade 
commodity. They calculated that cloth made up 40 per cent of the cargo for slave ships between 
1617 and 1618. However, it is difficult to know how this compares to the percentages of bundles 
discussed above. Stanley Alpern provides an extensive, but by no means exhaustive, list of 
European, Indian, and African textiles and clothing items that were included in slaving ships’ 
                                                          
14 Stanley E. Alpern, “What Africans Got for Their Slaves: A Master List of European Trade Goods” History in 
Africa, Vol. 22 (1995) pp. 20-21. 
 
15 Marion Johnson, “The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Economy of West Africa” in Roger Anstey and Paul E. 
H. Hair (eds) Liverpool, the African Slave Trade, and Abolition (Bristol: Historical Society of Lancashire and 
Cheshire, Occasional Series Vol. 2, 1976) p.16. 
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cargos in his articles “What Africans Got for Their Slaves: A Master List of European Trade 
Goods.”16 
The dominance of cloth as an import good into the Loango Coast might be surprising given the 
availability of high quality locally produced cloth. In the early sixteenth century, Andrew Battell 
observed the production of palm cloth, or raphia cloth, on the Loango Coast. He observed: “The 
men in this kingdom make good store of palm-cloth of sundry sorts, very fine and curious.”17 This 
cloth industry supported not only the local market but also markets as far away as Luanda where 
pieces of Loango textiles were used as currency (see the discussion on cloth as currency above).18 
However, European and Indian textiles found a ready market on the Loango Coast. Colleen Kriger, 
in Cloth in West African History, has argued that in areas such as the Guinea Coast where cloth 
production was a staple of the economy prior to European contact that: “far from being new 
trendsetters that offered long-overdue variety to a dreary local market, imported textiles were for 
the most part preselected to conform to established tastes and cultural values.”19 This pattern of 
European adaption to African demands also characterized the import industry on the Loango 
Coast. 
The analysis of slave prices provided by these data requires an understanding of Loango Coast 
currency. The cloth currency on the Loango Coast was a sophisticated currency which transformed 
to meet the demands of increasing cross cultural exchange from the earliest period of contact to 
the late eighteenth century. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Vili made cloth currencies 
called the libongos panos or panso sambes were in common circulation as far away as Luanda. 
However, the value of this currency diminished in Luanda when the Portuguese began using 
copper as currency in 1694. In Phyllis Martin’s article “Power, Cloth and Currency on the Loango 
Coast” she describes a ‘piece’: “The basic piece of cloth was used for currency, a libongo *the 
plural of libongo is mbongo], was about fourteen inches square and describes as about the size of 
                                                          
16 Alpern, “What Africans Got for Their Slaves,” pp. 6-12. 
 
17 Battell, Strange Adventures, p. 50. 
 
18Miller, Way of Death, p. 181-2, 274; Broecke, Journal, p.102. 
 
19 Kriger, Cloth in West African History, p. 39. 
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a large handkerchief.”20 Martin argued that in this early period the production of cloth was limited 
to the households of the elite in Loango, thus being a “carefully standardized” currency. 
Furthermore she suggested: “The Maloango, himself, may have been the chief guarantor of the 
currency.”21 In the seventieth and eightieth centuries, another type of cloth was in circulation on 
the Loango Coast called a macoute. This was different from the macoute used in Luanda by the 
Portuguese. Circa 1700, 350 macoute could purchase one slave. By this time a third measure of 
cloth currency came into use: the piece. This is the currency which appears alongside guilders in 
the MCC account books. A piece was a locally spun cloth measuring “six yards of material, and 
could be subdivided into four fathoms or twelve sticks.”22 In addition to being an actual cloth, a 
piece could also be a standard unit of measure to value trade goods as we see in the MCC records. 
In 1700 one piece had the same value as a gun, a barrel of gun powder, or two cutlasses.23 
A large and highly specific demand for certain European textiles developed out of a more historical 
demand for cloth on the Loango Coast not only as currency but also as a key commodity. Cloth 
was one of the oldest and most valued commodities of the Loango Coast. Understanding the 
peculiarities of the demand for cloth on the Loango Coast is fundamental to understanding the 
intersections between the Loango markets, their links to the interior, and the willingness to supply 
slaves for European consumption. Thus a more in-depth discussion on the production and social 
                                                          
20 Martin, “Power, Cloth and Currency on the Loango Coast,” p.2. 
 
21 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 38. 
 
22 Ibid., p. 107. 
 
23In his work on WIC  sources Henk den Heijer found that the Dutch also purchased cloth on the Ivory Coast 
and in Benin for resale on the Gold Coast although it is unclear whether this cloth was used as currency. See 
Henk den Heijer, “West African Trade” in Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven (eds) Riches from Atlantic 
Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Shipping, 1585-1817 (Leiden: Brill, 2003) p. 154  . For a description of the 
historiography of Cloth-Currency on the Guinea Coast of Africa see Carlos F. Liberato’s “Money, 
Cloth-Currency, Monopoly, and the Slave Trade in the Rivers of Guiné and the cape Verde Islands, 
1755-1777,” in Catherine Eagleton, Harcourt Fuller, and John Perkins (eds.) Money in Africa (British Museum 
Press, 2009) pp. 9-29. Joseph C. Miller describes the use of cloth as currency in the Angola slave trade in 
Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, pp. 81-82. Cloth was not only used as 
currency in Africa during this period. Walter Hawthorn reports that cloth currency was also used in the 
Portuguese colonies of Pará and Maranhão in Amazonia in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
See: Hawthorne, From Africa to Brazil, p. 147. For more information on the use of cloth currencies on the 
Loango Coast see: Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 36-39,60, 61, 106, 107, 165; Curto, 
Enslaving Spirits, p. 58. 
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significance of cloth in Loango society and how the influx of European cloth affected these 
traditions is needed. 
In her earlier works on Loango Coast in the seventeenth century, Martin suggests that weaving 
offered an occupation for a free man who did not have access to the wealth of the aristocracy in 
addition to the possible professions of copper smith and salt-making.24 Drawing on Portuguese 
sources, David Birmingham emphasizes the central role of cloth in the expansion of trading 
networks throughout West Central Africa: “In the early seventeenth century much of the slave 
trade was conducted in two stages. In the first stage salt and shells as well as European trinkets 
and beads were used to buy palm-cloth from the people of the forest regions to the north and 
east of Kongo. In the second stage this cloth, which was used for clothing as well as being the most 
widely accepted currency in Angola, was exchanged for slaves. Pombeiros were sent to ‘Congo de 
Batta’ (or ‘Gogon and Batta’ in Battell’s terminology) to buy the cloth. According to Pedro Sardinha 
this trade had expanded enormously in the first decade of the seventeenth century.”25 
Birmingham goes on to describe in more detail the cloth bought on the Loango Coast: “a number 
of cloths called ‘exfula’ where imported from the Loango coast. Each year two or three small 
vessels went there to fetch cargoes of six or seven thousand a piece. A rarer and more valuable 
Loango cloth was the ‘ensaca’ of which only about 300 were obtained each year, costing 1,200 reis 
apiece.” According to Birmingham ‘ensaca’ is twice as expensive as the highest grade cloth 
‘painted cloth’ which was available in Angola.26 
Martin describes the role of cloth on the Loango Coast which went far beyond a currency or basic 
clothing: “Clothing and accessories were little associated with utilitarian needs, since neither 
climate nor work conditions made them necessary. Rather, dress conveyed identity, status, values 
and a sense of occasion. The association of power and wealth, ostentatiously displayed, was 
                                                          
 
24 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 27-28. 
 
25 Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola,  p. 79. 
 
26 Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, p. 79. Also see Battell, Strange Adventures, pp. 43-44. 
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deeply entrenched in equatorial African societies from the earliest times.”27 She goes on to 
suggest that certain types of cloths could be worn only with permission of the ruler.28 These laws 
are reminiscent of similar European sumptuary laws which forbade peasants to wear brightly 
coloured clothing or that governed the size of a ruff in correspondence to wealth and political 
position. Interestingly, while the people of the Loango Coast only allowed certain powerful 
members of society to wear specific types of high quality, locally produced cloth, they also 
developed somewhat contrary laws in regards to the consumption and display of European 
textiles. Thus, European textiles, and later Asian textiles imported by Europeans, added complexity 
and texture to a thriving textile trade on the Loango Coast. These imported textiles would have 
had to be competitive with the internal textile market by offering superior prices, quality, or 
variety. 
Just as the production of superior quality of cloth offered significant economic potential within 
Loango Coast markets and in external trade, so did the importation of European cloths.  The 
scarcity of European and East Indian cloth on the Loango Coast in the seventeenth century meant 
that it had more prestige value. The prestige associated with cloth resulted in constant demand for 
new varieties to distinguish the wealthiest members of society. As the profits of merchants rose, 
the wealth of the traditional rulers remained fairly constant. Thus, shifting cloth preferences came 
to symbolize the shifting power base on the Loango Coast which is described in the previous 
chapter.29 
The third set of items to appear is alcohol. Alcohol is measured in two ways: by “kelder” and by 
“anker”. As malt is the only type of alcohol explicitly mentioned, calculations are made assuming 
both measures kelders and ankers refer to malt in these documents. Jacobse paid higher prices for 
both kelders and half ankers, spending 3 and 4,10 guilders respectively while Mulders paid 2,15 
                                                          
27 Phyllis M. Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville” The Journal of African History, Vol. 35, No. 3. 
(1994) p. 401. 
 
28 Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville,” pp. 402-3. Also see Battell, Strange Adventures; Brun, 
Schiffarten; Dapper, Naukerige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten. 
 
29 See Martin, “Contesting Clothes in Colonial Brazzaville,” pp. 403-404; and Martin, “Family Strategies in 
Nineteenth-Century Cabinda.” 
 
195 
 
and 4,4 respectively. Alcohol represented seven per cent of the merchandise in these bundles. 
This is three per cent less alcohol than Unger finds for the MCC in Western Africa. This could 
suggest either that the demand for alcohol was slightly lower than the West African Coast, or that 
these bundles under-represent the total demand for alcohol on the Loango Coast. In contrast to 
these figures, José Curto has calculated that of the 1.2 million slaves shipped from Angola between 
1710 and 1830, almost 300,000 were purchased using Brazilian alcohol. 30 This works out as 25 per 
cent of each bundle. This is substantially higher than either Unger’s calculations for MCC trade in 
Western Africa and the sample given in this chapter. Furthermore, Miller concluded: “British 
muskets and French brandies off-loaded at Loango only partially satisfied hunters and chiefs in the 
interior near that part of the coast; buyers there also demanded secondary contacts with traders 
who could deliver Portuguese gunpowder and Brazilian rum from Luanda or Benguela.”31 José 
Curto has argued that within a West Central African context, alcohol played both a practical role, 
being consumed with meals, and a social role, being present at “occasions, social gatherings, 
commercial transactions, feasts, marriages, rituals, ancestor worship, and possibly even the 
display of the rulers’ power.”32 Thus, it is unlikely that there was less demand for alcohol on the 
Loango Coast. If indeed alcohol was a less important part of a bundle on the Loango Coast than 
elsewhere, the extraordinary amount of cheap alcohol available through Luanda trade networks 
may have been part of the cause. 
The final products to be listed in the MCC transactions include pots and basins. These appear only 
in Jacobse’s transactions, suggesting that Jacobse provided a more diverse set of trade goods than 
Mulders. Perhaps this can be attributed in part to Jacobse’s greater experience trading on the 
Loango Coast.33 As not only the captain, but also as the chief factor, an MCC captain was 
responsible for overseeing the complete provisioning of the voyage.34 Numerous bills of sale for 
                                                          
30 Curto, Enslaving Spirits, p. 129. 
 
31 Miller, Way of Death, p. 78. 
 
32 Curto, Enslaving Spirits, p. 40. 
 
33 Jacobse had already made a voyage to the Loango Coast in 1756, see http://www.slavevoyages.org 
Voyage ID 10958. 
 
34 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 150. 
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provisions purchased in the Netherlands are kept in each MCC ship’s records. Each bill is endorsed 
by the captain or his representative. Two items conspicuously absent from the MCC records for 
the ships trading in Loango are cowry shells and beads which were in high demand in the Niger 
Delta, Gambia and the Gold Coast and cowry shells which were in high demand in Angola.35 
By comparing the common elements of these four transactions we can draw the following 
conclusions. First and foremost, Mulder was more successful than Jacobse at obtaining the best 
prices on trade stuffs in the Netherlands, paying a rate equal to or below Jacobse price on seven of 
eight items listed (see Illustration 4 below.) Second, prices of good fluctuated more in the 
Netherlands during the provisioning of these two ships than on the Loango Coast, where exchange 
between these two voyages remained steady. This would suggest more state control in the 
markets of the Loango Coast, and more flexibility to individual traders in the Netherlands during 
the same period. Third, by comparing the exchange values of guilders to pieces on eight key trade 
commodities, we can calculate a rough exchange rate of 3,15 Dutch guilders to one Loango piece 
in 1759. Four, textiles were clearly the most valued commodity on the Loango Coast contributing 
to 64 per cent of the four bundles listed below, weapons following at a distant 21 per cent, and 
alcohol and sundries contributing seven and eight per cent respectively (see Illustration 5 below). 
Illustration 4: A Comparison of Trade Goods 
Source: These figures are calculated using Illustrations 2 & 3. 
                                                          
35 For more information on the demand for beads and cowry shells, see:  Johnson, “The Atlantic Slave Trade 
and the Economy of West Africa” pp. 17,18, & 20;  Curtin,  Economic Change in Precolonial Africa, pp. 
238,240, 242, 246, 252, 258, 263, 312-319 & 326; Miller, Way of Death, 77, 78, 86, 183; 
 Gilders/ 
Jacobse 
Gilders/ 
Mulders 
AVG 
Gilders 
Quantity Piece Exchange Value 
for a 15 piece 
Male Slave 
Gilders/  
Piece 
Gunpowder 4.00 4.00 4.00 1 1 15.0 4.00 
Gun  3.65 3.45 3.55 1 1 15.0 3.55 
Blue Guinea 11.30 11.25 11.28 1 3 5.0 3.76 
Tapsiels 9.50 9.00 9.25 1 2 7.5 4.63 
Company 
Nicanes  
6.25 6.38 6.31 1 2 7.5 3.16 
Kelder 3.00 2.75 2.88 1 1 15.0 2.88 
Half Anker 4.50 4.20 4.35 1 1 15.0 4.35 
   
AVG Exchange: 3.76 
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Illustration 5: Distribution of Goods in Bundles Sorted by Piece Values 
 
Transaction No. 1 2 3 4 Totals Percentage 
Weapons 5 4 9 3 21.0 21.4% 
Textiles 15.5 8.5 30 8.5 62.5 63.8% 
Alcohol 2 2 2 1 7.0 7.1% 
Sundries 1 1 3 2.5 7.5 7.7% 
 
Source: These figures are calculated using Illustrations 2 & 3. 
 
To measure changes in bundles over time, Mary Henrietta Kingsley offers a point of comparison. 
She identified three types of trade goods that were in demand on the Loango Coast in her 1883 
book West African Studies. Here she describes broad patterns for the demand for trade goods at 
“Congo and Cabenda” in 1700. First and foremost, she lists textiles: Blue bafts, Guinea stuffs, 
Tapseils, Nicanees, Black bays, Annabasses, Painted callicoes, Blue paper Slesia, Scarlet, 
Pentadoes, Blue perpetuanas; second, she lists weapons: Muskets, Powder (in seven pound 
barrels), and Dutch cutlasses; and third, she list miscellaneous goods: Brass basins, Pewter basins 
of four, three, two and one pounds, and Coral.36 Almost 60 years later Mulders and Jacobse list 
similar items in their trade receipts with Merchant Banse, Jan Flink, Mafoeke, and Jan Klaasen. 
Several consistencies appear between Kingsley’s list from 1700 and the 1759 MCC trading receipts. 
In both cases gunpowder, guns, textiles, and basins rank among items of value on the Loango 
Coast. However, we find a slight change in the price of gunpowder. Whereas Europeans could 
trade seven pounds at the value of one piece in 1700, by 1759 the ratio was eight pounds of 
powder to one piece. It is more difficult to judge the change in textile prices as Kingsley specifies 
the measure of cloth that is exchangeable for a piece whereas Mulders and Jacobse do not include 
a measure. The exchange of one gun for one piece seems to remain consistent. Thus by comparing 
the MCC transaction records of 1759 to Kinsley’s reports we can conclude, over a 60 year period 
demand for cloths such as Guinea stuffs, Tapseils, and Nicanees remained in high demand on the 
Loango Coast, as did demand for guns and gunpowder, though the value of gunpowder diminished 
slightly over this time period. 
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In Phillip Unger’s analysis of the MCC slave trading records for the Western African Coast, he 
provided a breakdown of key commodities present in an average bundle. Based on his data, 
textiles were most important making up an average of 57 per cent of each bundle, gunpowder 
represented the next largest demand making up approximately 14 per cent of each bundle, 
alcohol accounted of 10 per cent, and guns and luxury goods accounted for nine per cent each.37 
While Unger’s analysis included data from the West and West Central African Coasts, Postma 
suggested that the proportion of textiles were higher in bundles traded on the Loango Coast. 
Postma qualifies this statement, acknowledging a small sample which Jan Gewald used to calculate 
these figures.38 
Caravans 
In examining supply chains in the transatlantic slave trade from the Loango Coast, it is import to 
remember two things: first and foremost, this is a trade developed, controlled, and at least to 
some extent financed by African traders. There is no evidence of European middle men operating 
in these supply chains; indeed, there are no African middlemen in the sense of Africans working at 
the behest of Europeans but only African agents and traders. Second, these trade networks were 
not formed by the demand for slaves but rather through the demand for copper and ivory. In 
describing the procurement for slaves who were sold at the Loango Coast, Martin asserts: 
Unlike some other African kingdoms such as Dahomey, Loango had had a 
previous and long-established prosperity based not on the slave trade, but on a 
long-distance trade in copper and ivory. Thus, for the Vili, it was perhaps easier 
to obtain slaves through traditional trading methods rather than by other 
means [such as waging war or as a sentence for committing a crime].39 
                                                          
37 W. S. Unger, “Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel II,” p. 68. 
 
38 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 105. 
 
39 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, p. 118. 
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Although Martin acknowledges the limitations of the sources on the supply routes running from 
the Loango Coast to slave markets in the interior, 40 she is confident that many of the caravan 
leaders originated in the Loango Coast.41 It is very possible that this absence of information on 
slave caravans to the Loango Coast can be directly linked to European detachment from the 
process. This detachment could have sprung from an active policy among the Vili to protect their 
dominance of the trade, or it could have simply been a byproduct of the impermanent presence of 
Europeans on the coast. 
Due to this relative lack of European involvement in slave procurement on the Loango Coast, very 
little work has been done on the topic. Jan Vansina’s work remains one of the most substantial 
contributions to our understanding of these networks. In his 1962 article “Long-Distance 
Trade-Routes in Central Africa,’’ he begins by dividing “the structure of indigenous trade in Central 
Africa” into three different categories: 
1) Local trade: “trade from village to village within a given population” which is 
based on local resources and skills 
2) Trade between ‘chiefdoms’: “conducted over greater distances either between 
culturally different peoples within a state, or between neighbouring peoples” 
which involves the trade of locally produced items in exchange for 
long-distance trade items such as European imports, salt, copper, and luxury 
goods which have passed through many hands. 
3) Direct trade over long distances: “consisted mainly of the exchange of 
European goods-such as cloth, cowries, beads, fire-arms, powder, wine and, in 
some instances, iron or copper objects for slaves, ivory and copper, and , in the 
later seventeenth century, wax, and in the late nineteenth century, rubber.” 42 
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42 Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa,” pp. 376-77. 
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In terms of local trade networks on the Loango Coast, Vansina traces the Loango Bay trade of 
ivory, redwood, and oyster with Mayumba, and an ivory and redwood trade with Sete Cama. More 
likely in the trade between ‘chiefdoms’ was the trading networks established via the Portuguese 
with communities further afield: 
Moreover the Portuguese had established a regional network between San 
Tome, Benin, Calabar, and the Rio del Rey, Loango and Pinda and Luanda. From 
Loango they exported to Luanda, elephants’ hair, redwood, and raphia cloth. 
This raphia cloth was also used as currency in Angola. Copper from Loango and 
Pinda was exported to Luanda and turned into manilas which were exported to 
Benin, Calabar, and the Rio del Rey, where blue cloth would be bought to be 
sold again in Loango and Pinda.43  
However, for the purposes of this chapter it is the last category, direct trade over long distances, in 
which we are most interested. In Joseph Miller’s 1989 article “The Numbers, Origins, and 
Destinations of Slaves in the Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade,” he suggest there were 
three long distance commercial networks in West Central Africa: “The same African suppliers who 
sent slaves toward Luanda also sold captives to both of the competing trading networks, one to 
the north that reached the Atlantic bays along the Loango Coast and beyond the mouth of the 
Zaire River and a southern one at the Portuguese town of Benguela.”44 Miller insists that these 
were “distinct commercial networks.”45 These networks drew slaves from regions of dense 
population around the Kwanza River, the Kwango Valley, the Kunene River, and even as far away 
as the Kasai River; whereas the Zambezi River, the Kubango River, and the Kunene River 
specifically served only the southern network. Likewise, slaves originating in regions north of the 
Congo River were sold exclusively through what Miller describes as the northern network. In 
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addition to these trading networks, Eugenia W. Herbert identifies trading routes between Loango 
and Mindouli (east of Loango, across the Niari River).46 
Vansina explains the logistics involved in organizing this sort of long distance trading route: “The 
trade was conducted by caravans, and currencies, standards of value, and means of payment for 
services were extensively used.”Vansina refers to the provisioning centres as ‘stables’ where 
caravans were outfitted and the bulk of goods and slaves were stored.  For the Loango Coast 
trade, the ports of Loango, Malemba, and Cabinda served as both the markets of cross-cultural 
exchange and stables which sent caravans into the interior.47 The exceptional nature in terms of 
proximity of African rulers to “stables” and the outfitting of long distance caravans by African 
merchants delayed the permanent settlement of European factories on this part of the western 
African coast as African not European traders directed the trade and controlled the physical area 
up until the time of colonialization. 
After 1700 escalating conflicts in the hinterland of the Loango Coast radically increased the supply 
of slaves to Cabinda, Malemba, and possibly even Loango. This influx of slaves was timed perfectly 
to meet a sharp increase in demand driven the the appearance of French traders on the coast. 
Vansina suggests that it was in this context that the Vili began to expand their trading routes 
further into central Kongo: 
There they would meet the Hum, who organized the trade from the Pool to this 
area. The other major trade route from the old kingdom of Okango or Kwango – 
which had been destroyed, also around 1700, and replaced by the kingdom of 
Yaka – had been taken over by the Zombo, who exported either to the harbors 
of the north [the Loango Coast] or via the Loje valley to Ambriz. 48 
As early as 1550 Vansina suggests that the Hum were trading slaves, who he identifies as “the Teke 
and prisoners-of-war originating from countries beyond the Teke kingdom, far to the north or the 
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north-west of the Pool.”49 However, it is unlikely that many of the slaves from this period left for 
the Americas through the Loango Coast ports as the slave trade on the Loango Coast did not really 
begin to take off until the end of the seventeenth century: 
By 1580 the caravans were also bringing ivory and raphia cloth from the Teke at 
the Pool in exchange for salt, which came from salt-pans in Ambriz and Pinda, 
nzimbu shells, and probably cowries. Nzimbu shells were used as currency in the 
kingdom of Kongo and in most of the areas lying to the east of it, whilst raphia 
cloth was the unit of currency in Angola.50 
It is odd that Angola and Loango should rely upon raphia cloth as their currency during this period, 
while Kongo, which was situated between the two, should rely upon nzimbu shells. Perhaps raphia 
cloth was the form of currency on this whole stretch of coast prior to extensive trade to the east, 
as these nzimbu shells most definitely came from the east. Then it is possible that European trade 
interrupted this transition and reinforced the cloth currency in some ports where cloth imports 
supported an internal production network whereas in other ports, such as Ambriz where there 
was not a local cloth industry, European trade strengthened an inclination towards nzimbu shells. 
Vansina writes of the trade on the Loango coast: “The trade was almost entirely in the hands of 
the Vili, the people of Loango, who manned the caravans and directed them. The few Portuguese 
traders used to send their pombeiros inland. The main trade-route went from Loango to Stanley 
Pool, to the Teke town of Monsol. The Teke exported slaves and ivory. Copper came from the 
Mindouli mines, which first belonged to the Teke and were taken later by Kongo from Nsundi, and 
north-east of Mayumba, where pygmies hunted it.” 51 In his 1974 analysis of the Niger River Basin, 
Thurstan Shaw suggested the possibility that Vili copper may have made it all the way to the Niger 
                                                          
49 Ibid., The Pool refers to Pool Malebo, which was formerly Stanley Pool; it is also known as Malebo Pool, or 
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50 Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes,” p. 378. 
 
51 Vansina describes pombeiro as follows: “Pombeiro come from Mpumbu, the name applied by the Kongo 
to Stanley Pool. The name is derived in the Kongo from the Kikongo name for the Hum or Wumbu, living on 
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then that the trade had been in existence for some time and that the caravans were frequent.” Ibid. 
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River Basin before the European arrival on the coast.52 Vansina continues: “The Vili brought 
European goods and salt inland as well as big iron knives which they bought in Mayumbe to sell 
them to the Jaga just east of that area. The slaves were used as carriers and thus the 
entrepreneurs did not have to pay for the carriage of copper and ivory.”53 Although the evidence 
of a Portuguese presence on the Loango Coast prior to 1810 is scarce or non-existent, it is possible 
that Vansina is drawing his evidence from a later time period.  
Vansina traces the main caravan route from the Loango Coast along the north side of the river 
though Kwilu Nyari to Kimbede and finally to Stanley Pool. Here, he suggests, the Vili caravans 
could purchase Teke, Hum, and Bobangi slaves in circa 1787, thus drawing slaves from as far as the 
“lower reaches of the Ubanghi River.”54 Goods traded by the Vili at the Pool could easily be 
purchased by traders from Luanda. In describing demand for European goods in Luanda, Vansina 
argues that other European goods were “cheaper and better quality” than Portuguese goods.55 
José Curto reinforced this argument in his study on the importance of alcohol to the Luanda slave 
market: “Without *cheap Brazilian alcohol+, the Luso-Brazilian slave traders based at Luanda were 
unable to have their caravan leaders attract the business of African slave suppliers who would 
otherwise illegally seek better quality and lower priced goods provided by their English and French 
competitors.”56 This reinforces the idea that by the 1800s the Portuguese dominated the 
Kongo/Angola trade by military force not through superior economic bargaining. However, in 
Loango the political center was much closer to the coast and Europeans were not allowed to build 
permanent trading post or military post, nor were they able to procure caravans or actively 
participated in trade with the interior. Here the Vili peoples were more discriminating of European 
goods and drove a harder bargain. 
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Despite his extensive coverage of what he describes as two parallel and intersecting phenomenon 
of European demand for slaves and a changing value system in the Kongo River basin which 
promoted the enslavement of large groups of people, Vansina stop short of suggesting a causal 
link. Nor does he argue that the European trade had a significant demographic impact on Central 
Africa. His analysis is more interested in the growing connectedness of West Central Africa, 
describing it at the end of the nineteenth century as “covered by a web of regional trade 
systems.”57 In addition to the Loango Region’s links to the vast slave trade markets south of the 
Congo River, the Atlantic slave trading markets of Loango, Cabinda, and Malemba also engaged in 
slave procurement in markets to the east of the Loango Coast.58 
One major piece of the puzzle of the Loango caravan which is missing is the time it would take for 
the caravan to complete a round trip. However, Andrew Battell’s Strange Adventures estimate a 
shorter trade route between Loango Bay and Cango which Battell suggests takes a 14 day journey. 
Ravenstein, Battell’s editor, provides a map at the end of the volume. Ravenstein’s map suggests 
that Cango was a community to the north east of Loango Bay. Phyllis Martin corroborates this 
location.59 If Ravenstein’s estimations about the location of Cango are correct, the direct distance 
between the two places is approximately 90 direct miles (as opposed to the actual distance 
travelled).60 The actual route was presumably longer as it would follow local paths, roads, and river 
crossings as well as detour around obstacles of a geographical or political nature. If this route 
indeed took 14 days to travel, a caravan could expect to cover approximately 6.5 direct miles a 
day. Now, by the same map, Loango Bay is approximately 240 direct miles from Malebo Pool 
*Stanley Pool+. In William J. Samarin’s 1985 book chapter “The State’s Bakongo’s Burden Bearers,” 
he provides a map tracing nineteenth century caravan routes from Loango, directly east over land 
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58 Miller, “The Numbers, Origins, and Destinations of Slaves,” p. 383. 
 
59 See “Map 2. Loango and its neighbours in the seventeenth century” in Martin, The External Trade of the 
Loango Coast, p. 12. 
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through Ludima and Boanza to Brazzaville on the western side of Malebo Pool.61 This journey is 
likely similar to the journey plotted by caravans in the eighteenth century. If the obstacles are 
comparable to the trip to Cango, a one way trip to Malebo Pool would have taken approximately 
37 days. Return travel to the Pool and back would have taken almost two and a half months. If this 
is the main caravan route to collect slaves, as Vansina suggests, it would be difficult to procure 
slaves in less than three months assuming that the actual transactions and provisioning of the 
caravan would also take some time. 
In the Congo River basin where the food staple was cassava, Robert Harms estimated that 
preparing enough food to provision a long distance trade expedition in the late nineteenth century 
could take several days.62 Just as voyages from Europe had to consider harvest times and the 
availability of food stuffs in provisioning their long distance trade ventures, caravans from the 
Loango Coast likely travelled most often when foodstuffs were in good supply. Cassava was 
harvested in the Congo River basin at the end of the wet season and prepared for consumption in 
the early dry season.63 Thus, caravans leaving the Loango Coast in April/May would have found it 
easiest to procure adequate foodstuffs to provision a caravan quickly. In Chapter 3 we found that 
ships arriving on the Loango Coast between September and October were able to find a cargo 
most quickly. If caravans were influenced by the supply of foodstuffs on the Loango Coast and set 
out for the slave markets of interior in April/May this may account for the low number of ships on 
the coast during these months. If caravans returned approximately four months, allowing for 
travel, trade, and a return journey, caravans would have begun to return in August/September. 
However, this cycle of supply and demand does not allow for European investment. This suggests 
that caravans set out on speculation, hoping for the arrival of European slaving ships. 
This brings us back to the issue of credit: if indeed Europeans were financing these slaving 
expeditions, the negotiation of credit would presumably also take some time. The two voyages 
mentioned above are able to procure between 424 and 474 slaves in two months’ time, even 
                                                          
61 See Map 12.1 in William J. Samarin, “The State’s Bakongo Burden Bearers,” in Catherine 
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given the rough and speculative nature of the time taken to travel this distance, it seems highly 
unlikely that European credit could have resulted in such speedy provision of slaves, at least not 
from the Malebo Pool. It is also unlikely that one caravan could procure as many as 474 slaves, 
thus multiple caravans would have to be outfitted. Furthermore, Chapter 4 previously suggested 
that 75 percent of merchants trading with the MCC over a 27 year period traded less than 10 
slaves, with the average procurement rate of 2.8 slaves per year. It is improbable that European 
traders would have financed such minor transactions. Furthermore, the absence of permanent 
MCC agents on the Loango Coast, as outlined in Chapter 3, eliminates the possibility of longer 
term credit arrangements outside of the shipboard documentation. These factors, combined with 
the absence of evidence of credit the MCC data and James Fraser’s testimony that he engaged 
barter to procure slaves (as discussed in Chapter 2), suggest that previous authors have 
overestimated the use of European credit to procure slaves on the Loango Coast. 
Conclusion 
This chapter expands upon the themes of barriers, trust, and knowledge accumulation which 
appear throughout this thesis. By the eighteenth century, English, French and Dutch merchant 
ships had established a pattern of trade with the people of the Loango Coast which both facilitated 
trade while balancing the conflicting objectives of each party. Solutions to these conflicts ranged 
from the exclusion of permanent factories, to the construction of barriers between local 
communities and cross-cultural trading spaces, to the fixing of slave prices. Over time, trading 
practices were streamlined to accommodate growing trade. While the Maloango was able to 
regulate the trade himself in the early seventeenth century, making negotiations and granting 
trade permissions, bye the eighteenth century the increased volume of trade required more 
complicated systems. Thus a set of conventions evolved which included the firing of cannons to 
open negotiations and the appointment of Mambouks and Mafouks to represent local rulers. Most 
important to the negotiations was the establishment and maintenance of trust. While some 
authors have suggested that the supply of European credit for the facilitation of trade was at the 
heart of this issue of trust, this chapter suggests a different perspective. This chapter has argued 
that while some Europeans may have offered credit to facilitate slave trading transactions, this 
does not appear to have been central to the slave supply chains of the eighteenth century slave 
trade on the Loango Coast. Instead, the slave trade at the Loango Coast was dominated by barter 
transactions within an organized market system. However, further research is required to 
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establish how the provisioning of the caravans to the interior occurred. It is clear that Loango 
Coast merchants were able to procure substantial numbers of slaves and to provide these slaves in 
increasing quantities and at reasonable prices. In return, their European trading partners were 
expected to continue to provide Loango Coast merchants with high quality trade goods. When 
Europeans did not appear, large number of slaves continued to accumulate on the Loango Coast 
further reinforcing the evidence in this chapter that African merchants provided the majority of 
capital for the slave caravans.64 
The successful trade between European and Loango Coast merchants was driven by the ability of 
both partners to supply the other’s demands. From the European perspective, this required a 
slightly different approach in each different trading region. In an examination of the bundles 
exchanged for slaves in the day to day transactions of the Loango Coast slave trade, three key 
categories of trade goods emerge: guns, textiles, and alcohol. The demand for guns on the Loango 
Coast, though slightly lower than other regions, was still substantial at a ratio of one gun per slave. 
This demand for weapons in a relatively peaceful region suggests that guns were valued beyond 
their utility in war for their resale value in the interior, their utility in hunting and protection from 
wild animals, their utility as noisemakers, and their significance as prestige signifiers. While the 
broad patterns of bundles traded on the Western African Coast included a large percentage of 
textiles, the popularity of textiles was most pronounced on the Loango Coast. For alcohol, the 
demand on the Loango Coast was relatively low compared to the other ports of the transatlantic 
slave trade. This may be explained in part by the incredibly high imports of cheap Brazilian alcohol 
in Luanda. This would have diminished the demand in the Congo River basin for more expensive 
Dutch, English, and French alcohol supplied through the Loango Coast. These goods were traded in 
exchange for slaves, driven by an ever increasing demand by Europeans. Expanding upon trade 
routes which were developed in the sixteenth century or before, European guns, textiles and 
alcohol gradually begin to supplement and perhaps at times even to surpass demand for local 
production of salt, raphia cloth, and copper which were traditional monopolies of the Loango 
Coast that were dispersed by caravan traders. 
                                                          
64 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 90, 139-140. 
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Although the Loango Coast developed different patterns of consumption and trade regulation, it 
shared substantial sources of slaves with the Angola Coast markets, while also importing small 
numbers of slaves from the northern and eastern regions. Yet Loango traders are able to supply 
trade goods of greater quality and variety than those offered by traders from the closer port of 
Luanda. The strategy of traders on the Loango Coast in trading with all Europeans is therefore 
consistent with their desire to obtain the best quality goods. One key to this superior supply is 
firearms. In maintaining their relationships with Europeans as trade partners rather than military 
competitors, as happens in Kongo, Angola, and Benguela, the sale of firearms posed no significant 
risk to European traders. Equally, by keeping competition open, Europeans were encouraged to 
compete with each other driving up the price of slaves while also keeping the quality of goods 
higher. Thus the Dutch, English, and French goods supplied to Loango Coast traders offer 
something unique at the internal markets, which in turn justify longer and more costly caravans. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
Stretching from 1514 to 1865, cross-cultural trade on the Loango Coast represents the longest 
recorded period of slave supply into the transatlantic slave trade.1 During this era, slave trading 
underwent a series of economic and technological transformations which evolved through 
continual contact between the four continents of the Atlantic world. Using slave trading 
negotiations to measure the tempo of change, this thesis has used the case study of the Loango 
Coast in the eighteenth century to explore the culture of exchange which evolved in the Atlantic 
and more specifically the Western African world. Within this context, the Loango Coast was a 
key contributor to the Atlantic and African commercial spheres in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. This thesis has argued that the Loango Coast emerges as a distinct 
geographic and political region; and therefore the category of West Central Africa is better 
understood as two economic spheres by analysing patterns of trade. 
The Loango Coast emerged as a major supplier of slaves to the Atlantic market in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. During this period raw data from the Voyages Database indicate at 
least one million enslaved Africans left the Loango Coast ports of Loango Bay, Malemba, and 
Cabinda, making the Loango Coast the fourth largest supplier in the transatlantic slave trade.2 In 
return these merchant communities received substantial quantities of textiles, weapons, 
alcohol, and various other European and East Indian trade goods linking the Loango Coast not 
only into the Atlantic trading networks but also into the textile trading networks, which linked 
the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. Although the traders of the Loango Coast engaged in substantial 
internal trading networks which spanned from Angola to Gabon and perhaps even as far as the 
Niger River, this new explosion of “external trade” in the eighteenth century led to increased 
intercultural contact and the consolidation of a socioeconomic system which allowed the 
smooth transactions of goods for persons on the Loango Coast. 
                                                          
1 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces Query: Principal place of slave purchase – West 
Central Africa. Accessed on 23 May 2010. 
 
2 See Chapter 1, Table 3 for a breakdown of the raw data from the Voyages Database. 
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In an attempt to better understand these transformations, this thesis has begun to address the 
question of what cross-cultural exchange looked like on the Loango Coast in the eighteenth 
century. In doing so, it has developed three major themes around the topic of cross-cultural 
exchange: neutrality, institutionalization, and insulation First, the theme of neutrality reflects 
the status of the Loango coast as a region defined by an open trade policy. This policy was 
maintained despite the transformation of political authority in the eighteenth century, thereby 
differentiating Loango from the turbulent Angola coast to the south. Second, the theme of 
institutionalization encapsulates the evolution of mechanisms, European, African, and 
cross-cultural, which facilitated and defined trade on the Loango Coast. Finally, the theme of 
insulation exemplifies the effects of these mechanisms on the Loango Coast, contrasting the 
Loango Coast with other key regions of transatlantic slave trade supply. Using these themes, this 
chapter organizes the conclusions of this thesis, thereby resituating the Loango Coast in the 
West Central African Coast and the Atlantic World. 
Political Stability and Economic Neutrality on the Loango Coast 
This thesis has established that the Loango Coast was a politically stable and economically open 
trade region from the point of first contact until the end of the eighteenth century. It had 
recognisable market institutions and legal systems in addition to viable resources which were 
available to any nation who respected local conventions. This argument was laid out primarily in 
the first chapter, which explored European engagement on the Loango Coast using the Voyages 
Database and is supplemented by the argument about the nature of cross-cultural exchange in 
Chapter 2, the explanation of the political organization of the Loango Coast in Chapter 4 and the 
discussion about slaving hinterlands in Chapter 5. Although European levels of engagement sit at 
the heart of this argument, they do not define the pattern of trade. Rather it is the local political 
conditions as defined by the Vili, and later by the Kotchi and the Woyo, which established and 
reinforced a firm policy of open trade while simultaneously maintaining peaceful relations 
throughout the region and facilitating the steady trade of slaves on the Loango Coast.  
Patterns of trade on the Loango Coast have been explained by contrasting the centralized 
polities and relatively peaceful relations between these polities on the Loango Coast with the 
fragmented and warring polities of the Angola Coast. This thesis has argued that establishing 
neutrality on the Loango Coast was essential to its success as a trading region. The Loango Coast 
provided both the stability required for long-distance caravan supply routes and the steady 
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demands of multiple European trading partners. While the Loango Coast is commonly lumped 
with the Angola Coast into the more general region of West Central Africa, this categorization 
can be misleading. Upon the arrival of the first Europeans to the Congo River, the peoples of the 
Loango Coast were politically distinct from the Kongo and Ngola peoples to the south of the 
Congo River. Nevertheless these groups were linked by a common cosmological framework with 
regional variations. Equally, commonalities in language and culture facilitated extensive trading 
networks bridging the Congo River. However, the relatively peaceful and centralized 
governments of the Loango Coast enforced an open trade zone, where all Europeans were 
welcome to trade. They resisted settlement in the eighteenth century in contrast to the Angola 
Coast, where the Portuguese were both military allies and trade partners forming an exclusive 
trading relationship and allowing for permanent settlement. 
Although scholars, including Johannes Postma, David Birmingham, and Phyllis Martin, have long 
argued that the Loango Coast was a distinct trading region in precolonial Africa, the creators of 
the Slave Voyages Database have chosen to conflate the Loango and Angola Coasts into a 
broader categorization of West Central Africa. Providing the first analysis of the Voyages 
Database to separate these two coasts, this thesis has shown two distinct trading patterns 
emerged for trade in West Central Africa.3 Ports listed between the mouth of the Congo River 
and northward to Cape Lopez exported slaves to multiple ships with multiple flags including 
Dutch, French, English, Portuguese, Brazilian, Spanish, and American, whereas ports from 
Ambriz southward to Cabo Negro traded over 90 per cent of their slave exports to ships flying 
the Portuguese and later the Brazilian flags. Furthermore, an analysis of time series data has 
clarified that the Portuguese engaged in the majority of their slave trading on the Loango Coast 
during the nineteenth century. In light of the Portuguese dominance of the southern coast, this 
exclusion of the Portuguese raises important questions about the nature of trading systems on 
the Loango Coast. These conclusions support Phyllis Martin’s theory that the traders of the 
Loango Coast strictly enforced a free trade policy.4 Even with this redefinition of slave trading 
regions, the Loango Coast remains in the top four slave supplying regions of the transatlantic 
                                                          
3 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, pp. 56-7 & 60-61; Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870, pp. 
68-74; and Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 29-32. 
 
4 Phyllis M. Martin, “The Slave Trade Era, c. 1670-1793: European Rivalry and African Policy,” in Phyllis M. 
Martin The External Trade of the Loango Coast 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations 
on the Vili Kingdom of Loango (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) pp. 73-92. 
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slave trade behind Angola, the Bight of Benin, and the Bight of Biafra (listed from largest to 
smallest). 
At the beginning of the slave trade, the West Central African Coast was made up of four major 
polities: the Loango to the north which maintained hegemonic influence over the lesser polities 
of Ngoyo and Kakongo; the Kongo on the south bank of the Kongo River; the Angola, or Ngola, 
to the south of the Kongo, who over the period of the slave trade challenged and eventually 
dominated the Kongo; and the Dombe to the furthest south. Each polity established or 
expanded a coastal city to accommodate the growing European trade: Loango settled a city on 
Loango Bay; Ngoyo at Cabinda; Kakongo at Malemba; Kongo at Ambriz; Angola at Luanda; and 
Dombe at Benguela. The northern ports of Loango, Cabinda, and Malemba evolved into an open 
trade zone. Kongo served as a buffer between the northern polities and Angola to the south 
which was allied with and eventually politically and economically dominated by the Portuguese, 
as they became dependent on the Portuguese to maintain control over Kongo and the polities 
to the east. The conflicts between Angola, Kongo, and the polities to the east continued 
throughout the early period of contact and into the eighteenth century. While Kongo was never 
completely dominated during this period, it was vulnerable to the Angola/Portuguese alliance. 
The stronghold of Luanda blocked other European trade to the south and helped the Portuguese 
to gain a foothold in the Benguela hinterlands. 
Problems of definition in this area stem from imprecise and conflicting usage of terms between 
Europeans in historical documents. This has resulted in English, Dutch, French, and Portuguese 
scholars using the same terms but with different meanings which causes many difficulties when 
cross comparing studies. Therefore a common usage of geographical terms is essential. If 
Western Africa is understood as reaching from Senegambia to Angola, and West Africa is a 
category within Western Africa stretching from Senegambia to the Bight of Biafra encompassing 
Senegambia, Upper Guinea, Gold Coast, Bight of Biafra and Bight of Benin, then West Central 
Africa can be best understood as a category within Western Africa stretching from Loango to 
Angola. Thus it would acknowledge the distinctness of the development of both the Loango 
Coast and the Angola Coast. These definitions focus on the African reality and avoid the pitfalls 
of geographically defining Africa primarily through its interaction with European slave traders. 
Building upon the arguments of the first chapter, Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the slave 
trade on the Loango Coast was supported by a strong centralized government, similar to the 
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organization of trade the port of Bonny at the Bight of Biafra. On the Loango Coast appointed 
government officials facilitated trade and resolved disputes. Chapter 4 has given a more 
nuanced analysis of these political roles outlining the dominance of the polity of Loango in the 
early period of trade and the peaceful transition of Ngoyo and Kakongo from tributary to 
independent polities. Despite this political fragmentation, slave exports continued to rise. 
Within these polities, this thesis has demonstrated that the political leaders did not have a large 
investment in the slave trade and thus did not obtain substantial profits directly through trading 
slaves. Finally Chapter 5 has argued that while the Loango and Angola Coasts had overlapping 
slave supply routes, with supporting evidence from Phyllis Martin, Jan Vansina and Joseph 
Miller, that MCC records show that Loango Coast markets did not have the same patterns of 
demand for European trade goods: Loango Coast merchants did not accept beads or shells as 
payments for slaves as was common on the Angola Coast, but rather Loango Coast merchants 
required textiles, guns, alcohol, and basins or pots. Thus the Loango Coast can be contrasted to 
the Angola Coast in the role of its leadership in trade, its lack of major conflicts, and its demand 
for European trade goods. The differing trade patterns between the Loango and Angola Coasts 
reflected differing local political and economic realities and the adaptation of European 
merchants to these conditions of trade. 
The Institutionalization of the Slave Trade 
Understanding the political and economic system, which had evolved on the Loango Coast by 
the end of the eighteenth century, requires the exploration of European sources that privilege 
Eurocentric interpretations of events. In doing so we must avoid the old stereotypes of modern 
Europeans and traditional Africans, and the equally dissatisfying categories of civilized and 
innocent, in order to understand African agency during the transatlantic slave trade and the 
existence of complicated mechanisms of governance and trade prior to European contact. 
Through exploring the institutionalization of trade on the Loango Coast, this thesis has 
documented the relationship between traders of Europe and the Loango Coast as they move 
from negotiations of first contact to major slave trading partners. On the one hand, the 
experiences of indigenous peoples engaging in first contact with sea faring Europeans is a 
common story of the early modern age. On the other hand the set of internal solutions and 
institutions which developed on the Loango Coast were adapted to a specific context. This 
argument is outlined in chapters two through five. Chapter 2 began with a brief examination of 
European conceptions of cross-cultural trade then traced these elements as they appeared in 
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the period of first contact on the Loango Coast and later how they appeared in the more 
systematized institutions of eighteenth century slave trading. Chapter 3 examined the decision 
making processes involved in predicting optimal trade on the Loango Coast; Chapter 4 examined 
the role of local traders on the Loango Coast and their impact on political systems; and Chapter 
5 examined the negotiation and supply of trade goods between the Loango Coast and the 
Interior. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, when Europeans “reached out” to extend their trading networks 
they encountered other complex trading networks with which they cultivated conditions of 
exchange. These exchanges, at least initially, were framed by their previous experiences of cross 
cultural exchange. While Europeans sought to re-establish privileges which were common for 
foreign traders in European port cities, such as the foundation of a nation or a permanent 
settlement, they also would have expected various obstacles in their role as outsiders. Just as a 
Dutch traders would not have expected equality when trading with a local trader in Portugal, 
Europeans could not have expected the same privileges as local traders on the Loango Coast. 
Thus once European traders had established a basis for on-going trade, their first goal on the 
Loango Coast was to establish a merchant community to facilitate safety, communication, 
transport, and information. 
During the early period of trade on the Loango Coast, multiple commercial strategies were 
attempted. Filipa Ribeiro da Silva has suggested that the Dutch experimented with three types 
of trade: a multi-ship strategy which involved a small ship arriving in advance to negotiate trade 
conditions; a temporary settlement strategy which involved leaving a Dutch agent on the coast; 
and sending a regular wave of ships to the coast to establish a steady presence. 5 However, 
Pieter van den Broecke’s experiences on the Loango Coast have suggested that when Europeans 
overstepped their perceived rights on the Loango Coast local justice was swift and decisive, 
reinforcing the right of the local people to trade with whom they pleased. 6 Furthermore, 
Chapter 2 detailed the continued and unsuccessful attempts of Europeans to establish 
permanent settlements. This blocked any single European group from gaining control over their 
                                                          
5
 Broecke, Journal of Voyages, Pg. 94. 
 
6 Broecke, Journal of Voyages, pp. 54-55. 
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European competition on the Loango coast. This multilayered approach to shipping strategies 
suggested the employment of trial and error in establishing trade norms in the early period of 
trade. During this period, Phyllis Martin has suggested that the proximity of the Loango ruler to 
the coast and his “considerable royal authority” over locals and visitors alike played a significant 
role in establishing mutually beneficial trade protocols on the Loango Coast.7 
Chapter 3 further expands upon this idea of negotiating trade mechanisms through a process of 
trial and error. Driven by demands for gold and luxury goods, European encounters with African 
merchants on the Western Coast of Africa were characterized by an initial period of openness 
and flexibility on the part of the European merchants adapting to new markets. During this 
period, European merchants adapted their mechanisms of trade developed in the European 
contexts to meet the new challenges and demands of sub-Saharan port cities. Examples of this 
negotiation on the Loango Coast have shown that although European vulnerability diminished 
over time, African merchants continued to set the terms for trade. The ability of European 
merchants to adapt to the ebbs and flows of African markets was a key factor in the successful 
exploitation of first luxury goods in European markets, and later slaves in transatlantic markets. 
These adaptations have been evaluated over three temporal registers: years, months, and days. 
In the analysis of year to year patterns of the transatlantic slave trade on the Loango Coast, this 
thesis has identified four periods of disruption and six periods of particularly dense trade. This 
analysis has confirmed Stephen Behrendt’s observations that cycles of war and credit had an 
important impact on transatlantic slave trading patterns. Although Behrendt’s analysis of English 
trading records documented a slightly different timeline on the ebbs and flows of trade than the 
MCC records, these have been explained in terms of differing national interests. In both cases, 
when their country went to war their shipping was reduced. This pattern was especially acute 
when European conflicts overflowed onto the Loango Coast. However, external events could 
also increase demand for slaves on the Loango Coast. In the post war periods and in the late 
eighteenth century as the availability of credit radically increased, the demand for slaves in the 
Americas the number of ships arriving at the Loango Coast increased distinctly. This increased 
demand required mechanisms of trade which facilitated the smooth running of supply and trade 
negotiations. One of the strategies settled upon to facilitate the incredible boom in slave 
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 Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pg. 24. 
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demand in the second half of the eighteenth century was the incentive of skyrocketing slave 
prices. During this period, slave prices recorded by the MCC ranged from an average of 13.7 
pieces per slave in 1759 to 48.6 pieces per slave in 1776, at least a 250 per cent increase. 
Narrowing our focus from the broader patterns of year to year trade, this thesis has also 
examined the ebbs and flows of trade on a month to month basis. Despite Behrendt’s analysis of 
the transatlantic shipping cycle which suggested that the Loango Coast had no optimal slave 
trading period, an examination of MCC shipping cycles has yielded some distinct monthly 
trading patterns. The examination of 28 MCC ships’ trading logs has established that there were 
two peaks in arrivals of MCC ships on the Loango Coast in March and September; a further 
analysis has shown that the optimal time for trade to be March through April and again August 
through November. 
Using the 27 MCC voyages with sufficient data, I have calculated a voyage took between two 
and nine months to reach the Loango Coast, with the average ship taking 4.7 months and the 
most frequent timing for a voyage being even less at four months. If a ship were outfitted with 
foodstuffs in the North Sea in April and May, it could reasonably be expected to reach the 
Loango Coast in August and September. This correlation may partially explain the 
disproportionate number of ships arriving on the Loango Coast in September and the resulting 
high numbers engaging in trade in October. Furthermore, the popularity of the 
September/October trading period could be partially explained by the desire of ships to leave 
the coast before the peak of the rainy season and the onset of gastrointestinal diseases in 
January/February. Although Behrendt has suggested that there was no seasonality to the slave 
trade on the Loango Coast, MCC records have indicated that ships arriving on the Loango Coast 
in October procured slaves at least twice as fast as those that arrived in any other month. 
However, 28 ships is a small dataset and further evidence is required to make a conclusive 
argument. Nevertheless, this pattern of increased trade in July through November is not 
confined to the Loango Coast. It is also reflected in Herbert Klein’s study of Portuguese trade on 
the Angola Coast which includes data from 549 ships in an overlapping time period: 1723 to 
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1771.8 This suggests a common season of trade in the two West Central African regions of 
Loango and Angola. 
Furthermore, an analysis of MCC slave prices on the Loango Coast has indicated that despite an 
established demand for male slaves in the transatlantic slave trade, female slaves on the Loango 
Coast were only marginally less expensive than male slaves. Despite the relatively high cost of 
female slaves, they made up 37 per cent of an average slave cargo, which is seven per cent 
above the average on the Loango Coast and two per cent above the transatlantic average. Over 
time, slave prices on the Loango Coast diminish during periods of European conflict and increase 
during periods with high concentrations of European demand. 
Chapter 3 examined the outfitting strategies in Europe, provisioning and trade in Western 
Africa, the duration and mortality rates of the middle passage, the destinations and commerce 
in the Americas, and the return and re-provisioning in Europe. In doing so, it has shown the 
importance of developing a “culture of knowledge” and how this knowledge allowed both the 
European and African traders to optimize profits and minimize risks. Within the Atlantic world, 
the Loango Coast provides the challenges of disease in the rainy season, distance from Europe, 
and scarcity of foodstuffs counterbalanced with the provision of a reliable source of water, an 
efficient procurement of enslaved Africans, and a short middle passage. 
Moving from the monthly to the daily patterns of trade, Chapters 4 and 5 focused on the African 
actors in cross-cultural exchange and the space where those actors interact with Europeans. 
Chapter 4 introduced the Mafouks, appointees of local rulers on the Loango Coast, who oversaw 
the regulation of cross-cultural exchange. Through an analysis of MCC records, this chapter has 
shown how the Mafouks invested large amounts of capital in the slave trade and accumulated 
large profits, while the local rulers only received a variable percentage of the profits from the 
Mafouks and did not invest large sums in slaves for transport. While acknowledging the large 
contributions of a few merchants to the slave trade, this chapter has suggested that the majority 
of slave trading transactions were small exchanges with the average merchant selling less than 
one slave per year to MCC ships. From this information the thesis has inferred that due to the 
complications of offering credit to a large number of traders for small returns, it is unlikely that 
                                                          
8 Klein, “The Portuguese Slave Trade from Angola in the Eighteenth Century,” pp. 894-918. 
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the majority of MCC transactions required financing from external European sources. 
Furthermore, it suggests that while a few big men acquired slaves through provisioning 
caravans, the majority of traders must have exchanged their goods or labour for smaller 
numbers of slaves hoping to make an investment. If large traders provisioned caravans which 
arrived on the Loango Coast ahead of the arrival of a European ship, selling part of the slaves to 
smaller local traders may have reduced the burden of slave care on the larger merchants. It is 
also possible that some slaves were obtained through small local raids or kidnapping; however, I 
have not been able to locate any evidence of this method of procurement. 
Chapter 5 moved on to argue that due in part to the centralized nature of the Loango Coast 
governments and their desire to control shipping activities on the coast, the Mafouks and 
European ship captains established a trading protocol. Upon arrival at a port, the ship would 
anchor and signal with its cannons. In response a party would approach the ship in canoes to 
negotiate the conditions of trade, including gifts, and later taxes, for the privilege of trading, the 
hire of men and canoes to transport the Europeans and their goods between shore, and at times 
fixed prices for male and female slaves was agreed upon. This established, Europeans could land 
and commence trade. 
By the eighteenth century, this thesis has suggested that the increased knowledge and 
experience of both the European and Loango Coast merchants had allowed the trading ports of 
the Loango Coast to establish the set of protocol recorded by the Middelburg merchants. In 
contrast to Lovejoy and Richardson’s theory that Euro-African relations were characterized by 
systems of trust, authority, and pawnship, this thesis has suggested a fourth system of trade 
developed on the Loango Coast within the context of the transatlantic slave trade: a 
barter-based, ship trade supported by a centralized local government and internal financing. 
This theory of trade was hypothesised in Chapter 2, the idea of ship trade was explored in 
Chapter 3, and Chapter 5 developed the idea of barter within the context of an organized 
market. 
The barter of trade goods for one or more slaves involved three levels of knowledge and three 
corresponding power relations. An examination of four individual negotiations has shown firstly 
how the Mafouk successfully negotiated a fixed price which balanced his exclusive access to 
knowledge of internal slave markets and his desire to keep European merchants from moving on 
to more profitable slave markets. Equally, if the Europeans did not agree to these terms, they 
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risked prolonging their voyage and a loss of reputation with the local Mafouk. Secondly, 
Middleburg and Malemba traders negotiated an exchange of goods for slaves agreeing upon the 
exchange value of European goods in the local currency of a piece. Thirdly, Europeans retained 
exclusive knowledge of the value of European merchandise, or rather merchandise obtained in 
Europe, and thus had the ability to promote more vigorously goods which have equal value in 
the Loango Coast markets but which have lesser value in Europe. In the case of both the Loango 
and the Middelburg merchants, experienced traders had the edge in these negotiations. Yet by 
the eighteenth century, inexperienced traders on both sides had access to larger bodies of 
institutional knowledge which helped to protect them from rash decisions. Evidence of this 
institutional knowledge is available in the letters of instruction provided to the Captain Charles 
Wilson, the notes of the unknown American slave merchant, and James Fraser’s testimony in 
the British House of Commons.9 
The negotiation of European trade goods for African slaves centred on the composition of a 
bundle. Bundles on the Loango Coast held three primary commodities guns, textiles, and 
alcohol. A sample of trading records shows that guns made up 21 per cent of each bundle, 
textiles 64 per cent, and alcohol 7 per cent (measured by their value in pieces). The 
extraordinary demand for cloth lay not in the absence of a cloth industry on the Loango Coast, 
where substantial quantities of raphia cloth were produced for both internal consumption and 
export, but in the use of cloth as a prestige marker and a currency. 
These goods, along with locally produced commodities, were then loaded onto caravans to be 
traded in the interior for slaves, copper, and ivory. It is important to note that this was a trade 
developed, controlled, and at least to some extent financed by African traders. There is no 
evidence of European middle men operating in these supply chains; indeed, African middlemen 
on the Loango Coast were organized by and loyal to the local Mafouk rather than to European 
interests. Furthermore, these trade networks had not been formed by the demand for slaves 
but rather through the demand for copper and ivory in an earlier period. It is very possible that 
this absence of information on slave caravans to the Loango Coast can be directly linked to 
                                                          
9 Leyland, Penny and Co. “Letter to Captain Charles Wilson of the Brig Madampookata” Harold Cohen 
Library, Liverpool, United Kingdom, Dumbell papers, MS 10.47 (transcribed in Appendix D); Minne Gilbert, 
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European detachment from the process. This detachment could have sprung from an active 
policy among the Vili, and later among the Kotchi and Woyo, to protect their dominance of the 
trade, or it could have simply been a byproduct of the impermanent presence of Europeans on 
the coast. While these caravans primarily focused on the vast slave trade market at Malebo or 
Stanley Pool on the Congo River and markets to the south of the Congo River, the Atlantic slave 
trading markets of Loango, Cabinda, and Malemba also engaged in slave procurement in 
markets to the east of the Loango Coast.10 A round trip on foot between the primary ports of the 
Loango Coast and Malebo Pool could have taken a minimum of three months. Though we do not 
have adequate data to speculate on how many slaves such a caravan would include, it is highly 
unlikely that a single caravan could transport the average 361 slaves it took to supply a MCC 
ship. Furthermore, an analysis of merchants trading at Malemba suggests that 75 percent of 
Loango merchants trading with the MCC over a 27 year period traded less than 10 slaves, with 
the average procurement rate of 2.8 slaves per year. It is improbable that European traders 
would have financed a large number of such minor transactions.11 Moreover, the absence of 
permanent MCC agents on the Loango Coast diminishes the possibility of longer term credit 
arrangements outside of the shipboard documentation. Even if a MCC ship spent an average 4.8 
months on the Loango Coast, it is unlikely that Loango caravans would have enough time to 
obtain European credit, outfit a caravan, make the voyage to the interior, trade their 
commodities for slaves, return to the Loango Coast, and deliver the slaves in this window. It 
remains to be discovered how these caravans were financed. Additionally, the absence of 
evidence of credit being extended or repaid in the transaction records of 30 MCC shipping 
voyages and the evidence from the British parliamentary papers discussed in Chapter 2 suggest 
that previous authors, such as Lovejoy and Richardson, have overestimated the use of European 
credit on the Loango Coast. Furthermore, the only identified source which explicitly speaks to 
the method of exchange between Europeans and Africans on the Loango Coast has indicated 
that these slave purchase transactions were barter based. 
This evidence presents the Loango Coast as a market with a unique pattern of consumption and 
trade regulation. Although it shared substantial sources of slaves with the Angola Coast markets, 
it also imported small numbers of slaves from the northern and eastern regions. Nevertheless, 
                                                          
10 Miller, Eighteenth-Century Angolan Slave Trade, 383. 
 
11 Figures taken from Table 1 in Chapter 3. 
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Loango traders were able to supply trade goods of greater quality and variety than those offered 
by traders from the closer port of Luanda. The strategy of traders on the Loango Coast in trading 
with all Europeans is therefore consistent with their desire to obtain the best quality goods. One 
key to this superior supply is firearms. In maintaining their relationships with Europeans as trade 
partners rather than military competitors, as happened in Kongo, Angola, and Benguela, the sale 
of firearms posed no significant risk to European traders. Equally, by keeping competition open, 
Europeans were encouraged to compete with each other driving up the price of slaves while 
also keeping the quality of goods higher. Thus the Dutch, English, and French goods supplied to 
Loango Coast traders offered something unique at the internal markets which justified longer 
and more costly caravans. 
This thesis has argued that slave trade on the Loango Coast was a barter based system which 
evolved where it is possible that internal financing allowed the greater independence of local 
traders from their European counterparts and negated the need for systems of credit to be 
developed. Ship based trade may have had an impact on the loading time of slaves, but it also 
prevented European encroachment on the sovereignty of local governments while 
simultaneously minimizing maintenance costs for European traders. Finally, a centralized 
government created the stability and regulation which allowed the trade to flourish reduced 
threat of default or trickery, both parties knowing the terms of negotiation are guaranteed by 
the Mafouk on the one side and the ship captain on the other. Thus, Western African trade 
communities’ transatlantic trade relations should not only be evaluated in terms of their 
relation to European credit but evaluated in terms of three dimensions: credit versus barter, 
settlement versus ship trade, and centralized versus autonomous trade. This highlights the need 
to understand each Western African port within its own specific context, while at the same time 
acknowledging the common features which bind them together in the transatlantic slave trade. 
The Insulation of the Loango Coast in the Eighteenth Century 
In examining the consequences of the development of the trade mechanisms outlined in the 
previous section, this thesis has argued that the nature of trade relations that were negotiated 
on the Loango Coast had an insulating effect in the eighteenth century. This argument builds 
upon ideas of cultural and geographical buffers that were introduced in Chapter 2 and teased 
out in Chapter 5, the evolution of the political system which was discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, 
the preference for ship board trade outlined in Chapter 3, and the questions of financial 
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investment which were explored in Chapters 2 and 5.This system began to evolve around first 
contact between the Vili at Loango Bay and Europeans and later transferred to the major ports 
of Cabinda and Malemba where the traders of the Loango Coast developed a system of trade 
which was characterized by a combination of significant internal credit, ship trade, and 
centralized indigenous control. The Mafouks of the Loango Coast served not only as important 
brokers of trade on the Loango Coast; they also supplied large numbers of slaves to the 
transatlantic trade.12 Although it is difficult to judge the internal processes involved in the 
development of these systems, the positioning of the Mafouks between Loango Coast 
communities and European merchants resulted in the relative insulation of the Loango Coast in 
the eighteenth century, which slowed the permeation of European values, particularly the 
spread of Christianity, during this period. This highlights the varying levels of cultural adaptation 
in the process of contact between two cultures. 
As the dominant polity of the Loango Coast, the Vili set the tone for European relations with the 
traders of the Loango Coast. The policies of trade that were established at Loango Bay were 
emulated at Cabinda and Malemba. In Chapter 2, this thesis has tested the political theories of 
Paul Sharp which have suggested that when two cultures collide there is both an impulse to 
learn about each other and become closer as well as an impulse to maintain connection while 
maintaining separateness.13 Through a process of encounter and reencounter, norms were 
established between European and Loango merchants. After prolonged attempts of Europeans 
to establish permanent factories failed at these ports, Europeans had settled into a pattern of 
ship board trade. As elaborated upon in Chapter 3, shipboard trade in the eighteenth century 
allowed most ships to spend only four to five months on the Loango Coast rather than the 
average seven months required to provision a slave ship on other parts of the Western African 
Coast. Chapter 5 has described how ship board trade in some circumstances required Europeans 
to sleep aboard their ships. Thus the model of ship board trade supported a model of minimal or 
minimizing contact. 
                                                          
12 See Chapter 4, Table 8. 
 
13
 Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Relations, pp. 10-11. 
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Additionally, though it was the norm for Europeans to provide the broker at other ports of the 
Western African Coast, local brokers were most common on the Loango Coast. Wary of 
Europeans and interested in maintaining high levels of control over long-distance trade, Loango 
elites were providing their own brokers by the time the slave trade started to peak. Another 
element of this internally regulated system is the role of credit, as there is little evidence of 
African traders seeking European credit. If Europeans were not providing significant sources of 
credit, this would have reduced the time and energy required in exchange as caravans could 
depart for the interior markets before the arrival of Europeans. This would offer further support 
to this idea of minimal contact. 
Though Europeans had a set of pre-established long distance trade norms, they did not 
necessarily work best on the Loango Coast. Europeans did not set the tone for trade. In fact, the 
Loango Coast was one of the few regions of Africa which simultaneously established a set of 
slave trading institutions agreed upon by Loango merchants and Europeans while at the same 
time insulating its people from cultural and religious transformation in the eighteenth century. 
On the Loango Coast, the impulse to maintain separateness was particularly successful. This 
conclusion is supported by David Birmingham, Linda Heywood and John Thornton’s studies of 
cultural assimilation on the West Central African Coast in the pre-colonial period.14 
In one of the most striking examples of insulation, Chapter 4 has examined how the rulers of the 
Loango Coast polities removed themselves from the day to day functioning of the slave trade. 
This analysis of rulers on the Loango Coast has shown the relative insignificance of the rulers in 
slave procurement. Instead we find a heavy investment by the Mafouks and Mambouks, the key 
officials appointed by the Maloango, Mangoyo, and Manikakongo to supervise the trade, 
negotiate with Europeans, and collect revenues, first in the form of gifts and later in more 
organized taxation systems. 
By comparing the activities of the local rulers to their appointed Mafouks, this thesis concludes 
that the rulers themselves were reluctant to make a large direct investment in the transatlantic 
slave trade. Perhaps this can begin to be explained by coming back to the multidimensional role 
                                                          
14 David Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870, p. 53; and, Heywood and Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic 
Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, p. 207. 
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of rulers discussed above. In addition to their political, judicial, and economic roles as rulers of 
their respective communities, the Maloango, Manikakongo, and Mangoyo also had significant 
religious and social roles. In appointing a Mafouk to oversee intercultural exchange it is possible 
that the leaders of the Loango Coast were attempting to insulate their polities; however, it is 
more likely that the institutions of cross-cultural trade became too complex to manage while 
simultaneously offering political and religious leadership. The Maloango created a system where 
exchanges were monitored by one man, who had no access to leadership promotion, where 
exchanges happened on the outskirts of town, and where profits were largely concentrated with 
a few individuals rather than the community as a whole. This system was implemented by the 
Maloangos, the Manikakongos, and the Mangoyos of the Loango Coast thereby shielding their 
communities, at least partially, from the effects of external economic, religious and social 
influences. 
Whatever the intent and however strategic or accidental this process was, the ultimate outcome 
was successful, at least in the short term. During the eighteenth century, the people of the 
Loango Coast maintained “certain deeply rooted social and cultural values during times of 
fundamental change.”15 At the same time they resisted the influence of European religion to a 
much greater extent than other financially successful Western African ports.16 Thus the Loango 
Coast insulated itself from direct contact and profound change through the appointment of 
Mafouks. Although Zdenka Volavka and Heywood and Thornton have supported the idea of the 
Loango Coast as less absorbent of foreign social and religious beliefs than the Angola Coast 
during this period, they do not speculate how this barrier was constructed. This thesis has 
suggested that the appointment of royal representatives to oversee cross-cultural exchange 
played a fundamental role in this process. 
Through an examination of the MCC slave trading transactions, this thesis has argued that the 
Mafouk of Malemba, and to a lesser degree the Mafouks of Loango and Cabinda, held pivotal 
roles in intercultural exchange, benefiting hugely in both economic and political terms. This 
transition had profound effects on political structure of the Loango Coast. In the eighteenth 
                                                          
15 Volavka, Crown and Ritual, p. 6-7. 
 
16 Heywood and Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, p. 207. 
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century, the role of Mafouk insulated the Maloango, the Mangoyo, and the Manikongo from 
direct contact with European traders while alleviating their administrative burden. Equally it 
allowed these leaders to indirectly benefit from the financial profits of the economic exchange 
while diminishing the effects intercultural exchange. However, the increasing profits and 
prestige gained by the Mafouk, an appointee without natural paths of access to leadership 
himself, and the growing dependence of the Loango Coast leaders on these brokers eventually 
create unforeseen consequences in the next century undermining the political stability of the 
region and leaving it more vulnerable than ever to European interference in the late nineteenth 
century. While Martin recognized the role of the political role of slave trade in the deterioration 
of traditional power structures, and Thornton and Heywood have acknowledged the slow rate of 
cultural absorption on the Loango Coast during the eighteenth century, this thesis brings 
together these two ideas to argue that the role of the Mafouks and Mambouks played a central 
role in the slave trade allowing them first, to create or support an insulating barrier between the 
Europeans and the people of the Loango Coast, and second to amass immense personal wealth 
that would eventually lead to the breakdown of the traditional political system. 
Conclusion 
By the time the English, Dutch, and French slave traders had abandoned the Loango Coast, the 
insulating factors of the major trading families of the Loango Coast began to seriously 
undermine the political structures of the Vili, the Kotchi and the Woyo. By the early nineteenth 
century, the men selected to rule these polities refused the obligation to attempt to control the 
ever more self-sufficient merchant class. Describing the fate of the Loango Coast in the 
nineteenth century, David Birmingham has concluded: “The traditional structure of a great 
political and religious king supported by a large royal family was subverted. The power of the 
king was reduced, the pattern of succession was disrupted, and the power shifted in fact, if not 
in theory, to the commercial officials and the slave-owning agricultural aristocrats. This pattern, 
with a weak nominal king and a range of powerful notables, apparently survived until the 
colonial period.”17 As long as the slave trade persisted and these merchants continued to 
accumulate wealth, these merchants had been able to maintain order. However, with the end of 
the income from the slave trade and the death of the last slave trading merchants, the 
                                                          
17 Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870, pp. 146-147. 
 
226 
 
communities fractured. Thus when Europeans returned to the Loango Coast in the late 
nineteenth century to occupy and colonize the peoples of the Loango Coast they were met by a 
power vacuum.18 Thus, it was the end of the slave trade itself which removed the last layer of 
protection between the people of the Loango Coast and European colonizers laying the way for 
the economic exploitation and political domination of the Loango Coast which would stagnate 
its political, economic, and cultural development over the next century. 
Beyond the implications of this study on our understanding of governance on the Loango Coast, 
this thesis highlights the distinct nature of trade on the Loango Coast; the absence of European 
credit data in the MCC shipping records; and, the difficulties in procuring slaves via caravan in 
the average four months a European ship spent on the coast. This thesis attempts to take a step 
beyond the European focused studies of shipping patterns to discover the identity of the African 
traders of the Loango Coast. In doing so it provides the first comprehensive list of members of 
an African merchant community in the eighteenth century. This list has helped to reinforce 
fragmented lists of rulers for the polities of Loango, Kakongo, and Ngoyo. It has also given us a 
more concrete picture of the role of Mafouks in the eighteenth century. Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, it has emphasised the investment of large numbers of relatively small 
investors giving names and faces to the minor merchants of the slave trade. Thus African 
merchants stop being amorphous interchangeable figures in the history of the transatlantic 
slave trade and begin to gain an identity more comparable to that of their European 
counterparts. 
 
  
                                                          
18 See Martin, “Family Strategies in Nineteenth-Century Cabinda,” pp. 65-86.; and idem. “Trade and 
Change Among the Vili” in Phyllis Martin, The External Trade of the Loango Coast, pp. 158-174. 
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Appendix A: MCC Voyages to the Loango Coast, 1733-1794 
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1733 DEC MAR Fregatschip Het Hof van Zeeland Jan de Moor 321 321 574-578
1748 ? ? Fregatschip Groot Prooyen Hendrik Van Rijn 323 323 486-492
1749 JAN OCT Fregatschip de Grenadier Albert Steenhof 323 323 455-460
1755 AUG DEC Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde Adriaan Jacobze 346 346 978-983
1757 OCT NOV Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde Adriaen Jacobse 462 462 984-988
1758 OCT FEB Snauwschip de Drie Gezusters Hendrik Vandleven 405 405 333-337
1758 AUG NOV Fregatschip De Vrouw Johanna Cores Jan Fuyneman 372 372 1222-1227
1759 FEB APR Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II Schipper David Mulders 424 424 793-799
1759 AUG OCT Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde Adriaan Jacobse 472 472 989-993
1760 AUG MAR Fregatschip De Vrouw Johanna Cores Jan Tuijneman 361 361 1228-1233
1761 ? ? Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II David Mulders 338 338 800-807*
1762 SEP ? Fregatschip Philadelphia Phillippus Verdonk 357 357 929-935
1762 ? ? Fregatschip Middelburgs Welvaren II*** Jacobus Husson 338 338 808-812*
1764 AUG FEB Fregatschip Philadelphia Philippus Verdonk 326 326 936-942
1765 OCT FEB Snauwschip de Nieuwe Hoop Schipper David Mulders 197 197 823-829
1766 SEP MAR Snauwschip De Eenigheid Schipper Willem de Molder 307 307 398-403
1767 SEP MAR Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde Cornelis Pieterszen 334 334 1009-1012
1767 MAR NOV Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam Jan Menkenveld 302 302 516-522
1769 SEP FEB Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde Cornelis Pieterszen 379 379 1013-1017
1769 JUL JAN Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam Adriaan Chatelain 326 326 523-527
1771 MAR JUL Snauwschip De Welmeenende Cornelis van Haijen 257 257 1307-1311
1771 MAR JUN Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam Adriaan Chatelain 367 367 528-531
1770 MAR OCT Fregatschip de Geertruyda en Christina Johannas Bakker 320 320 410-413
1772 APR OCT Fregatschip Aurora Schipper Johannas Bakker 317 317 215-218
1772 JAN JUN Fregatschip Prins Willem de Vijfde Cornelis Loett (Loeff - Loess) 318 318 1018-1022
1773 FEB AUG Fregatschip Haast U Langzaam Jan van Sprang 326 326 532-536
1774 APR DEC Fregatschip Aurora Schipper Johannas Bakker 313 313 219-223
1774 MAR AUG Fregatschip de Watergeus Adriaan Chatelain 368 368 1286-1288
1775 AUG ? Snauwschip de Jonge Willem**** Cornelis Loett (Loeff - Loess) 75 75 677-680
1776 JUL NOV Fregatschip de Watergeus Adriaan Chatelain 325 325 1289-1292
1780 ? ? Fregatschip de Watergeus*** Cornelis Loett (Loeff - Loess) 338 338 1297-1298*
1794 SEP JAN Fregatschip het Vergenoegen Johannas Gerrits Claver 393 393 1103-1110
Totals 2435 7303 320 672 10730
* Number of slaves purchased is an estimate using the average number of slaves purchased by the other 29 ships
** Second last year of Voyage 
*** Ship Sunk returning to the Netherlands
**** This ship embarked 90 slaves on the Guinea Coast before heading South to embark a further 75 slaves at Malemba
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Appendix B: MCC Slave Price Data, 1732 to 1776  
 
Men Women Boys Girls Total 
Year Min  Max No. Value Avg Min  Max No. Value Avg Min  Max No. Value Avg Min  Max No. Value Avg Min  Max No. Value Avg 
1732 15.0 22.0 27 521.0 19.3 16.0 19.5 5 93.5 18.7 5.0 22.0 11 143.5 13.0 13.0 13.0 1 13.0 13.0 5.0 22.0 44 771.0 17.5 
1733 17.0 24.0 156 3267.8 20.9 17.0 22.0 35 687.5 19.6 9.0 27.0 52 752.0 14.5 9.0 18.0 25 349.0 14.0 9.0 27.0 268 5056.3 18.9 
1748 10.0 17.0 154 2182.0 14.2 11.0 15.0 110 1441.0 13.1 6.0 13.0 39 396.0 10.2 7.0 12.0 17 178.0 10.5 6.0 17.0 320 4197.0 13.1 
1749 16.0 23.0 164 3339.5 20.4 13.0 22.0 105 1982.8 18.9 11.0 22.0 31 494.0 15.9 13.0 20.0 15 241.5 16.1 11.0 23.0 315 6057.8 19.2 
1755 24.0 29.5 111 3254.5 29.3 22.0 35.0 89 2498.5 28.1 14.0 28.0 68 1584.0 23.3 16.0 27.0 34 764.0 22.5 14.0 35.0 302 8101.0 26.8 
1757 16.0 21.3 31 563.0 18.2 14.5 14.5 1 14.5 14.5 11.5 23.5 7 79.0 11.3 10.5 13.0 3 35.5 11.8 10.5 23.5 42 692.0 16.5 
1758 15.0 22.3 26 518.0 19.9 14.0 22.9 12 228.8 19.1 13.0 13.0 4 52.0 13.0 n/a n/a 0 
  
13.0 22.9 42 798.8 19.0 
1759 14.0 15.0 196 2923.0 14.9 12.0 15.0 114 1595.0 14.0 9.0 15.0 67 772.0 11.5 9.0 13.0 47 534.0 11.4 9.0 15.0 424 5824.0 13.7 
1762 16.0 24.5 143 3144.0 22.0 15.0 23.0 86 1738.0 20.2 9.5 20.5 84 1261.5 15.0 8.0 20.0 37 542.5 14.7 8.0 24.5 350 6686.0 19.1 
1764 16.5 27.5 132 2888.0 21.9 14.5 25.0 63 1159.3 18.4 10.5 18.5 56 816.0 14.6 11.0 18.0 31 439.0 14.2 10.5 27.5 282 5302.3 18.8 
1765 20.0 24.0 43 998.0 23.2 18.0 23.0 27 565.0 20.9 11.0 21.0 36 591.5 16.4 12.0 20.5 16 262.5 16.4 11.0 24.0 122 2417.0 19.8 
1766 17.0 25.0 18 413.0 22.9 15.0 24.0 37 702.0 19.0 9.0 22.0 17 246.5 14.5 10.0 18.0 13 175.0 13.5 9.0 25.0 85 1536.5 18.1 
1767 22.0 43.0 66 1851.0 28.0 10.5 30.0 17 375.5 22.1 11.0 24.5 19 326.0 17.2 14.0 24.0 11 194.0 17.6 10.5 43.0 113 2746.5 24.3 
1769 20.0 34.0 52 1563.0 30.1 17.0 34.0 28 738.0 26.4 14.5 28.0 44 887.5 20.2 16.0 27.0 14 273.0 19.5 14.5 34.0 138 3461.5 25.1 
1770 27.0 45.0 147 5328.0 36.2 23.0 86.5 75 2642.5 35.2 13.0 38.0 68 1806.5 26.6 13.3 30.5 38 915.0 24.1 13.0 86.5 328 10692.0 32.6 
1771 26.0 32.0 67 1996.3 29.8 23.0 32.0 33 963.0 29.2 12.0 27.0 38 794.5 20.9 17.5 29.5 7 166.5 23.8 12.0 32.0 145 3920.3 27.0 
1772 32.0 45.5 31 1151.0 37.1 33.0 44.5 10 389.0 38.9 20.5 35.0 15 403.0 26.9 22.5 32.0 9 240.0 26.7 20.5 45.5 65 2183.0 33.6 
1774 40.5 52.0 16 778.5 48.7 36.0 51.8 14 641.0 45.8 19.5 35.5 32 992.5 31.0 27.0 34.5 9 287.5 31.9 19.5 52.0 71 2699.5 38.0 
1776 58.5 59.3 6 353.5 58.9 39.2 55.2 10 477.0 47.7 30.7 30.7 3 92.0 30.7 n/a n/a 0 
  
30.7 59.3 19 922.5 48.6 
                       
3475 74064.8 21.3 
                          These data are calculated using 3263 transactions from the MCC shipping data in which ONLY one category of slaves is purchased: Male, Female, Boy or Girls. Any data in which two or more of these 
categories is present has been excluded as it is impossible to divide these cumulative totals into exact values. Calculated using price data from: MCC 216, 219, 335, 400, 410, 456, 488, 517, 524, 528, 
533, 575, 677, 795, 825, 932, 938, 980, 985, 990, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1106, 1224, 1229, 1286, 1289 & 1308. 
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Appendix C: A List of Loango Coast Slave Trading Merchants from the MCC Records, 1732 to 1797
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1774 1774 1  ? Pieter 1 7 1 7 7.0 154.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 __ins Colleij 1 6 1 6 6.0 177 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Amsterdam 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Andrees Mangova/Andries Mangova 3 11 3 11 11.0 94.0 3.0 188.0
1767 1774 3 Andries/Prins Anderies/Prins Andrees/Prins Andries 11 47 11 47 15.7 57.0 3.7 153.0
1771 1771 1 Andries Dien 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1768 1768 1 Andries Mafoeke 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Anthonij Anboujou 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Anthonij van Malemba/Antonij van Malemba 5 5 5 5 5.0 208.0 5.0 108.0
1759 1759 1 Antonie 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1759 2 Apollo 15 24 15 24 12.0 83.5 7.5 56.0
1759 1759 1 Arie aan boe/Arij aan boe 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1772 1774 2 Arij Maba/Arij Mabbu 3 7 3 7 3.5 280.0 1.5 342.0
1770 1771 2 Arij Mantie/Arij Matien/Arij Martien 2 12 2 12 6.0 177.0 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Arij Simson 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Arij Teijiensa/Arij Tiensa 3 4 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1774 1774 1 Atoemba Atoemba 1 8 1 8 8.0 137.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Prins Arij 14 14 14 14 14.0 67.5 14.0 13.0
1764 1772 2 Ban Matijelle/Basa Mathella/Basa Mathijella 3 6 3 6 3.0 310.5 1.5 342.0
1759 1759 1 Batiekanse/Batte Cansie/Batie Carasie/Balsekanse 3 4 5 6 8 10 10.0 107.0 8.0 48.0
1769 1771 3 Batij Claas/Batje Claad/Batje Claas/Battie Claas/Prins Batje Claas/Prins Battje Claas/Prins Battje Klaas23 29 7 22 30 51 17.0 46.5 10.0 30.5
1770 1770 1 Batje/Battie 6 9 6 9 9.0 120.5 6.0 83.0
1762 1762 1 Bek Jan 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Belkesnsa 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1766 1767 2 Ben Coffij 3 3 3 3 1.5 452.5 1.5 342.0
1770 1770 1 Bikeo 9 11 9 11 11.0 94.0 9.0 37.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Boersie 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Bon Vernando 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1774 4 Boense Basa/Boense Bassa/Boensie Basa/Boersie Basa/Boese Basa/Boesse Basa/Boesse Baza/Bouse Baza/Boussie Bassa18 70 18 70 17.5 43.5 4.5 123.5
1774 1774 1 Boma Niema 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Bomba 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1762 1772 2 Bomgo/Prins Boangoo 3 3 2 7 5 10 5.0 208.0 2.5 223.0
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1767 1768 2 Bon Claaijs Monebee 16 32 16 32 16.0 53.0 8.0 48.0
1759 1759 1 Bonse 13 13 13 13 13.0 77.5 13.0 16.5
1759 1759 1 Bonse Mantesse 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Bonza Sioes/Bonza Soeer 1 2 1 3 2 5 5.0 208.0 2.0 280.0
1749 1759 2 Boo Coffij/Bou Coffij 9 12 9 12 6.0 177.0 4.5 123.5
1771 1771 1 Bossesoer Tjecaja/Cossesoer Tjecaja 1 1 4 10 5 11 11.0 94.0 5.0 108.0
1767 1767 1 Caap Bende 2 3 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1757 1 Caap de loop 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1767 1 Cabende Claaijs 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1776 3 Cabende/Cabienda/Cabiendn 5 9 5 9 3.0 310.5 1.7 332.0
1770 1770 1 Cabinda de Jong/Kabinda de Jonge 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1762 1 Caijo de Comma 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1772 1772 1 Cambo Konings Zoen/Kambo Konings Zoen 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1774 1776 2 Cap Barbe/Capiteijn Baab 5 28 5 28 14.0 67.5 2.5 223.0
1769 1769 1 Cap Moor Voor Matientje/Cap Moor Voor Matting 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1772 2 Capiteijn Moor/Capitii jn Mon/Capteijn Moor 3 3 3 3 1.5 452.5 1.5 342.0
1773 1773 1 Cappita van Magoven 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1758 1758 1 Prins Calleij 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1769 1 Prins Cambo/Prins Chambo 5 5 5 5 5.0 208.0 5.0 108.0
1749 1767 3 Prins Claas/Prins Claes/Prins Klaas/Prins Klaes 19 26 19 26 8.7 126.0 6.3 74.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Coffij Maponde 2 3 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 Catte Quande 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 Cilklonden 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Coebeloe Loeboe 1 2 4 14 5 16 16.0 53.0 5.0 108.0
1769 1774 4 Coema/Comma/Comme 1 2 3 4 4 6 1.5 452.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Coffij Anboe 9 15 9 15 15.0 59.5 9.0 37.5
1772 1772 1 Coffij Caleijnse 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1772 3 Coffij Cosie Jongen/Coffij de Losie Jong/Coffij Losie Jong 8 9 8 9 3.0 310.5 2.7 213.5
1776 1776 1 Coffij Dongoe 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Coffij Makossa 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1764 1774 4 Coffij Martien/Coffij Martiijn/Coffij Matijelij 5 9 5 9 2.3 344.0 1.3 352.0
1764 1764 1 Coffij Mavinga 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
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1770 1770 1 Coffij Teijlmbamba/Coffij Tempambo 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1770 8 Coffij/Coffije/Koffij/Prins Coffij/Prins Koffie 109 159 3 6 112 165 20.6 27.0 14.0 13.0
1757 1757 1 Collenbin Konings zoon 1 6 1 6 6.0 177.0 1.0 470.5
1768 1768 1 Combange Combates 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1767 1767 1 Commandeur 4 5 4 5 5.0 208.0 4.0 141.0
1772 1776 3 Conde Samboe/Condo Sambo/Kondo Sambo 13 60 13 60 20.0 30.0 4.3 129.5
1749 1749 1 Conings Loon 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1770 2 Coraie/Corail 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1770 2 Coubrin Macost/Coubroin Matosi/Coubrou Macos 14 14 14 14 7.0 154.5 7.0 67.0
1769 1770 2 Coubrou 9 9 3 12 12 21 10.5 102.5 6.0 83.0
1767 1767 1 Crenisse Mouijmalblle 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 De bimba 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1757 1757 1 denfeloen 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1759 2 Dicke Barend/Dickke Barent 43 50 43 50 25.0 19.0 21.5 6.0
1774 1774 1 Dieke de Vries 4 8 4 8 8.0 137.5 4.0 141.0
1767 1771 5 Docke/Dokke/Prins Dock/Prins Dokke 4 4 8 24 12 28 5.6 190.0 2.4 230.0
1749 1749 1 Prins Duck Wil 8 8 8 8 8.0 137.5 8.0 48.0
1770 1770 1 Doende 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1767 1 Doffij Markedoor 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1764 1764 1 Dolphin 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Dokkoe 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1773 1773 1 Prins Faaten Gomma 2 19 2 19 19.0 35.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1770 2 Prins Famel/Prins Famele/Prins Famell/Prins Famile 7 8 7 8 4.0 253.5 3.5 157.0
1757 1757 1 Prins Feck 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1768 2 Prins Ferdinand/Prins Fernand 10 19 10 19 9.5 111.0 5.0 108.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Ferenk Makolla/Prins Frenk Makolla 10 16 10 16 16.0 53.0 10.0 30.5
1767 1768 2 Fam Koning 7 11 7 11 5.5 193.0 3.5 157.0
1762 1762 1 Femmen 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1764 1765 2 Ferdenart 9 9 9 9 4.5 225.5 4.5 123.5
1757 1758 2 Fernande 3 6 3 6 3.0 310.5 1.5 342.0
1767 1767 1 Fernande Poo 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1759 1759 1 Flink/Frink 5 6 5 6 6.0 177.0 5.0 108.0
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1774 1774 1 Foema Candie 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1768 2 Foete Tatie 10 11 10 11 5.5 193.0 5.0 108.0
1757 1757 1 Fooarij 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1766 1766 1 Fouke Combij Pollo Matamba/Mafouke Combij Pollo Matamba 4 4 4 4 4.0 253.5 4.0 141.0
1767 1767 1 Frange Bange/Franke Banges 2 3 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1764 2 Frank Cabenda/Franke Kabende 3 3 3 3 1.5 452.5 1.5 342.0
1764 1767 2 Franke 4 4 4 4 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1766 1767 2 Geele Prins 4 4 4 4 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1762 1 Gerst 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1770 2 Goblet 2 2 4 18 6 20 10.0 107.0 3.0 188.0
1764 1767 3 Goevermier Antonie/Goeverneur Antonie/Governuer Antonin/Gouverneur Anthonij 13 13 13 13 4.3 231.0 4.3 129.5
1772 1774 3 Gomma Konings Zoen/Gomma Koning Zoon 12 44 12 44 14.7 61.5 4.0 141.0
1759 1759 1 Gouverneur Mapello/Gouverneur Mappello 8 16 8 16 16.0 53.0 8.0 48.0
1757 1759 2 Gouverneur Matendo/Governeur Matinde/Governeur Mattendo 3 4 3 4 2.0 396.5 1.5 342.0
1757 1757 1 Gouverneur Matimo/Gouverneur Matimongoo/Governeur Mattimomongo/Gouverneur Mattimongo/Gouverneur Mattimongoo6 11 6 11 11.0 94.0 6.0 83.0
1749 1749 1 Gouverneur Minne Baanse 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1755 1 Goveneur Cabende 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1762 1762 1 Groot Markez Dick 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Guine Mattiemba 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Im Arij/Imarij 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1757 1757 1 Immi Webbens 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Prins Gillo 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Prins Jakob 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1757 4 Jan/Prins Jan 15 15 15 15 3.8 275.0 3.8 151.5
1759 1759 1 Invensie Congo 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1757 1757 1 Jaas Koningzoon 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1767 3 Jan Alfet/Jan Alfret/Jan Alphet/Jan Alttet 10 10 10 10 3.3 284.0 3.3 163.0
1764 1769 3 Jan Amsterdam 4 8 4 8 2.7 337.0 1.3 351.0
1749 1765 5 Jan Arij/Janarij 37 41 37 41 8.2 131.0 7.4 58.0
1762 1770 3 Jan Baarents/Jan Baarns/Jan Barentz 46 59 46 59 19.7 33.0 15.3 9.0
1759 1759 1 Jan Bien Opsteeker/Jan Bier Opsteeker 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1774 5 Jan Binda/Jan Cabende/Jan Cabinda 27 36 27 36 7.2 145.5 5.4 95.5
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1770 1770 1 Jan Blanco 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Jan Bordt 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1769 1770 2 Jan Broer 11 11 4 11 15 22 11.0 94.0 7.5 56.0
1764 1772 5 Jan Cato/Jan Catoo/Jan Catto 29 36 29 36 7.2 145.5 5.8 92.0
1770 1770 1 Jan Claas Timbongo 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1771 5 Jan Claase/Jan Clase/Jan Clasen/Jan Klaafe/Jan Klaase/Jan Klaasen/Jan Klaasfe/Jan Klase/Jan Klasen/Jan Klassen/Prins Jan Claas/Prins Jan Classen63 107 1 3 64 110 22.0 24.0 12.8 18.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Jan Claas Malembo 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Jan Coffij/Jan Koffij 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1770 5 Jan Coni/Jan Conij/Jan Connij/Jan Conni/Jan Cooni/Jan coonij/Prins Jan Coni 30 32 10 23 40 55 11.0 94.0 8.0 48.0
1759 1759 1 Jan Flink 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1769 1 Jan Groer 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Jan Holvoet 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1768 1768 1 Jan Hout 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Jan Janse Mavongoo/Jong Janse Mavongo/Jonge Janse Mavongo 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1769 1769 1 Jan Jelimbe 4 5 4 5 5.0 208.0 4.0 141.0
1767 1767 1 Jan Kiel 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Jan Koening/Jan Koning 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1764 1776 4 Jan Lazare/Jan Lesaar/Jan Lezaar/Jan Loesaav 15 20 2 17 17 37 9.3 115.0 4.3 131.0
1770 1770 1 Jan Letto 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1771 2 Jan Luemba/Jan Malemba/Jan Salemba 7 9 3 7 10 16 8.0 137.5 5.0 108.0
1772 1772 1 Jan Mamkakka 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Jan Mateello/Jan Mateijl la 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1749 1 Jan Minnebal 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Jan Matitenbie 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Jan Otte 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1764 3 Jan Prins 18 20 8 8 26 28 9.3 113.0 8.7 41.5
1769 1774 3 Jan Zwart 18 32 3 10 21 42 14.0 67.5 7.0 67.0
1774 1774 1 Jan Zwarte Toto 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1758 3 Prins Jansen 5 15 5 15 5.0 208.0 1.7 332.0
1759 1765 2 Jeck Bord/Jeck Bordt 4 9 4 9 4.5 225.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1769 1 Jeck Jimike 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1776 2 Jeck Koining/Jeck Koning 2 6 2 6 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
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1774 1774 1 Jeck Koning Malemba 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Jeck Mafoeke 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1765 1772 5 Jeck Magova/Jeck Mangove/Prins Jeck Magova/Prins Jeck Mangove 38 62 38 62 12.4 82.0 7.6 53.5
1772 1772 1 Prins Jes Mamtunie 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1776 2 Jeck Masolla/Jeck Mazola 2 6 2 6 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1766 5 Jek/Prins Jeck/Jek Prins 35 52 1 2 36 54 10.8 100.0 7.2 60.0
1762 1762 1 Jek Konning Linste 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1762 1 Jek Zien Gaa 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Jelle Magove 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1759 3 Jem Arij/Jemmie Arij/Jemmij Arij/Jim Arij 12 12 12 12 4.0 253.5 4.0 141.0
1759 1759 1 Jemmie Koffij/Jemmij Koffij 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1768 1770 2 Jhms Claas/Jimi Claaijs/Jims Claas 5 9 5 9 4.5 225.5 2.5 223.0
1767 1767 1 Jim Baatie/Jim Battie 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1767 1770 3 Jimbi/Jmbie 3 3 3 3 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 Jimbo Labelle 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Jimie Jars 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1758 2 Jimmi Ammetton 5 16 5 16 8.0 137.5 2.5 223.0
1755 1755 1 Jimmidood 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1767 1767 1 Jo Monebee 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1764 4 Joarij/Joo Arij/Jou Arij 49 54 49 54 13.5 71.5 12.3 20.0
1774 1774 1 Joel Maze 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1767 2 Jon Croos/Jong Croos 5 6 5 6 3.0 310.5 2.5 223.0
1749 1759 2 Jong Jan Arij/Jonge Jan Arij 5 8 5 8 4.0 253.5 2.5 223.0
1759 1759 1 Jong Marck David/Jongmarck David 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1774 1774 1 Jong Matitentie 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Jong Tom Ellefutte 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Jong Tom Sito 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1767 1 Jonge Bondes 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1749 1 Jonge Captijn Moor 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1767 4 Jonge Claaijs/Jonge Claas/Jonge Klaas 11 19 11 19 4.8 220.0 2.8 211.0
1749 1765 3 Jonge Coffij/Jonge Koffij 26 28 26 28 9.3 113.0 8.7 41.5
1762 1762 1 Jonge Dik 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
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1767 1767 1 Jonge Fernandes 5 6 5 6 6.0 177.0 5.0 108.0
1758 1758 1 Jonge Franke 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Jonge Gouari Maronge 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Jonge Jan 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Jonge Jan Coffij 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Jonge Jeck 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1758 1767 2 Jonge Madeke/Jonge Mafoeke 6 7 6 7 3.5 280.0 3.0 188.0
1749 1749 1 Jonge Marki 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Jonge Mattjentje 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Jonge Minnebel 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1770 1 Jonge Monnebanse 9 12 9 12 12.0 83.5 9.0 37.5
1749 1749 1 Jonge Pieter 13 13 13 13 13.0 77.5 13.0 16.5
1764 1764 1 Jonge Was 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Jonge Windt/Jonge Wint 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1749 1749 1 Jonge Wint Hondt 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1762 1 Jos Sien Gaa 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1770 2 Joubert/Prins Joubent/Prins Joubert 5 5 1 2 6 7 3.5 280.0 3.0 188.0
1771 1771 1 Prins Jmbico 7 12 5 14 12 26 26.0 16.0 12.0 22.5
1774 1774 1 Kamboekn 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Kandie 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1776 1776 1 Kapieta Juba 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1770 1772 2 Katte Quande/Kotte Quande 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 King markedoor 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 King Pombe Jobbe 2 2 1 5 3 7 7.0 154.5 3.0 188.0
1762 1762 1 Klaas de Lozie/Klaas Lozij 5 5 5 5 5.0 208.0 5.0 108.0
1755 1755 1 Kleijn Klaasje 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Kleijn Mapotika 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Kocks Maat 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Koffij Calientje 1 9 1 9 9.0 120.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Koffij Tatij 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1762 1764 2 Kok Tate 4 4 4 4 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1759 1 Kokke Labonse 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
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1759 1759 1 koks maedt 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1757 1 Kollenbin Koning Zoon 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1768 3 Koning 21 32 21 32 10.7 101.0 7.0 67.0
1762 1764 2 Koning Elingstel 8 8 8 8 4.0 253.5 4.0 141.0
1757 1757 1 Koning Jon 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1758 2 Koning Stolck 6 22 6 22 11.0 94.0 3.0 188.0
1772 1774 2 Konings markedoor/Konings Maridoor 4 34 4 34 17.0 46.5 2.0 280.0
1766 1766 1 Kotte Kwande voor de Koning 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1768 2 Krins Cabinda 1 1 1 1 0.5 591.5 0.5 590.5
1770 1770 1 Krins Koning 4 5 4 5 5.0 208.0 4.0 141.0
1769 1769 1 Labeer 1 2 1 1 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1774 1774 1 Label dongo 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Lakela 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1762 5 Lange Jan 24 30 1 3 25 33 6.6 163.0 5.0 108.0
1762 1762 1 Lange Jan Kok 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1764 1764 1 Lange Jan Poffe 3 4 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1771 1771 1 Lange Piet 11 12 3 8 14 20 20.0 30.0 14.0 13.0
1757 1757 1 Lange Pieter 2 8 2 8 8.0 137.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1762 1 Lange Vees 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1772 2 Lavena de Losai Jong/Loemba de Losie Jong 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Le Veine de Jonge 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Lende 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Libelle Doengo/Liebelle Doengo 3 4 2 5 5 9 9.0 120.5 5.0 108.0
1767 1767 1 Lobbe Claaijs 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1772 1774 2 Logie Jongen/Logie Jongens/Loosie Jongen/Lossie Jogen 3 14 6 55 9 69 34.5 9.0 4.5 123.5
1776 1776 1 Loheemba Lokaijje 1 6 1 6 6.0 177.0 1.0 470.5
1758 1762 2 London/Prins Londen 5 8 5 8 4.0 253.5 2.5 223.0
1749 1749 1 Longe Jan Arij 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Longom Bakkes 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Lowij 7 7 7 7 7.0 154.5 7.0 67.0
1769 1769 1 Prins L Dock 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Prins Laas 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
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1774 1774 1 Prins Laden 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Langro 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1769 1 Prins Linga/Prins Lingo 5 6 1 2 6 8 8.0 137.5 6.0 83.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Lonne Mojombe 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 M____ M_____ 1 16 1 16 16.0 53.0 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Maaster Braams 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Mabanse 36 36 36 36 36.0 6.5 36.0 3.0
1757 1759 2 Mabialla/Mabijalla 2 2 3 6 5 8 4.0 253.5 2.5 223.0
1757 1774 4 Maboba/Maboeba/Maboeba/Maboek/Maboeka/Maboeke/Prins Maboeke/Prins Maboeken/Prins Maboke/Prins Mabuka43 72 43 72 18.0 39.5 10.8 28.0
1774 1774 1 Maboeki Rowaan 1 6 1 6 6.0 177.0 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Maboeki Wabba 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Mabonda de Peer 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Mabuma Viensa/Mabuma Viensa Konings Zoon 2 18 2 18 18.0 39.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 Macos Melonge 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1770 2 Prins Mabaka/Prins Mabake 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1774 2 Prins Mabeijl la/Prins Mabeilla/Prins Mabieele 3 8 3 8 4.0 253.5 1.5 342.0
1767 1768 2 Prins Mabjere/Prins Majere 7 11 7 11 5.5 193.0 3.5 157.0
1759 1759 1 Prins Mabokeras 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1757 1759 3 Prins Mabotte 7 13 7 13 4.3 231.0 2.3 231.0
1767 1776 4 Prins Macolle/Prins Makolla/Prins Makossa/Prins Makosse 20 140 20 140 35.0 8.0 5.0 108.0
1765 1773 6 Prins Macosse Mamobij/Prins Makossa Mambua/Prins Makossa Mamubo/Prins Makosse Mamoba/Makassa Memba/Makosse Mamoeba/Prins Mekassa Mamba44 87 44 87 14.5 63.0 7.3 59.0
1759 1772 2 Prins Maeoangelo/Malowango/Mowango/Prins Mawangelo/Prins Monwango 10 23 10 23 11.5 86.5 5.0 108.0
1759 1759 1 Prins Mag wangese 20 20 20 20 20.0 30.0 20.0 7.0
1771 1771 1 Maffoeque Emanuel/Mafoeque Emamice/Mafoeque Emanuel/Mafoeke Emanuel 9 11 3 8 12 19 19.0 35.5 12.0 22.5
1759 1771 5 Maffoeque Robbin/Mafoek Robijn/Mafoeke Robben/Mafoeke Robijn/Mafoeke Robin/Mafoeque Robbin/Mafoeque Rotter/Maphuka Robben 29 48 9 28 38 76 15.2 58.0 7.6 53.5
1755 1776 9 Mafoe Bliem/Mafoeke Blienboo/Mafoeke Bliem/Mafoeke Bliembo/Mafoeke Blienbo/Mafoeken Blienboo/Mafoeke Blim/Mafoeke Blimbo/Mavoeke Blinbo/Mafoeke Cliem/Mafoeken Bliem/Mafouke Blimbo/Maphaka Blimba/Maphuka Blimba83 195 83 195 21.7 26.0 9.2 34.0
1769 1769 1 Mafoek Calli 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1759 1 Mafoeke Boosman 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1767 1767 1 Mafoeke Canties 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1774 3 Mafoeke Claas/Mafoeke Klaas/Mafongo Claas 25 108 25 108 36.0 6.5 8.3 43.0
1757 1757 1 Mafoeke Cousin 1 3 3 6 4 9 9.0 120.5 4.0 141.0
1758 1762 2 Mafoeke Deijk/ Mafoeke Dik 5 9 5 9 4.5 225.5 2.5 223.0
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1762 1767 4 Mafoeke Fabba/Mafoeke Fabbaa/Mafouke Saba/Mafouke Vaba/Maphaka Vaba 48 75 48 75 18.8 37.0 12.0 22.5
1762 1762 1 Mafoeke Kobbole/Mafoeke Kobele/Mafoeke Koebel/Mafoeke Koebela/Mafoeke Koebele/Mafoeke Koebeloe/Mafoeke Koebole39 39 39 39 39.0 5.0 39.0 1.0
1762 1776 3 Mafoeke Koembie/Mafoeke Kombij/Maphuka Koembie 21 30 21 30 10.0 107.0 7.0 67.0
1749 1749 1 Mafoeke Louwango 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1771 8 Prins Majelle/Prins Mapello/Prins Matiella/Prins Matijella/Prins Matijello/Prins Matjeele/Prins Matjel/Prins Matjela/Prins Matjele/Prins Matjelle/Prins Matjello/Prins Matjeole/Prins Mattelle/Prins Mattjele/Prins Mattjelle75 141 75 141 17.6 42.0 9.4 33.0
1749 1771 4 Prins Majobo/Prins Majombe/Prins Majompe/Prins Man Jobba/Prins Mapompe/Prins Majombe 8 8 1 2 9 10 2.5 340.0 2.3 232.0
1749 1776 4 Prins Makaaije/Prins Makaij/PrinsMakaijje/Prins Makaik/Prins Makaje 7 18 7 18 4.5 225.5 1.8 328.5
1773 1773 1 Prins Malingen 1 7 1 7 7.0 154.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Mamamiensa 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Mame Makossa 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Prins Mandezete 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1768 1768 1 Prins Mane Loeketas 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Prins Manemuza 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1771 3 Mafoeke Malimbe/Mafoeke Melemme/Mafoeque Malemba 10 17 10 17 5.7 189.0 3.3 163.0
1769 1774 3 Mafoeke Tate 8 30 8 30 10.0 107.0 2.7 213.5
1767 1767 1 Mafoeke Wis 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1771 8 Mafoeke/Maffongo/Mafongoo/Makoeke/Maphaka 111 153 5 7 116 160 20.0 30.0 14.5 10.0
1773 1773 1 Mafoeken Pollen 4 20 4 20 20.0 30.0 4.0 141.0
1770 1773 3 Mafoeken Wabben/Maphaka Waba/Mapheika Waba 6 14 6 14 4.7 221.0 2.0 280.0
1771 1771 1 Mafoeque Fammer 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Maphaka Mabaka 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Maphuka Manuel 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Maphuka Pesso 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Maphuka Pieter 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Maphuka Tom Pollo/Mphuka Tom Pollo 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1762 1762 1 Magoff Mafoeke 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1771 2 Magoffe Dick/Magove Diek 7 17 3 10 10 27 13.5 71.5 5.0 108.0
1764 1774 3 Magova 68 70 1 3 69 73 24.3 20.0 23.0 4.5
1771 1774 2 Magova Claas/Magove Klaas 7 18 2 5 9 23 11.5 86.5 4.5 123.5
1774 1774 1 Magova Jns Konings Vaerp 1 3 1 3 3.0 253.5 1.0 342.0
1772 1774 2 Magova Makaaija/Magova Prins Makaijia/Magove van Makaaije 3 8 3 8 4.0 253.5 1.5 342.0
1771 1771 1 Magove Koning 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
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1766 1766 1 Majem Poketa 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Majimba Claas 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1774 1774 1 Makaaija 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1773 1773 1 Makaijen van Magoven 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Makakka Basa 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1776 1776 1 Makalleman 1 8 1 8 8.0 137.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Makelaer Bokse 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1774 1774 1 Makembe Biko/Makembe em Beike 2 3 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1759 1 Makka Mamoeba 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Makoffa Gubec/Makossa Gublu 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1772 1772 1 Makossa Mamima 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1764 1776 6 Makossa/Makosso/Prins Mkosse 3 12 3 12 2.0 396.5 0.5 590.5
1771 1771 1 Makosse Koning 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1759 2 Malemba/Malembo 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Malieenlu 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1769 1 Malkadoor Malondu 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1768 2 Maloende Masenje/Maloende Masentie 3 4 3 4 2.0 396.5 1.5 342.0
1769 1774 3 Prins Mangoeve/Prins Mavoenge/Prins Magoeoe 9 77 9 77 25.7 18.0 3.0 188.0
1770 1770 1 Mamabele P  Was/Mamebele Prins Was 3 4 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1770 1770 1 Mamebaanse Tom Pollo/Mamebaca se Tom Pollo/Mamebaense Tom Pollo/Memibaense Tom Pollo5 7 5 7 7.0 154.5 5.0 108.0
1764 1774 5 Mamebaanse/Mannebaanse/Mannebanse 7 12 7 12 2.4 343.0 1.4 350.0
1772 1772 1 Mamebanse Prins Was 5 8 5 8 8.0 137.5 5.0 108.0
1774 1774 1 Mamebeelei 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Mamebele op Malemba 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 Mamoeba 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1772 1772 1 Mamtette Lolmba 2 10 2 10 10.0 107.0 2.0 280.0
1749 1764 2 Manboeke 3 4 3 4 2.0 396.5 1.5 342.0
1767 1767 1 Manepoeketa Majobo 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1764 3 Mangoffe/Mangoffet 38 44 38 44 14.7 61.5 12.7 19.0
1762 1762 1 Mangoffee Mafoeke 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1773 1773 1 Mangooven van de Kooning 1 7 1 7 7.0 154.5 1.0 470.5
1776 1776 1 Manka Masasie 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
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1770 1770 1 Mankaka Mangonge Keela 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Mankakka Mangonse 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Manko 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Manne Beele/Mannebeele 2 2 1 2 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1749 1774 3 Mannetattie/Mantijntje 2 6 2 6 2.0 396.5 0.7 589.0
1774 1774 1 Manteve 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1776 5 Prins Maponda/Prins Maponde 20 134 20 134 26.8 14.0 4.0 141.0
1759 1759 1 Prins Mapoteko/Prins Mapotika 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1759 1759 1 Prins Matempe 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1771 1771 1 Prins Mavoege/Prins Mavoenge 7 18 7 18 18.0 39.5 7.0 67.0
1757 1774 7 Manuel/Manuwel/Manuwell/Prins Manuel 40 159 2 11 42 170 24.3 21.0 6.0 83.0
1776 1776 1 Mapoete Masumboe 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Mapotika Doffijn 11 11 11 11 11.0 94.0 11.0 26.5
1776 1776 1 Maquebo 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Maqueebba Mambba 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 Marbeule 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Marke Davut 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1773 1773 1 Markedoor Koning Zoon 2 13 2 13 13.0 77.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1776 5 Marcadoor/Markesoor/Markidoor/Markodoor 13 43 13 43 8.6 127.0 2.6 216.0
1772 1772 1 Markidon van de Koning/Markidoor van de Koning 3 13 3 13 13.0 77.5 3.0 188.0
1770 1770 1 Markie 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1764 1765 2 Marollo Apollo/Mazollo Apollo 5 11 5 11 5.5 193.0 2.5 223.0
1771 1771 1 Masanse 2 30 2 30 30.0 11.5 2.0 280.0
1776 1776 1 Masoengoe Matoenove 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Masola Koning Zoen 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1765 1765 1 Masoola/Mazola 5 5 5 5 5.0 208.0 5.0 108.0
1749 1771 10 Mat Intje/Mateelentee/Matieentie/Matientie/Matiijnie/Matijenije/Matijnje/Matijntje/Matinie/Matinje/Matj Intie/Matjenje/Matjentie/Matjinje/Matjintje/Matjnie/Mattijnje/Mattintje/Mattjentje/Mattjnie169 364 8 27 177 391 39.1 4.0 17.7 8.0
1762 1762 1 Matientie Lato/Matjenje Lato/Matjinje Lato/Mattjenje Lato 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1769 1769 1 Matientje Andries 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1757 1 Matintje Konings zoon 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Matitentie Bieko 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Matitentie Retoer 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
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1774 1774 1 Matongo Claas 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Matotte 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Mattintie van Mangoeve 2 9 2 9 9.0 120.5 2.0 280.0
1771 1771 1 Mattjentje Dokke 1 1 1 2 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1776 1776 1 MeGaart 1 6 1 6 6.0 177.0 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Melonde Malos/Melonde Melos/Melonge Macos 9 9 9 9 9.0 120.5 9.0 37.5
1770 1770 1 Melonde Maros Latoes/Milonde Markos Latoes 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1771 1771 1 Mil Waal 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1773 5 Minne belle/Minnen Belle/Moenbellen/Moenebele/Moenebellen/Moenebule/Moinibuli/Monbelle/Monebella/Monna Bella/Monnebeele/Monnebella/Monnebelle17 65 17 65 13.0 77.5 3.4 161.0
1755 1774 10 Minnen banse/Monebanse/Monnebaanse/Monnebanse/Monnebense/Monnen Banse/Monneb/Mannebanse66 130 5 11 71 141 14.1 64.0 7.1 61.0
1769 1771 3 Moenbank/Moenebank 6 58 6 58 19.3 34.0 2.0 280.0
1776 1776 1 Moenebatje 2 7 2 7 7.0 154.5 2.0 280.0
1773 1773 1 Moenematta Konings Caffe Cier 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1771 1776 3 Moenemoensoe/Prins Moenemoensoe 8 48 8 48 16.0 53.0 2.7 213.5
1773 1773 1 Moenemoese Eerste Jonge/Moenemsensen eerste Logie Jonge 4 29 4 29 29.0 13.0 4.0 141.0
1773 1773 1 Monebanse Coning Zoon 1 8 1 8 8.0 137.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1768 2 Monebee Maboek 6 10 6 10 5.0 208.0 3.0 188.0
1769 1770 2 Monnebanse Laton/Monnebase Laton 15 17 15 17 8.5 129.0 7.5 56.0
1769 1770 2 Monnebelle Joba 5 5 5 5 2.5 340.0 2.5 223.0
1770 1770 1 Monso 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Montette 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Net Arij/Nett Arij 8 8 8 8 8.0 137.5 8.0 48.0
1768 1768 1 Nite Claaijs 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1764 1764 1 Onse Coffij/Onse Koffij/Onso Coffij 3 4 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1749 1749 1 Oud Coffij/Oude Coffij/Oudt Coffij 8 8 8 8 8.0 137.5 8.0 48.0
1749 1749 1 Oud Lang Jan/Oude Lange Jan/Oudt Lange Jan 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1770 1770 1 Oud London 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Oude Franck/Oude Frank/Oudt Franck 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1749 1749 1 Oude Nett Arij 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 P Magova 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 P Majimma Ingous 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Pacsent 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
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1767 1768 2 Prins Parrij 10 12 10 12 6.0 177.0 5.0 108.0
1762 1762 1 Paarendoeke 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Pains Lingo 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Paketapo 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Pakkeza 2 3 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1759 1 Pam Copte 1 1 1 1 1.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Pam Pollo 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1758 2 Pampje 4 13 4 13 6.5 164.5 2.0 280.0
1776 1776 1 Pansoe Laamboe 1 10 1 10 10.0 107.0 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Passanttte Pollo 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1774 2 Pattei/Pattie 2 7 2 7 3.5 280.0 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Pattie Magovas Zoen 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1773 1773 1 Pattimbongo van magoven 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1749 1765 5 Peero Malemba/Piero Malemba/Pierro Malembo/PierroMalemba 27 27 27 27 5.4 196.0 5.4 95.5
1757 1758 2 Peero Matintje/Peerro Matintje/Pero Matingje/PerooMatintje 4 9 4 9 4.5 225.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1759 2 Peter Griffij/Pieter Griffijn 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Peter Makossa/Pieter Makosse 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1770 1770 1 Pieketa Loende 2 5 2 5 5.0 208.0 2.0 280.0
1770 1776 4 Pieketa Pee/Pieketapo/Pieketee/Pieketie 14 70 14 70 17.5 43.5 3.5 157.0
1769 1769 1 Pierro 1 1 1 2 2 3 3.0 310.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1770 2 Pierro Magoffe 7 7 7 7 3.5 280.0 3.5 157.0
1762 1774 6 Pieter/ Prins Pieter  19 55 1 1 20 56 9.3 113.0 3.3 163.0
1749 1749 1 Pieter Ampole 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Pieter Andoensie 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1764 1764 1 Pieter Apollo/Pieter Apolloo 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1749 1 Pieter Cabende 9 9 9 9 9.0 120.5 9.0 37.5
1759 1759 1 Pieter Cinci 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1770 1 Pieter Claas/Pieter Classen/Pieter Claaven/Prins Pieter Claas 11 18 11 18 18.0 39.5 11.0 26.5
1749 1749 1 Pieter Coffij 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1764 1767 2 Pieter Donk 5 5 5 5 2.5 340.0 2.5 223.0
1758 1758 1 Pieter Eaasse 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Pieter Goebu 1 7 1 7 7.0 154.5 1.0 470.5
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1759 1759 1 Pieter Insonie 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1759 1 Pieter Jamboeka 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Pieter Jansen 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1766 1772 3 Prins Pieter Joens/Prins Pieter Johns 3 4 3 4 1.3 456.0 1.0 470.5
1770 1774 3 Prins Polle/Prins Pollo 4 6 2 6 6 12 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1769 1769 1 Prins Present 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1767 2 Pieter Jonboke 7 8 7 8 4.0 253.5 3.5 157.0
1757 1759 2 Pieter King/Pieter Koning 6 6 6 6 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1762 1762 1 Pieter Klaas Dominee 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Pieter Lowange 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1770 2 Pieter Macaaij/Pieter Maraaij 5 5 1 4 6 9 4.5 225.5 3.0 188.0
1767 1767 1 Pieter Malembe 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1759 2 Pieter Marka door/Pieter Markadoor/Pieter Markedoor 28 30 28 30 15.0 59.5 14.0 13.0
1767 1767 1 Pieter Markedoor oud Mannebaanse 3 4 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1759 1773 4 Pieter Mavonge/Pieter Mavongo/Prins Pieter Mavongo 16 28 16 28 7.0 154.5 4.0 141.0
1762 1762 1 Pieter Pasep/Pieter Pasop 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1774 1774 1 Pieter Porttie 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Pieter Sinboeke 7 7 7 7 7.0 154.5 7.0 67.0
1749 1749 1 Pieter Zwart 4 4 4 4 4.0 253.5 4.0 141.0
1772 1772 1 Pikett de Losi Jong 6 13 6 13 13.0 77.5 6.0 83.0
1759 1759 1 Po 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Po Alie 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Po Jinbo Lowange 14 14 14 14 14.0 67.5 14.0 13.0
1759 1759 1 Poaw 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1776 1776 1 Polle Boeka 1 5 1 5 5.0 208.0 1.0 470.5
1776 1776 1 Polle Markedoor 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Ponge Madeke 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Pouw 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1771 1771 1 Prina Matioa 1 16 1 16 16.0 53.0 1.0 470.5
1767 1767 1 Princes Meningo 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1767 1 Prinisse Moijmalil le 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Memmienso 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
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1764 1764 1 Prins Monteffe 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Mooije 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Prinses Mamtevi/Prinses Mamtevie/Princes Mamtivis/Prinses Mamtuva/Prinses Mantevie 7 26 7 26 26.0 16.0 7.0 67.0
1774 1774 1 Puket/Puketa/Puketapo/Puketie 5 17 5 17 17.0 46.5 5.0 108.0
1767 1767 1 Quibon 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1771 3 Quini Matienije/Quinie Mattjente 11 11 1 4 12 15 5.0 208.0 4.0 141.0
1762 1762 1 Qwienda Mangoff 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1757 1 Robben/Prins Robben 2 7 2 7 7.0 154.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1758 2 Robben de Winter 4 22 4 22 11.0 94.0 2.0 280.0
1755 1755 1 Robbert Jan 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1749 1749 1 Roben Gangomsinga 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Rode Logi Jong 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1765 2 Rotterdam 7 7 7 7 3.5 280.0 3.5 157.0
1774 1774 1 Prins Sam 1 9 1 9 9.0 120.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1769 1 Prins Sambo 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1770 2 Prins Sangron 2 2 2 2 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Sakela Logi Jong 1 3 1 3 3.0 310.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Sakkela 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1774 4 Sam Claas/Sambo Klaas/SamboKlaase/Samboo Klase/Prins Sambo Klaas 7 8 7 8 2.0 396.5 1.8 328.5
1770 1770 1 Sambij 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Sangela Loeet 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Sangeloe 1 6 1 6 6.0 177.0 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Sarsant/Sersant 3 4 3 4 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
1770 1770 1 Se nomba de Lasie Jong 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Sierke Laarde/Sierke Larde 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1749 1749 1 Sim Pokote 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1769 1769 1 Siclander 6 6 6 6 6.0 177.0 6.0 83.0
1770 1770 1 So Nemba Em Bakke 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1762 2 Soe Belle/Soebelle/Zoebellaa 3 3 3 3 1.5 452.5 1.5 342.0
1774 1774 1 Sonaka Jompo 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1769 1 Sorme Maijomba/Prins Sonne Majomb 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1767 1767 1 Prins Taffij 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
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1772 1772 1 Prins Tam Maponda 2 17 2 17 17.0 46.5 2.0 280.0
1774 1774 1 Prins Tate Gomma 1 7 1 7 7.0 154.5 1.0 470.5
1774 1774 1 Tam Beelei/Tam Beelie/Tam Belie 3 24 3 24 24.0 22.0 3.0 188.0
1772 1774 2 Tam Pollo/Tam Polloo 9 33 9 33 16.5 49.0 4.5 123.5
1755 1776 7 Tate/Prins Tate 34 43 4 6 38 49 7.0 154.5 5.4 94.0
1765 1765 1 Tate Lemboeba 4 4 4 4 4.0 253.5 4.0 141.0
1764 1765 2 Tate Mafoek/Tate Mafoeke 18 23 18 23 11.5 86.5 9.0 37.5
1766 1767 2 Tate Mafouke Sijn Broer/Tate Mafouke Zijn Broer 4 5 4 5 2.5 340.0 2.0 280.0
1766 1766 1 Tate Mafouke Zoon 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1766 1766 1 Tate Mandgove Zijn Jonge 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1776 1 Tate Wabbe/Tatie Waba 3 13 3 13 13.0 77.5 3.0 188.0
1770 1770 1 Tatte Commandor 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Tattie 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1762 1762 1 Tek Koning Lingste 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1767 7 Prins Thom/Prins Tom/Prinstom 264 368 2 6 266 374 53.4 2.0 38.0 2.0
1771 1771 1 Prins Titte 5 7 1 2 6 9 9.0 120.5 6.0 83.0
1766 1767 2 Prins Tom Brib Mannebaanse/Prins Tom Crib Mannebaanse 8 11 1 1 9 12 6.0 177.0 4.5 123.5
1757 1764 3 Prins Tom Coffij/Tom Koffie 8 9 8 9 3.0 310.5 2.7 213.5
1764 1764 1 Prins Tom Crib/Prins Tom Krib 23 41 23 41 41.0 3.0 23.0 4.5
1762 1762 1 Tek Koning Tolk 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1772 1772 1 Them Pattie 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1749 1 Thom Vrijman 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1771 1771 1 Tiecaja/Tjecaja 7 7 7 7 7.0 154.5 7.0 67.0
1770 1770 1 Tieeentie Loemba/Tienttie Lomba 2 4 2 4 4.0 253.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 Tijimpattie Magovaa-doen 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1774 4 Tim Candie/Timcandie 13 87 13 87 21.8 25.0 3.3 165.0
1776 1776 1 Timpansoe 2 10 2 10 10.0 107.0 2.0 280.0
1771 1771 1 Timpattie 1 11 1 11 11.0 94.0 1.0 470.5
1774 1776 2 Timpolle 20 120 20 120 60.0 1.0 10.0 30.5
1776 1776 1 Tincosse/Tinkosse 5 33 5 33 33.0 10.0 5.0 108.0
1755 1762 4 Tom Aarij/Tom Arij/Tomaij/Tomarij 48 53 48 53 13.3 73.0 12.0 22.5
1762 1767 4 Tom Apollo/Tom Apolloo 12 16 12 16 4.0 253.5 3.0 188.0
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1771 1771 1 Tom Beele 6 10 1 3 7 13 13.0 77.5 7.0 67.0
1764 1764 1 Tom BeJonge 8 11 8 11 11.0 94.0 8.0 48.0
1764 1776 3 Tom Bonge/Tom Bongoe/Tom Bouges 9 11 9 11 3.7 276.0 3.0 188.0
1767 1767 1 Tom Fernandes 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Tom Fombij 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1762 1762 1 Tom Gem 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1755 1755 1 Tom Governeur Cabende 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1759 1759 1 Tom Governuer 5 5 5 5 5.0 208.0 5.0 108.0
1757 1759 2 Tom Grieffij/Tom Griffie/Tom Griffij/Tom Griffin 9 18 9 18 9.0 120.5 4.5 123.5
1759 1771 2 Tom Imica/Tom Jemica/Tom Jimica 20 21 20 21 10.5 102.5 10.0 30.5
1759 1766 2 Tom Jemanbe/Tom Jombie 3 3 3 3 1.5 452.5 1.5 342.0
1766 1773 3 Tom Loambe/Prins Tom Leomba/Prins Tom Liomba 5 18 5 18 6.0 177.0 1.7 332.0
1766 1773 3 Prins Tom Maponde/Prins Tom Maponden/Prins Tom Mapondo/Prins Tom Meponda 5 13 5 13 4.3 231.0 1.7 332.0
1759 1764 2 Tom Makasfo/Tom Makosse/Tom Makosso/Tom Makozoo 6 7 6 7 3.5 280.0 3.0 188.0
1764 1764 1 Tom Manboe 4 4 4 4 4.0 253.5 4.0 141.0
1764 1765 2 Tom Poffij 13 13 13 13 6.5 164.5 6.5 73.0
1762 1773 2 Tom Pollo/Tom Polloo/Tom Pollen 7 7 4 38 11 45 22.5 23.0 5.5 93.0
1759 1765 2 Tom Povre 23 23 23 23 11.5 86.5 11.5 25.0
1764 1764 1 Tom Prins 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1757 1759 2 Tom Vrijman 3 4 3 6 6 10 5.0 208.0 3.0 188.0
1759 1759 1 Tombie 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1757 1758 2 trankkiellake 3 15 3 15 7.5 144.0 1.5 342.0
1772 1772 1 Van die Losijongens 1 4 1 4 4.0 253.5 1.0 470.5
1755 1755 1 Van diverse makelaars gekogt op het verbuck 1 30 1 30 30.0 11.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Ver Nando Pieketa 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
1769 1770 2 Voerdeijn/Vordeijn 11 14 1 3 12 17 8.5 129.0 6.0 83.0
1770 1770 1 Prins Verdenando/Prins Verdinando/Prins Vernando 8 14 8 14 14.0 67.5 8.0 48.0
1755 1770 5 Prins Waba/Prins Wabbe/Prins Was 22 30 22 30 6.0 177.0 4.4 128.0
1757 1770 4 Prins Was Mamebeele 1 2 1 2 0.5 591.5 0.3 592.0
1773 1773 1 Prins Was Ondenebansen 1 14 1 14 14.0 67.5 1.0 470.5
1770 1770 1 Prins Wie Tombij 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1768 1771 4 Prins Wiel/Prins Will/Prins Wile 3 3 12 19 15 22 5.5 193.0 3.8 151.5
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1767 1770 2 Prins Wil Matombe/ Wil Tombie/Prins Wis Fombe/Prins Wit Tombe 4 4 4 4 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1773 1773 1 Prins Wille Bort Mattijentie/Prins Willeport Matientie/Prins Willebort Matijentie/Prins Willebort Mattijentie5 26 5 26 26.0 16.0 5.0 108.0
1762 1762 1 Waar Binje 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1770 1770 1 Wall 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1759 1759 1 Water Boer 1 1 1 1 1.0 523.5 1.0 470.5
1767 1768 2 Wie Gouverneur/Wis Governeur 8 9 8 9 4.5 225.5 4.0 141.0
1770 1770 1 Wie Vernando Mima 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1749 1749 1 Wil Claes/Will Claes 6 6 1 1 7 7 7.0 154.5 7.0 67.0
1764 1776 6 Wilborot/Prins Willebordt/Prins Willebort/Prins Wel boerd 10 11 10 11 1.8 449.0 1.7 332.0
1762 1762 1 Wilie Walije/Willi j Walije 2 2 2 2 2.0 396.5 2.0 280.0
1766 1767 2 Wille Loamba 4 5 4 5 2.5 340.0 2.0 280.0
1767 1767 1 Wille Teundi 4 5 4 5 5.0 208.0 4.0 141.0
1757 1758 2 Willem Mafoenge/Willem maVoenge/Willem mavoenke 5 17 5 17 8.5 129.0 2.5 223.0
1759 1759 1 Willem Toete/Willem Tote 3 3 3 3 3.0 310.5 3.0 188.0
1757 1758 2 Willem Waar 3 8 3 8 4.0 253.5 1.5 342.0
1770 1770 1 Zoen van Prins Maponde 1 2 1 2 2.0 396.5 1.0 470.5
248 
 
Appendix D: Transcription of a Letter from Leyland, Penny and Co. to Captain Charles Wilson of the 
Brig Madampookata1 
 
The Brig Madampookata sailed on the 8th of Febr[uar]y 1783 
Captn Chas Wilson       Liverpool 4 January 1783 
 
Sir 
You being appointed to the command of our Brigantine Madampookata are directed to embrace the 
first opportunity and proceed thro[ugh] the South Channel for Cabinda on the coast of Angola – make 
a large allowance for the in draft set[t]ing on the Coast of Spain of Barbary (especially at this season 
of the year) and in passing the Island Madeira keep at least by your reckoning 4º Degrees to the 
Westward of it, and in all probability you will see it – from thence steer for the Cape de Verd[e] 
Islands, and take your departure from those Islands ~ We recommend to your perusal the annext [sic] 
directions for making the quickest passage to Angola. 
If you should be so fortunate to capture any vessel from our Enemies, on this side or near the 
Latitude of Cape Finisterre, direct the Prize Master to keep well to the Westward until he gets to the 
Northward of Cape Clear, then proceed into the first safe port in Ireland, from thence immediately 
write to us, and wait our orders; but should you capture a vessel near the Latitude of Lisbon, with a 
Cargo suited for that market, give your orders to proceed there, and that we may be informed of the 
event as soon as possible – too much cannot be said as to all vessels that are, or appear to be Neutral, 
and we pray you will not meddle with them on any consideration ~ From the confidence we entertain 
of your knowledge and experience we need not be very particular in our other Instructions; yet we 
cannot avoid recommending to you to be strictly careful to guard against accidents by Fire, to be 
equally attentive to your Gun powder and Spirits, particularly where trading in Africa ~ be also 
uniformly watchful to guard against Insurrections, as they always proceed from Neglect, and will 
inevitably ruin the Voyage. 
You cannot too forcibly impress on the minds of your crew officers (who are unacquainted with the 
African Trade) how necessary it is to establish among the crew a steady uniform discipline to be duly 
careful to keep all Edge Tool and Iron from the Slaves, but above all guard against Drunkenness which 
is the source of every tumult and disorder on board, therefore when you dispose of Liquor to the 
Sailors, let it be only in small quantities at a time ~ 
                                                          
1 MS 10.47 Harold Cohen Library, Liverpool, Dumbell papers. 
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On your arrival off Cabinda, or should you first fall in with Malimba [Malemba], and find ships there, 
take care not to approach too near, until you are informed if they are Friends or Enemies – We 
apprehend you will meet with no ships at Cabinda; on your coming near the Bay anchor without in 
five Fathom, the canoes will come along beside and by them send for Prince Mambooka 
Madampookata [Mambouk], and the Mamfooka [Mafouk], acquaint them you are bound to the River 
Ammoris, and desire them to let you have a young man the son of Prince Peter Sweat for a Linguist, 
from whose assistance and Captn Lawsons’s directions you will benefit -  (We imagine at Ammoris 
you will buy slaves at 10 pieces or 12 at the most) – inform them you intend to finish your Trade on 
your return at Cabinda, at the same time make them this offer that if they will agree to give you 
prime slaves for 14 pieces with 2 or 3 pieces wages you will continue and make your whole purchase, 
nay rather give them 15 or 16 pieces, with 2 or 3 Pieces wages than go farther for we conceive what 
you’ll gain in dispatch will be adequate to the difference in price ~ you may with much propriety 
plead (being a small vessel you cannot afford to pay the same customs and presents and let the 
aforementioned gentlemen ratify such agreement ~ All this must be done before you send your Boat 
onshore ~ You will be remarkably choice in the quality of your Negroes, buy none but those that are 
in the full Bloom of youth and health, full chested, well limbed, without defect; in short you must be 
far more particular than its usual on the Windward Coast of Africa, where you have been generally 
employed a superior attention is also necessary to be paid to Angola Slaves, they being more tender 
and delicate ought to be treated accordingly ~ On their first coming on board feed them sparingly, the 
sudden change from green vegetable diet, to dry good is apt to make them costive, which the 
Surgeon must guard against ~ You’ll not fait to point out to your officers how necessary it is to be kind 
to the Slaves, to endeavour to cheer their spirits, and give them all comfort consistent with safety~ 
When you have completed your purchase proceed with a press sail for the Island St. Lucia where you 
will find Letters lodged for your Government with Messrs Gudgeon and Wildmen, follow those of the 
latest date, but if contrary to our expectations you should not meet with any letters from us, apply to 
Ducan Campbell Esq. 
If he will engage to take you up at the average of £38 Sterling certain with the benefit of Sales, Bills on 
the Sales being closed at 3,6 & 9 months, or not exceeding 6, 9 & 12 months fix with him ~ if not, then 
proceed without loss of time for Tortola, there apply to Messrs Capstick and Nelson and Messrs 
Hagart Allison and Co. at St. Thomas for Letters, put your cargo into the hands of the latter house, 
who we have a guarnte [sic] for and will give you Bills at 6, 9 & 12 months ~ If the War continues w 
hop you will average upwards of £42 Stirling, it will require all your address and management to 
procure a fair sale, for its now become too much the custom among the Factors to be both buyers & 
sellers of Slaves ~ You will receive from the House who sells the Cargo your Coast Commissions £4 at 
£104 on gross Sales (first deducting your and the Mates Privilege Slaves) with two average slaves on 
each and every hundred sold in the West Indies with £5 per month, subject to ships articles, your 
chief Mate Mr Molineaux is to have one privilege Slave, on an average with the Cargo and £4.10 per 
month, your Surgeon Mr Murray is to have £4.10 per month and head money, one Shilling currency 
on each Slave sold ~ We must likewise remark neither you, or any person on board, will be permitted 
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to buy or otherwise receive any Slave or Slaves on your or their accounts, on forfeiture of all your 
Coast Commissions and Privilege.~ 
The Madampookata in point of sailing and construction is particularly suited for the West Indies, such 
Vessels have sold for Eighteen hundred Guineas, if the War continues she will fetch a good price, 
you’ll get all you can for her and consult with the house who sells the Cargo, if they should want her 
give them the preference, if their offers are equally good to others, but do not sell her if you can’t get 
£1260 Sterling, or upwards, ~ If it should be peace and you find you cannot dispose of her, then sell 
your Water cash[e]s, plat form, boards etc. and fill her with Cotton only it being the safest remittance 
~ here we be to inform you should you sell the Vessel it must be to a person residing in the British 
West Indies and a subject of Great Britain, otherwise both you and we are liable to pay treble the 
value of the Vessel for which Bond is given, therefore you will take strict care to have a Certificate 
from the Collector of the Customs to cancel this Engagement ~ You will pray use the utmost economy 
in the Ships Disbursements in the West Indies ~ no part of the business of the Voyage marks the good 
character of an African Captain so much as this ~   We are etc. 
        Leyland, Penny and Co. 
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Appendix E: A Glossary of African Terms 
 
Bantu – A group of Sub-Saharan African languages with common characteristics, also can refer to the 
people who speak these languages. 
Kikongo - A set of dialects spoken in West Central Africa, which belonged to the larger category of 
West Bantu languages. 
Maloango – Appointed political, economic, and religious ruler or leader of the polity of Loango.  
Mangoyo/Maningoyo – Appointed political, economic, and religious ruler or leader of the polity of 
Ngoyo.  
Manikakongo - Appointed political, economic, and religious ruler or leader of the polity of Kakongo.  
Mafouk – Appointee of the Maloango, Mangoyo or Manikakongo to engage in economic affairs on his 
behalf. The primary Mafouks lived in the major ports  
Loango - Dominant Polity of the Loango Coast (1535-1650); an independent Polity in the 1700s. 
Kakongo – Polity between Loango to the north and Ngoyo to the south with a tributary relationship to 
the polity of Loango (before 1650); emerges as an Independent Polity (c. 1700). 
Ngoyo - Polity on the north bank of the Congo River a tributary relationship to the polity of Loango 
(before 1650); emerges as an Independent Polity (c. 1700). 
Vili - People lived primarily in the polity of Loango, also known as the “Foiti” or the “Muburi”. 
Muburi – The Kongo name for the Vili or for traders from the north of the Congo River including the 
Vili, Kotchi, and Woyo. 
Kotchi – People who lived primarily in the polity of Kakongo, also known as “Muburi”.  
Woyo – People who lived primarily in the polity of Ngoyo, also known as the “Muburi”. 
Mambouk – Appointee of the Mangoyo or the Manikakongo to oversee the Mafouks in Ngoyo and 
Kakongo. 
Zarry – An attempted Dutch settlement on the north bank of the Congo, or Zaire, River.                        
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